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Does the Rule of Reason Violate the
Rule of Law?
Maurice E. Stucke"
In the pastfew years, the Supreme Court has been more active in deciding
antitrust issues. The Court's choice of legal standards affects future market
behavior and the incentives for individuals and organizations to engage in
productive activity. Over the past thirty years, the Court has primarily
relied upon the rule-of-reason standard - a fact-specific inquiry into
whether a restraint of trade is "unreasonable." But despite its increased
activity, the Court never assesses the deficiencies of this standard under
rule-of-law principles. That assessment is critical. This Article analyzes
the rule-of-reason standard's significant deficiencies, and how these
deficiencies adversely affect antitrust enforcement and competition policy
generally. Because perfect compliance with rule-of-law ideals, however,
may be unobtainable and undesirable, this Article recommends several
improvements to reorient the rule of reason closer to rule-of-law ideals.
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INTRODUCTION

A "key feature of all industrial market systems," according to the
World Bank, "is a strong state that can support a formal legal system
that complements existing norms and a state that itself respects the
law and refrains from arbitrary actions."' This is especially true of
antitrust law. With clear applicable standards, market participants can
channel behavior in welfare-enhancing directions and better predict
their rivals' behavior. Clear standards reduce transaction costs, rentseeking behavior by market participants, and decision errors by the
The rule of law is part of our
antitrust agencies and courts.
"ubiquitous drive to make [our] environment more predictable, '2 itis
a precondition for effective antitrust policy, and it remains integral to
our democracy.3
1

WORLD

BANK,

WORLD

DEVELOPMENT

REPORT:

BUILDING

INSTITUTIONS

FOR

MARKETS 4 (2002); see also, J.C. Dammann & Henry Hansmann, A Global Market for
Judicial Services 11 n.18 (Univ. of Tex. Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. 98,
Yale Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 347, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=976115 (collecting other studies that functioning judiciary is important
precondition for, rather than simply consequence of, robust economic growth);
William Easterly & Ross Levine, Tropics, Germs and Crops: How Endowments Influence
Economic Development 17-18 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
9106, 2002).
2 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 14 (2005).
3 See generally D. Daniel Sokol, Order Without (Enforceable) Law: Why Countries

Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade Agreements, 83
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 231 (2008) (explaining rule of law's supporting role in antitrust
policy and economic growth). The rule of law, based on logical persuasion, displaced
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There is, however, a disturbing trend: antitrust standards are straying
from rule-of-law principles. Once hailed by President and Chief Justice
Taft as among "the most important statutes ever passed in this country,"4
the federal antitrust laws are now noteworthy for their "considerable
disadvantages."'5 In the past few years, the Court has complained about
the state of federal antitrust law. The Court decries antitrust's
"interminable litigation"6 and "inevitably costly and protracted discovery
phase," as hopelessly beyond effective judicial supervision.7 The Court
also complains that antitrust's per se illegal standard might increase
litigation costs by promoting "frivolous" suits.8 It fears the "unusually"
high risk of inconsistent results by antitrust courts.9
But who has created this predicament? The Supreme Court. Over
the past ninety years, the Court has supplied the Sherman Antitrust
Act's legal standards. In determining the legality of restraints of trade,
the Supreme Court generally employs either a per se or rule-of-reason
standard.1" Under the Court's per se illegal rule, certain restraints of
trade are deemed illegal without consideration of any defenses. These

the Furies, and a form of justice based on fear, anger and an orgy of reprisal life for
life. But Athena warned of polluting the rule of law, "foul a clear well and you will
suffer thirst ....The stronger your fear, your reverence for the just, the stronger your

country's wall and city's safety."

Aeschylus, The Eumenides, in THE ORESTEIA:

AGAMEMNON, THE LIBATION BEARERS, THE EUMENIDES 262, 262 (Robert Fagles trans.,

1984). As Aeschylus recognized, the response to fear is to reaffirm the rule of law.
Torture, on the other hand, is one sign of a "political order that has rejected the
standards and practices of democracy's revered institutions, notably in the realm of
law." KarenJ. Greenberg, Scars and Stripes, FIN. TIMES, May 31, 2008, at 19.
4 WILLIAM HowARD TAFT, THE ANTI-TRUST ACT AND THE SUPREME COURT 2 (1914).

1 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
412 (2004).
6 Id. at 414.
7 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1966, 1967 n.6 (2007) (quoting
Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995 (N.D. 111.2003));
see also

CIVIL

RULES

ADVISORY COMMITTEE,

MINUTES

32

(Nov.

8-9,

2007),

http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CVI1-2007-min.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL RULES
MINUTES] (demonstrating that court "spent some time decrying the enormous burdens
that could be imposed by [antitrust] discovery, and in doubting the possibility that
effective management of staged and focused discovery can be used to enable a plaintiff
to determine, at relatively reasonable cost to the defendants, whether information
exclusively available to the defendants can be used to supply a better preliminary fact
showing that will justify full-scale discovery and litigation").
8 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2718 (2007).
9 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383, 2395 (2007).
10 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS § 1.2, at 3-4 (2000), available at http'/www.ftc.gov/

os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter COLLABORATION GUIDELINES].
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restraints are so likely to harm competition and to lack significant
procompetitive benefits that, in the Court's estimation, "they do not
warrant the time and expense required for particularized inquiry into
their effects."" Under the per se rule, once a plaintiff proves an
agreement among competitors to engage in the prohibited conduct,
the plaintiff wins. 12 But the Court evaluates all other restraints under
the rule of reason. This standard involves a flexible factual inquiry
into a restraint's overall competitive effect and "the facts peculiar to
the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was
imposed." 13 The rule of reason also "varies in focus and detail
depending on the nature of the agreement and market
circumstances."14 "Under this rule the fact finder weighs all of the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition.""I Despite its label, the rule of reason is not a directive
defined ex ante (such as a speeding limit).16 Instead, the term
embraces antitrust's most vague and open-ended principles, making
prospective compliance with its requirements exceedingly difficult.
Much to the dismay of those who must comply with these antitrust
standards, the rule of reason has reemerged over the past thirty years at
the expense of the per se standard. Since 1977, the Court has narrowed
the scope of its per se rule. The Court overturned its per se rule for
vertical, nonprice restraints in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 17 for vertical maximum resale price maintenance ("RPM")' 8 in State
11 Id. at 3.
12 "The per se rule is the trump card of antitrust law. When an antitrust plaintiff
successfully plays it, he need only tally his score." United States v. Realty Multi-List,
Inc., 629 F.2d 1351, 1362-63 (5th Cir. 1980). Besides horizontal price-fixing and
allocation agreements, all other antitrust claims involve "rambl[ing] through the wilds
of economic theory" under the rule of reason. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972). Group boycotts and tying claims, although subject to
a per se standard, are more expansive on issues of market power and defenses. Nw.
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 293-94
(1985) (group boycotts); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 13-18
(1984); WILLIAM C. HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK §§ 2:19, 2:21 (2006).
13 Nat'l Soc'y of Prof 1 Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
14 COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 1.2, at 4. The rule of reason also
governs most monopolization claims under section 2 of the Sherman Act. See United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
15 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).
16 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescriptionto Retire the Rhetoric of "PrinciplesBased Systems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation, and Accounting, 60 VAND. L.
REv. 1411, 1418 (2007).
17 433 U.S. at 57-59. Sylvania manufactured and sold television sets. But by 1962,
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Oil Co. v. Khan,1 9 and for vertical minimum RPM in Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.2' But in shedding its earlier per se rule,

its market share of all television sets sold in the United States was only between one and
two percent. Id. at 38. Consequently, Sylvania reassessed its marketing strategy. It sold
directly to a fewer number of authorized retailers. Id. Sylvania limited the number of
franchises granted for a specific geographic location. Id. Moreover, it required each
franchisee to sell Sylvania products only in its assigned geographic territory. By 1965
Sylvania's market share increased to five percent. Id. Continental T.V., a Sylvania
retailer, complained about Sylvania allowing a new franchise one mile from Continental
T.V. Id. at 39. Other disputes arose between Continental T.V. and Sylvania.
Continental T.V. withheld payments to Sylvania. Id. at 40. Sylvania terminated
Continental T.V. as a franchise dealer and sued to recover for the money owed. Id.
Continental counterclaimed that Sylvania violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by
entering into and enforcing franchise agreements that prohibited the sale of Sylvania
products other than from a specified location. Id. The Court overruled its earlier
decision that such geographical sales restrictions imposed by a manufacturer on a
retailer (a form of a vertical nonprice restraint) are per se illegal under the Sherman Act.
Id. at 57. Instead, the Court held that these vertical, nonprice restraints should be
evaluated under its rule of reason. Id. The Court found that the economic market
impact of such vertical restraints is complex. A vertical nonprice restraint can
potentially and simultaneously reduce intrabrandcompetition (e.g., competition among
Sylvania dealers for the Sylvania brand of television sets) and stimulate interbrand
competition (e.g., competition among different manufacturers of television sets, such as
Zenith or RCA): "[W]hen interbrand competition exists, as it does among television
manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market
power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of the same
product." Id. at 52 n. 19. Nonetheless, the Court in Sylvania was careful to distinguish
its holding from another vertical restraint, namely resale price maintenance, the per se
illegality of which was established firmly for many years, and which involves
"significantly different questions of analysis and policy," reduces interbrand price
competition, and if used industry-wide might facilitate cartelization. Id. at 51 n.18.
18 Resale price maintenance ("RPM") refers to a manufacturer's or supplier's
practice of "specif[ying] the minimum (or maximum) price at which the product must
be re-sold to customers." OECD, GLOSSARY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANISATION ECONOMICS
AND COMPETITION LAw

75 (1993), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/2376087.pdf

[hereinafter OECD GLOSSARY].
19 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997). Khan entered into a contract with defendant State Oil to
lease and operate a gas station. Id. at 7. Khan could charge any retail price for the
gasoline but if the retail price exceeded State Oil's suggested retail price, then State Oil
kept the excess. Id. Khan fell behind in its lease payments and was evicted. Id. Khan
alleged that State Oil violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by preventing Khan from
raising or lowering retail gas prices. Id. The Supreme Court overruled its earlier per
se prohibition on vertical maximum resale price maintenance, and held that such
vertical price-fixing should be analyzed under its rule of reason. Id. at 22. The Court
noted that its holding in Sylvania substantially weakened the analytical underpinnings
of its per se standard for such vertical restraints. Id. at 14. Because nonprice vertical
restraints after Sylvania are subject to the rule of reason, franchised dealers might have
a local monopoly in their region. See id. at 12-14. The manufacturer might set a
maximum resale price to prevent franchised dealers from exploiting their monopoly
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the Court has not offered clear objective rules. Instead, the Court
retreated to its rule-of-reason standard.2' This trend is fostered by "a
growing tendency on the part of the Court to avoid issuing a clear,
general, and subsequently usable statement of the Court's reasoning or
the Court's view of the implications of its decision." 22 Not everyone is
position. See id. at 15-16. Moreover, if the manufacturer's maximum RPM restraint
was masking an arrangement to fix minimum retail prices, the manufacturer's
restraint could be challenged under the rule of reason. Id. at 17.
20 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007).
Defendant Leegin designed, manufactured, and distributed leather goods and
accessories. Leegin sold to small retailers feeling they treat customers better, provide
customers more services, and make the shopping experience more satisfactory than
customers' experience in Sam's Club or Wal-Mart. Plaintiff operated Kay's Kloset, a
women's apparel store in Texas. Plaintiff began carrying Leegin's Brighton products,
which at one time accounted between 40 and 50 percent of plaintiffs profits. In 1997,
Leegin instituted its Brighton Retail Pricing and Promotion Policy, and refused to sell
its products to retailers that discounted Leegin's products below Leegin's suggested
retail prices. Leegin adopted its minimum retail pricing policy to give retailers
sufficient margins to provide customers the services it considered to be central to its
distribution strategy. Leegin also expressed concern that such discounting harmed
Brighton's brand image and reputation. In 2002, Leegin discovered that plaintiff was
impermissibly discounting the Brighton line by 20%. Plaintiff justified its discounting
as a response to other competing retailers' discounting Leegin's Brighton line. After
Leegin asked plaintiff to stop discounting its Leegin products, plaintiff refused, was
terminated, and then sued Leegin for violating the Sherman Act. At trial, Leegin
wanted to introduce expert testimony describing the procompetitive effects of its
minimum resale pricing policy. The district court excluded the expert testimony as
irrelevant under the Court's per se rule against minimum resale price fixing. Plaintiff
was awarded $3.975 million in trebled antitrust damages. The Supreme Court
overruled its more than 90-year-old holding that resale price maintenance is per se
illegal, and held that such vertical restraints on discounting should be judged by the
rule of reason. The Court indicated that its earlier ruling rested on a formulistic
common-law rule against restraints on alienation rather than a "demonstrable
economic effect." The Court outlined the potential benefits of RPM, such as
stimulating interbrand competition, giving customers more options of low-price/lowservice brands and high-price/high-service brands, deterring discounting retailers from
free riding on retailers who offer value-added services, and facilitating market entry
for new firms and brands. The Court then noted RPM's potential anticompetitive
effects, such as facilitating a price-fixing cartel or tacit collusion among manufacturers
or retailers, protecting more dominant inefficient retailers with higher profits, and
preventing more efficient retailers from sharing their lower costs with consumers
through lower prices. Notwithstanding the risks of unlawful conduct, the Court
could not state with any degree of confidence that resale price maintenance "always or
almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output." Id. at 2717. The
Court found that vertical agreements establishing minimum RPM could have
procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circumstances in which
they are formed. Thus, the rule of reason should govern.
21 Id. at 2720; Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 n.15.
22 Frederick Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007
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complaining.2 3 But the Court's totality-of-economic-circumstances
standard has drawn heavy criticism over the past ninety-eight years,24
including criticism from the Court itself.25
SUP. CT. REV. 205, 207 (2007).
23 The Antitrust Modernization Commission said "advances in economic learning
have persuaded courts to replace [their] per se rules with a more flexible analysis
under the rule of reason." ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION 38 (2007) [hereinafter AMC REPORT]. Tethering antitrust law to
the "goal of consumer welfare [,the definition of which remains disputed,] with an
analysis based on economic learning . . . benefited consumers and [brought] more
consistency and predictability in antitrust doctrine." Id. at 42.
24 See John J.Flynn, The Role of Rules in Antitrust Analysis, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 605,
634; see also, AM. ANTITRUST INST., THE NEXT ANTITRUST AGENDA: THE AMERICAN
ANTITRUST INSTITUTE'S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH

PRESIDENT 202 (2008), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/
transitionreport.ashx [hereinafter AAI TRANSITION REPORT] (noting "surprising dearth
of either judicial or agency guidance on how a rule of reason analysis should be
conducted, particularly with respect to the actual balancing of procompetitive benefits
against anticompetitive effects or risks"); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 23,
THE RULE OF REASON 5 (1999) ("Commentators have long criticized the breadth of
Brandeis' statement in Board of Trade [of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)] as
'legitimiz[ing] the 'big case' in antitrust."' (citation omitted)) [hereinafter ABA
MONOGRAPH]; ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
44 (1993) (noting that Brandeis advocated "deviant rule of reason"); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE

255 (3d ed. 2005) ("Brandeis' statement of the rule of reason ... has been one of the
most damaging in the annals of antitrust" as it "has suggested to many courts that...
nearly everything is relevant."). See generally, Thomas C. Arthur, A Workable Rule of
Reason: A Less Ambitious Antitrust Role for the Federal Courts, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 337,
346 (2000) (arguing that Brandeis's opinion "made things worse"); Peter C.
Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of Trade
Case and the Meaning of the "Rule of Reason" in Restraint of Trade Analysis, 15 RES. L. &
ECON. 1, 4 (1992) ("[O]pen-ended listing of possibly relevant factors is hardly
illuminating as to their analytic inter-relationship, nor does it inform a decision maker
of what weights to ascribe to different factual conclusions."); Richard A. Posner, The
Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) (noting that content of rule of reason is largely unknown
and, in practice, is little more than euphemism for nonliability). The rule of reason,
with respect to section 2 monopolization claims, has also been attacked. See Einer
Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 255, 257
(2003) (describing monopolizations standards as "not just vague but vacuous");
Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 147-48 &
n.4 (2005) ("Notwithstanding a century of litigation, the scope and meaning of
exclusionary conduct under the Sherman Act remain poorly defined."); Thomas E.
Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act: The Search for Standards, 93 GEO. L.J. 1623,
1624 (2005) (stating that rule of reason "has been a source of puzzlement to lawyers,
judges and scholars").
11 See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating that per
se rule provides certainty and avoids lengthy and complex inquiries into history of
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Over the past few years, the Court's approach to the federal antitrust
laws has taken a perverse twist. The Court of late states that its rule of
reason is the "prevailing," 26 "usual," 27 and "accepted standard" 28 for

evaluating conduct under the Sherman Act. But then the Court uses
the infirmities of its rule of reason - e.g., high discovery costs and
inconsistent outcomes - to restrict, or increase the costs of, antitrust
plaintiffs' access to the courts. For the same reasons, the Court
justifies restricting governmental interference in the marketplace.
Lately, the Roberts Court has been active in deciding business law
issues generally and antitrust issues specifically.29 But while the
Roberts Court has addressed the risk of false positives under its per se
rule,3 ° it has never assessed the deficiencies of its rule of reason under
rule-of-law principles. 3' This assessment, however, is critical. The
particular industries to determine reasonableness of actions).
26 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49.
27 Leegin Creative Leather

Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2007).
Id. at 2712.
29 See Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court Inc.: How the Nation's Highest Court Has Come
to Side with Business, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/16/magazine/16supreme-t.html.
30 False positives here involve finding antitrust liability for restraints that are
competitively neutral or procompetitive. In Leegin, for example, the Court recognized
that its per se antitrust rules provide guidance to the business community and
minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system. 127 S. Ct. at 2718. But the
Court noted the risk of false positives from its per se rules in "prohibiting
procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage." Id.; see also Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004)
("Mistaken inferences and the resulting false condemnations 'are especially costly,
because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect." (quoting
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986))).
31 In Leegin, for example, the Court noted the risk of false positives under its per
se rule against vertical price-fixing. 127 S. Ct. at 2718. The Court found that RPM
may not always or almost always tend to restrict competition. Id. But the Court
lacked any empirical basis as to the percentage of instances when RPM is pro- or
anticompetitive or competitively neutral, and the magnitude of its benefits and harms.
For example, if RPM were likely to be anticompetitive 65 percent of the time, and
likely to cause over $100 billion in harm, while being procompetitive 20 percent of
the time (with $10 billion in benefits), the Court could decide whether the
incremental administrative costs of a more nuanced legal standard are worth its
benefits. In addition, the Court never addressed the risks of false negatives (and
positives) arising from its rule of reason or the increase in administrative costs under
the rule of reason. For example, the Court opines that its per se rule "may increase
litigation costs by promoting frivolous suits against legitimate practices." Id. at 2718.
This is illogical. In determining that a certain restraint is per se illegal, the Court has
concluded that the practice is generally illegitimate. As a result, one cannot fault
antitrust plaintiffs for challenging such restraints. Indeed the Sherman Act (or any
state statute prohibiting unfair and deceptive practices) could be faulted for promoting
28
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rule of reason's deficiencies have significant implications for antitrust
enforcement and competition policy generally. The current Court's
choice of antitrust standards affects future market behavior and the
incentives for market participants to engage in productive activity.
If any institution should be responsible for assessing the effects of
the rule-of-reason standards, it is the Court. It is "hard to see how the
'32
Indeed, the
judiciary can wash its hands of a problem it created.
from the
independently
arise
rule of reason's acceptance did not
scope
the
Court; the Court created the rule of reason and determined
rule-ofWhen
of its application. It could now create a new standard.
reason analysis is equated with per se legality (for the antitrust
4
plaintiffs bar)3 3 or uncertainty (for the defense bar), it signals the
standard's deficiencies. These results suggest that antitrust's legal
standards, rather than developing more definite elements and
privileges, are perhaps regressing to the status of a prima facie tort.
Above all other problems, the current "flexible" rule of reason
provides little predictability to market participants. It subjects litigants
and trial courts to the purgatory of "sprawling, costly, and hugely timeconsuming" discovery. 35 For example, a per se price-fixing claim under
36
section 1 of the Sherman Act requires proof of an agreement. But even
under some lower courts' more "structured" rule of reason, antitrust

frivolous suits against legitimate practices. The proper response is providing a better
legal standard that effectively spares specific legitimate practices (such as providing a
legal exception to the per se rule in cases of new entry). Id. at 2731 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, the Court's rule of reason would only exacerbate the litigation
costs, and thereby increase the risk of promoting frivolous suits against legitimate
practices. As discussed infra at Part II.C.7, the rule of reason, given its far broader
scope of factual issues and defenses, increases litigation costs. Thus while defendants
face the same amount of antitrust damages under either a rule-of-reason or per se
standard, defendants under the rule of reason face higher litigation costs and
unpredictable results.
32 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2630 (2008) (discussing punitive
damages).
13 See Arthur, supra note 24, at 337 ("The traditional rule of reason was uniformly
viewed as 'a euphemism for an endless economic inquiry resulting in a defense
verdict.") (quoting Maxwell M. Blecher, The Schwinn Case- An Example of a Genuine
Commitment to Antitrust Law, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 550, 553 (1975))).
34 See ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 24, at 102 (stating "rule of reason - and its
application in particular cases - has remained imprecise and unpredictable").
35 Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 n.6 (2007). This also
assumes that uncertainty provides no advantage to either private plaintiffs or
defendants. In reality, uncertainty may favor the players with greater resources or
alternative means to resolve their disputes.
36 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
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plaintiffs (including the federal antitrust agencies) and defendants must
engage in an elaborate four-part minuet.
As under the per se rule, plaintiffs must also prove an agreement
under the rule of reason. But they must then, first, establish that the
challenged restraint has had substantial adverse effects on
competition, such as increases in price, or decreases in output or
quality. In the absence of direct evidence of these anticompetitive
effects, plaintiffs can demonstrate the likely anticompetitive effects of a
restraint by showing the defendants' "market power" as inferred from
their high market share within a properly defined product and
geographic market. 37 Such a market definition, in turn, entails issues
of cross-elasticity of demand, 3 as well as supply substitutability into
those markets, and ease of entry.39
But that is just the opening of a four-step routine. After plaintiffs
meet their initial burden, the second step shifts the burden of
production to defendants to provide a procompetitive justification for
the challenged restraint (including the extent to which the restraint
increased productive efficiencies, lowered marginal costs, and yielded
procompetitive benefits to consumers).'
If the defendants offer
procompetitive business justifications, plaintiffs can, in the third stage,
respond by showing the defendants' procompetitive justifications as
pretextual, that lesser restrictive alternatives exist for the challenged
37 The burden is on the antitrust plaintiff to first define the relevant market within
which the alleged significant anticompetitive effects of the defendant's actions occur.
Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 388 F.3d 955,
962 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir.
2003); Nat'l Hockey League Players Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325
F.3d 712, 718 (6th Cir. 2003). An antitrust market consists of a relevant product and
geographic market. Double D Spotting Serv., Inc. v. Supervalu, Inc., 136 F.3d 554,
560 (8th Cir. 1998).
38 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1961) (defining
relevant geographic market as area in which potential buyer may rationally look for
goods or services he or she seeks); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) (defining relevant product market as those "commodities
reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes"); see also FED. TRADE
COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.1 (1992 & rev.
1997), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm#11 (outlining
product market definition for horizontal mergers).
39 Tops Markets, Inc. v. Quality Markets, Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998);
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), modified,
183 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
4 Only after the antitrust plaintiff has met its initial burden does the burden of
production shift to the defendant, who then must provide a procompetitive
justification for the challenged restraint. Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, 388
F.3d at 959; Visa, 344 F.3d at 238; Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d at 718.
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restraint, or that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve
the procompetitive objectives. 4 If plaintiffs' rule of reason claims
survive to this point, plaintiffs must, in a fourth step, show that the
restraint's anticompetitive effects outweigh its procompetitive
benefits.42 The fact-finder then engages in a "careful weighing of the
competitive effects of the agreement

-

both pro and con -

to

determine if the effects of the challenged restraint tend to promote or
destroy competition."4 3
To address the above four stages, antitrust litigants generally offer
competing economic expert testimony. To confound matters further,
the experts' neo-classical economic theories are often premised on
"rational" profit-maximizing behavior.
These theories, as the
reflects, may be divorced
literature
economics
behavioral
burgeoning
from marketplace realities.' Over the next decade, the rule of reason's
infirmities likely will worsen. The courts will weigh not only
conflicting testimony by Industrial Organization economists but
conflicting economic theories, with the rise of behavioral,
evolutionary, and New Institutional Economics. Because a rule-ofreason case is so costly to try, it is likely that fewer antitrust violations
will be challenged. This is disturbing under an evolutionary economic
perspective, when unchallenged anticompetitive conduct forecloses
An
entrants with innovative technologies from markets.45
independent judiciary and the rule of law may be the only protections
left for consumers and smaller competitors.
Part I of this Article examines the conventional wisdom that the
Court saved the unworkable Sherman Act "from stifling literalness
[i.e., condemning all restraints of trade] by 'the rule of reason."' 46 In
reality, the Court's rule of reason was highly contentious, and its

4" Visa, 344 F.3d at 238; see also Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, 388 F.3d at
959; Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d at 718; Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252
F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001); COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra note 10,
§ 3.36(b), at 24.
42 Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 507 (2d Cir.
2004); Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998).
13
Id. at 507; see also Visa, 344 F.3d at 238; Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours,
388 F.3d at 959; Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club, 325 F.3d at 718; Tanaka, 252 F.3d at
1063; Law, 134 F.3d at 1019.
4 See Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the
Twenty-First Century, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 534-35 (2007).
" Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REv. 497, 514-17.
1 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 27 (1945).
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critics accurately predicted its many shortcomings.4 7 The Court later
sought to bring its Sherman Act standards closer to rule-of-law
principles. But after Sylvania, the Court dismantled many of its per se
rules. Part II identifies seven deficiencies of the Court's rule of reason
under rule-of-law principles. But as Part III addresses, conformity
with a rigid rule of law may be suboptimal with respect to competition
policy. Because perfect compliance with rule-of-law ideals may be
unobtainable and undesirable, Part IV recommends several
improvements to harmonize the rule of reason with rule-of-law ideals.
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE-OF-REASON STANDARD

A.

The Sherman Act

The operative words of the Sherman Act are few in number.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act states that "[elvery contract,
combination... , or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce...
is declared to be illegal."48 Section 2 makes it unlawful for "[e]very
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce ... shall be deemed guilty."'
Unlike most
traditional criminal statutes, the Sherman Act "does not, in clear and
categorical terms, precisely identify the conduct [that] it proscribes."5"
Senator Sherman admitted that defining in legal language the precise
line between lawful and unlawful combinations was difficult, and
must be left for the courts: "All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to
declare general principles, and we can be assured that the courts will

" See infra Part II.C.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
49 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
" United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438 (1978). Nor does the
Sherman Act delineate which conduct should be criminally or civilly prosecuted; this
is left to the DOJ's discretion. Over the past 50 years, Congress increased the
maximum criminal fines and term of incarceration for Sherman Act violations.
Maurice E. Stucke, Morality and Antitrust, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 443, 460-69.
From a misdemeanor, the criminal penalties now stand as a felony with up to 10 years
imprisonment and a fine up to $100 million for corporations and $1 million for
individuals. Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-237, § 215, 118 Stat. 665, 668 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-3
(2006)). For statistics on criminal enforcement, see Joseph C. Gallo et al., Department
of Justice Antitrust Enforcement, 1955-1997: An Empirical Study, 17 REV. INDUS. ORG.
75, 95-96 (2000). For DOJ's policies on antitrust cases it prosecutes criminally, see
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, at 111-20 to 21 (4th ed. 2008),
availableat http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter3.pdf.
48
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apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the law ... ."51 Thus, the

Sherman Act provides the courts some discretion as to the means for
furthering the Act's objectives.5 2 But contrary to the Court's current
position,53 this discretion is not unfettered. For example, when the
Court opined that monopolies are important to our free-market
economy,54 its belief was inconsistent with the Sherman Act's general
principles.55 Ultimately, the antitrust standard must be grounded in
the statute's general principles.
51

21 CONG. REC. 2460 (1890); see also HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST

228 (1954) (citing references in legislative debates to courts as
instrumentalities for Sherman Act's clarification).
52 See TAFT, supra note 4, at 3 (1914) (explaining that "great lawyers" drafted
Sherman Act; they presumably used terms such as restraint of trade, monopoly,
combination and conspiracy "with the intention that they should be interpreted in the
light of common law, just as it has been frequently decided that the terms used in our
federal Constitution are to be so construed."); THORELLI, supra note 51, at 181-83; see
also 36 CONG. REC. 522 (1903) (statement of Sen. Hoar) ("We undertook by law to
clothe the courts with the power and impose on them and the Department of Justice
the duty of preventing all combinations in restraint of trade. It was believed that the
phrase 'in restraint of trade' had a technical and well-understood meaning in the
law."); 21 CONG. REC. 3146 (1890) (statement of Sen. Vest) ("We have affirmed the
old doctrine of the common law in regard to all interstate and international
transactions, and have clothed the United States Courts with authority to enforce that
doctrine by injunction."); 21 CONG. REC. 2456 (1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman)
("It does not announce a new principle of law but applies old and well-recognized
principles of the common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our State and Federal
Government."). The cohesiveness of the common law in 1890 is unclear. ABA
MONOGRAPH, supra note 24, at 16-17; THORELLI, supra note 51, at 50-53, 228; Herbert
Pope, The Reason for the Continued Uncertainty of the Sherman Act, 7 U. ILL. L. REV.
201, 203 (1912).
53 See generally Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,
2724 (2007) (explaining Court's antitrust doctrines evolve with new circumstances
and new wisdom).
" Although the Sherman Act's text and legislative history reject the Trinko
hierarchy, the Trinko Court surmised that cartels are the "supreme evil" and charging
monopoly prices is "an important element of the free-market system." Verizon
Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407-08 (2004).
The Trinko Court opined, contrary to the empirical evidence, that monopoly prices
attract "'business acumen' in the first place" and "risk taking that produces innovation
and economic growth." Id. at 407; Stucke, supra note 45, at 498.
51 See, e.g., John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the
Jurisprudenceof Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in
the Resolution of Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1125 (1987) (noting that
traditional antitrust jurisprudence has seldom addressed underlying values Congress
intended to maintain through legislation); Eleanor Fox, The Modernizationof Antitrust:
A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1182 (1981) (explaining that Act's four
major historical goals are "(1) dispersion of economic power, (2) freedom and
opportunity to compete on merits, (3) satisfaction of consumers, and (4) protection of
POLIcY
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The Introductionand Criticism of the Rule of Reason

Recently, the Court said it "has never taken a literal approach to
[the Sherman Act's] language. '5 6 But contrary to this assertion, the
Court did originally interpret the Sherman Act literally. In United
States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, the Court held that "every"
contract, combination or conspiracy that restrains trade is unlawful.57
The Court rejected the defendant railroads'58 and dissenting Justice
(later Chief Justice) White's rule-of-reason approach59 that, despite its
terms, the Sherman Act prohibited only "unreasonable" restraints of
trade. As the majority noted, the "plain and ordinary meaning of such
language is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is in
unreasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in such

competition process as market governor"); R. Hofstadter, What Happened to the
Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS, AND OTHER ESSAYS
188, 199-200 (1965) (stating that antitrust goals were economic (competition
maximizes "economic efficiency"); political (antitrust principles "intended to block
private accumulations of power and protect democratic government"); and social and
moral (competitive process was "disciplinary machinery" for character development)).
56 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2712 (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5
(2006)); see also Nat'l Soc'y of Pro'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687 (1978)
(stating that "problem presented by the language of [section] 1 of the Sherman Act is
that it cannot mean what it says").
57 166 U.S. 290, 312, 345 (1897).
Still rejecting the rule-of-reason approach, the
Court distinguished between restraints with a direct, immediate, and necessary effect
and those with an indirect or incidental effect upon trade or commerce. See, e.g.,
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 234 (1899) (stating that
contracts that affect trade "only incidentally, and not directly" are valid); Hopkins v.
United States, 171 U.S. 578, 600 (1898) (arguing that'Sherman Act "must have a
reasonable construction, or else there would scarcely be an agreement or contract
among business men that could not be said to have, indirectly or remotely, some
bearing upon interstate commerce, and possibly to restrain it"); United States v. Joint
Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898) (stating that "the statute applies only to those
contracts whose direct and immediate effect is a restraint upon interstate commerce,"
and is inapplicable where effect upon interstate commerce is indirect or incidental);
Milton Handler, The JudicialArchitects of the Rule of Reason, 10 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC.
21, 21-28 (1957). Arguably the Court loosely followed a version of then-Judge Taft's
ancillary restraint analysis in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271, 280-83
(6th Cir. 1898). A restraint entered into for the purpose of promoting legitimate
business was lawful, even though the agreement may indirectly affect commerce. Joint
Traffic, 171 U.S. at 568. Thus, the direct/indirect distinction represents a retreat from
condemning every restraint on commerce; whether it confers the courts with greater
discretion than rule-of-reason analysis is less clear.
' Trans-Mo. Freight, 166 U.S. at 329.
59 Id. at 351-52.
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language, and no exception or limitation can be added without placing
in the act that which has been omitted by congress."6"
Justice White's rule of reason fared no better under the
administration of then-President Taft. In 1910, President Taft rejected
amending the Sherman Act to prohibit only "unreasonable" restraints
of trade. 6' He felt that allowing courts to decide what constituted
reasonable restraints, suppression of competition, or monopolistic acts
would run contrary to rule-of-law principles. In a special message to
Congress, President Taft revealed the basis for his discomfort:
I venture to think that this is to put into the hands of the court
a power impossible to exercise on any consistent principle
which will insure the uniformity of decision essential to just
judgment. It is to thrust upon the courts a burden that they
have no precedents to enable them to carry, and to give them a
power approaching the arbitrary, the abuse of which might
involve our whole judicial system in disaster.62
Whereas a more general rule of reason was unworkable and unwise,
President Taft believed that the Court could continue to distinguish
between "incidental" and "direct" restraints of trade.63
Reflecting President Taft's views, Congress never amended the
Sherman Act to prohibit only "unreasonable" restraints of trade. It
refused to give to the courts what would amount to a legislative power
- "the power to say what are the good trusts and what are the bad
trusts, according

to ...

[their]

economic

and political views."'

166 U.S. at 328.
William Howard Taft, U.S. President, Special Message to Congress (Jan. 7,
1910), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=68486 (last visited Apr.
19, 2009) ("It has been proposed, however, that the word 'reasonable' should be
made a part of the statute, and then that it should be left to the court to say what is a
reasonable restraint of trade, what is a reasonable suppression of competition, what is
a reasonable monopoly.").
60

61

62

Id.

Id. ("A mere incidental restraint of trade and competition is not within the
inhibition of the act, but it is where the combination or conspiracy or contract is
inevitably and directly a substantial restraint of competition, and so a restraint of
trade, that the statute is violated."). President Taft noted that the term "restraint of
trade" came from the common law, which permitted certain covenants incidental or
ancillary to the carrying out of a main or principal contract. Id. Taft previously
explained how the common law permitted noncompete agreements when one party
sold its business to another. These noncompete provisions enable the seller to dispose
of all the fruits of its industry (including the business's good-will) to another.
Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. at 280 (Taft, J.).
64 TAFT, supra note 4, at 114 ("It would be un-wise to intrust this power to the
63
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Speaking on behalf of the Senate Judiciary Committee, one Senator
said that leaving it to the courts to decide what anticompetitive
restraints are reasonable or unreasonable would "lead to the greatest
variableness and uncertainty in the enforcement of the law....
[Tihere would be as many different rules of reasonableness as cases,
Any statute premised on a restraint's
courts, and juries."6"
for all practical
reasonableness would "entirely emasculate it, and
66
purposes render it nugatory as a remedial statute."
Although Congress never amended the Sherman Act to condemn
only unreasonable restraints of trade, the Supreme Court did so with a
simple change to the composition of its members.67 Chief Justice
White's rule of reason ultimately prevailed in 1911. In Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey v. United States, now-Chief Justice White addressed
the landmark antitrust challenge to John D. Rockefeller's monopoly of
The Chief Justice stated that the Sherman Act's
the oil industry.'
operative terms "restraint of trade" and "monopolize" had a "wellknown meaning" at common law.69 The common law courts had
applied a "standard of reason" in dealing with these issues." But by
incorporating those broad terms in the Sherman Act, Congress,
according to the Court, did not intend to constrain liability to only
those restraints illegal under the common law. Congress also sought
to prohibit "the many new forms of contracts and combinations which
were being evolved from existing economic condition." 71 Thus,
because the classes of restraint were sufficiently broad to cover every
conceivable contract or combination affecting interstate commerce, it
courts. It would be legislative power, not judicial power.").
65 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 96-97 (1911)
(Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (quoting Senator Nelson's comments in
1909 regarding bill which proposed to amend antitrust act in various particulars).
66 Id. at 97-98.

67 Herbert H. Naujoks, Monopoly and Restraint of Trade Under the Sherman Act, 5
Wis. L. REv. 129, 133 (1929).
1 221 U.S. at 30. The United States alleged that Rockefeller's Standard Oil had
controlled 90 percent of the business of producing, shipping, refining and selling
petroleum and its products, and thus could fix the price of crude and refined
Among the challenged practices were the railroads'
Id. at 33.
petroleum.
discriminatory rebates and preferences in favor of the defendants, defendants' control
of the pipe lines for transporting oil from the oil fields to refineries in six areas, unfair
practices against competing pipe lines, contracts with competitors in restraint of trade,
"unfair methods of competition, such as local price cutting at points where necessary
to suppress competition," and espionage of other competitors. Id. at 42-43.
69 Id. at 59-60.
70 Id. at 60.
71 Id. at 59.
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necessarily followed that not every restraint was illegal. It was the
courts' function to strike down only the unreasonable restraints, while
sparing the reasonable restraints of trade. Thus, courts must apply a
"standard of reason" to determine "whether in a given case a particular
act had or had
not brought about the wrong against which the statute
72
provided."

The Chief Justice discounted the United States' (and Court's prior)
construction of the statute, which deemed "every" contract in restraint
of trade or commerce illegal. The Sherman Act does not enumerate
those particular restraints that are illegal; because Congress, under the
majority's view, never intended to make all restraints illegal (despite
the statute's terms), "it is obvious that judgment must in every case be
called into play in order to determine whether a particular act is
embraced within the statutory classes, and whether if the act is within
such classes its nature or effect causes it to be a restraint of trade
within the intendment of the act."73 Perhaps in response to President
Taft's and others' concerns about a rule of reason, Chief Justice White
noted that the courts' discretion was circumscribed by the public
policy embodied in the statute: the courts could not reason a restraint
of trade "plainly within the statute" as legal.74
Despite Chief Justice White's assertion that the holding in Standard
Oil did not depart from any previous decision of the Court, 75 the
Court's rule of reason engendered strong disapproval. 76 Justice
Harlan's Standard Oil dissent attacked the majority's "judicial
legislation ' 77 as an "invasion by the judiciary of the constitutional
72

Id. at 60.

73 Id. at 63.
74 Id. at 67. Several weeks later, in United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S.
106 (1911), Chief Justice White again applied the rule of reason. The defendant
tobacco companies (i) spent millions of dollars to purchase competitors' facilities, not
with the purpose of using them, but to close them down and render them useless for
the purposes of trade, and bound the facilities' employees to long-term noncompete
agreements; (ii) colluded with foreign competitors to divide among themselves
geographic markets; (iii) engaged in predatory pricing (lowering prices below cost) to
drive competitors out of business or compel them to become part of defendant's
combination; (iv) controlled key ingredients essential to manufacture tobacco
products, which served "as perpetual barriers to the entry of others into the tobacco
trade." Id. at 182-83.
" Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 178-79. As Justice Harlan responded in his
separate opinion, "[t]his statement surprises me quite as much as would a statement
that black was white or white was black." Id. at 191 (Harlan, J. concurring and
dissenting in part).
76 See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 83.
77 Id. at 99 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
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domain of Congress. '7 8 The Court "has now read into the act of
Congress words which are not to be found there, and has thereby done
that which it adjudged in 1896 and 1898 could not be done without
violating the Constitution; namely, by interpretation of a statute
changed a public policy declared by the legislative department. "79
Justice Harlan predicted the later criticisms of the rule of reason:
I have a strong conviction that it will throw the business of the
country into confusion and invite widely-extended and
harassing litigation, the injurious effects of which will be felt
for many years to come. When Congress prohibited every
contract, combination, or monopoly, in restraint of commerce,
it prescribed a simple, definite rule that all could understand,
and which could be easily applied by everyone wishing to obey
the law, and not to conduct their business in violation of law.
But now, it is to be feared, we are to have, in cases without
number, the constantly recurring inquiry - difficult to solve
by proof - whether the particular contract, combination, or
trust involved in each case is or is not an 'unreasonable' or
'undue' restraint of trade. Congress, in effect, said that there
should be no restraint of trade, in any form, and this court
solemnly adjudged many years ago that Congress meant what
it thus said in clear and explicit words, and that it could not
add to the words of the act. But those who condemn the
action of Congress are now, in effect, informed that the courts
will allow such restraint of interstate commerce as are shown
not to be unreasonable or undue.8"
Thus, for Justice Harlan, the majority's rule of reason was the
"perversion" of the Sherman Act's plain words, all done in a way to
defeat the will of Congress. 8' By inserting the term "unreasonable" into
the Sherman Act, the Court "makes Congress say what it did not say;
what, as I think, it plainly did not intend to say; and what, since the
passage of the act, it has explicitly refused to say."82 The dissenting
Justice did not necessarily agree with the soundness of this legislative
policy. Instead, if a literal interpretation proved embarrassing, Justice
Harlan believed Congress should fix the Sherman Act.

78

Id. at 104.

Id. at 104-05.
80 Id. at 103.
81 Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 192.
79

82

Id.
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In response to Justice Harlan's and others' criticism, early defenders
of the rule of reason noted that its purpose was to broaden and enlarge
the force of the Sherman Act.8 3 The defenders feared that businesses
would escape prosecution by engaging in conduct not specifically
anticompetitive under the common law.' Interestingly, President Taft
began his Third Annual Message to Congress in 1911 defending the
Court's rule-of-reason analysis.85 President Taft argued that a rule-ofreason standard, if narrowly construed, would not emasculate the
Sherman Act.86 Even under the rule of reason, courts lacked the power
to say that certain restraints might be lawful if the parties moderated
their use of market power and did not exact from the public too great
and exorbitant a price. President Taft assured Congress that nothing in
Standard Oil and United States v. American Tobacco Co.87 suggested
"such a dangerous theory of judicial discretion."' Nor did the rule of
reason commit to the courts "undefined and unlimited discretion" as to
when restraints violated the statute.89 Instead, a reasonable restraint of
trade at common law "is well understood and is clearly defined" under
President Taft's ancillary restraint analysis, which he previously applied
as an appellate judge in an antitrust case. 90 Thus, in President Taft's
view, the Court's Standard Oil and American Tobacco decisions had not
usurped legislative power to formulate the Court's own social or
economic policies. 9'
Nonetheless, President Taft recognized the "need and wisdom of
additional or supplemental legislation" to provide the entire business
community better guidance and to foster competition "without loss of
83 See id. at 179; Felix H. Levy, The FederalAnti-trust Law and the "Rule of Reason," 1 VA.
L. REV. 188, 202 (1913); Tobacco Decision Meets with Favor,N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1911, at 1.
I Levy, supra note 83, at 203 ("[I]n view of the general language of the statute
and the public policy which it manifests, there is no possibility of frustrating that
policy by resorting to any disguise or subterfuge of form, since resort to reason
renders it impossible to escape by any indirection the prohibition of the statute.").
85 William Howard Taft, U.S. President, Third Annual State of the Union Address
(Dec. 5, 1911), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29552
(last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
86 Id.

See supra note 74.
1 Taft, supra note 85.
11

89 Id.

90 Id. "It must be limited to accomplish the purpose of a lawful main contract to
which, in order that it shall be enforceable at all, it must be incidental. If it exceed the
needs of that contract, it is void." Id. This is more fully explored in then-Judge Taft's
Addyston Pipe decision. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280-83
(6th Cir. 1898).
91 Taft, supra note 85.
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real efficiency or progress. '"92 Taft believed that such specificity
orients the rule of reason toward rule-of-law ideals:
I see no objection - and indeed I can see decided advantages
- in the enactment of a law which shall describe and
denounce methods of competition which are unfair and are
badges of the unlawful purpose denounced in the anti-trust
law. The attempt and purpose to suppress a competitor by
underselling him at a price so unprofitable as to drive him out
of business, or the making of exclusive contracts with
customers under which they are required to give up
association with other manufacturers, and numerous kindred
methods for stifling competition and effecting monopoly,
should be described with sufficient accuracy in a criminal
statute on the one hand to enable the Government to shorten
its task by prosecuting single misdemeanors instead of an
entire conspiracy, and, on the other hand, to serve the purpose
of pointing out more in detail to the business community what
must be avoided.93
Thus, despite his defense of the Court's rule of reason, President Taft
advocated for legislation to repair the standard. The legal standards,
under his proposed legislation, should make it be easier for
prosecutors to swiftly punish anticompetitive restraints, while
providing the needed transparency for businesses to avoid potential
criminal liability.
Debate over the state of antitrust enforcement generally, and the
Court's rule of reason specifically, continued into the 1912
presidential election. The Democratic Party's national platform
criticized the Court's rule
of reason, which deprived the Sherman Act
"much of its efficiency"94 and favored "legislation which will restore to
the statute the strength of which it has been deprived by such
interpretation."' 95 In contrast, the Republicans defended the Court's

92

Id.

93

Id.

" The 1912 Democratic Party platform included a 217-word section favoring "the
vigorous enforcement of the criminal as well as the civil law against trusts and trust
officials, and demand[ing] the enactment of such additional legislation as may be
necessary to make it impossible for a private monopoly to exist in the United States."
John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, Democratic
Party Platforms: Democratic Party Platform of 1912, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=29590 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009).
95 Id.
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rule of reason and the Taft administration's antitrust enforcement. But
they supported supplemental antitrust legislation to specify as
criminal offences those acts that uniformly violate the antitrust laws.
This clarity would orient the Sherman Act toward the rule of law:
those businesses who "honestly intend to obey the law" would have a
guide for their action; those businesses "who aim to violate the law
may the more surely be punished."96 And the Republicans supported
the creation of an administrative board to replace many of the
functions handled by the courts.9 7 In their view, creating a federal
trade commission would "promote promptness in the administration
of the law and avoid delays and technicalities incident to court
procedure."98

The Democrats got the better of the argument, or at least the
election. After defeating Taft and Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, in
addressing a Joint Session of Congress on Trusts and Monopolies,
sought to conform the rule of reason with rule-of-law principles:
The business of the country awaits also, has long awaited and
has suffered because it could not obtain, further and more
explicit legislative definition of the policy and meaning of the
existing antitrust law.
Nothing hampers business like
uncertainty.
Nothing daunts or discourages it like the
necessity to take chances, to run the risk of falling under the
condemnation of the law before it can make sure just what the
law is.... And the business men of the country desire
something more than that the menace of legal process in these
96 The Republican Party platform had a 246-word section committed to antitrust
enforcement and supplemental legislation that provides "same certainty should be
given to the law prohibiting combinations and monopolies that characterize other
provisions of commercial law; in order that no part of the field of business
opportunity may be restricted by monopoly or combination, that business success
honorably achieved may not be converted into crime, and that the right of every man
to acquire commodities, and particularly the necessaries of life, in an open market
uninfluenced by the manipulation of trust or combination, may be preserved." John

T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, Republican Party
Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1912, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/
index.php?pid=29633 (last visited Apr. 1, 2009). Independent candidate Theodore
Roosevelt attacked both Wilson (noting that 80 percent of trusts were incorporated in
New Jersey, where the Democratic candidate was governor) and the Republicans
(under the control of special interests), and promised a commission to better
effectuate antitrust policy. Theodore Roosevelt, U.S. President, The Leader and the
Cause, Address at Milwaukee, Wis. (Oct. 14, 1912) (http://www.theodoreroosevelt.com/trmilwspeech.html).
97 Woolley & Peters, supra note 96.
98 Id.
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matters be made explicit and intelligible. They desire the
advice, the definite guidance and information which can be
supplied by an administrative body, an interstate trade
commission. 99
To provide such guidance, President Wilson proposed that the actual
processes and methods of monopoly and the many hurtful restraints of
trade, which he felt were sufficiently known by that time, should be
"explicitly and item by item forbidden by statute in such terms as will
practically eliminate uncertainty, the law itself and the penalty being
made equally plain."'0 0 That same year, with criticism from President
Wilson and others mounting, Congress passed the Clayton Act and
Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act").' 01 Both acts promoted
the Federal Trade Commission as the means for setting and enforcing
clearer standards of liability.'0 2
This endeavor to promote clarity, however, suffered a setback in
1918. Justice Brandeis explained in Board of Trade of Chicago v. United
States (CBOT) 10 3 that not every restraint of trade was unlawful, only
the unreasonable restraints, determined under the following rule-ofreason factors:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is
such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
9 Woodrow Wilson, U.S. President, Address to a Joint Session of Congress on
Trusts & Monopolies (Jan. 20, 1914) (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?.pid=65374).
1oo Id.
'o' ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 73-74 (5th ed.

2003) (explaining that 1914 statutes constituted response to rule of reason:
"Advocates of a vigorous antitrust policy felt that this flexible approach gave
undesirable and unreviewable power over the nation's economic development to the
judiciary. On the other hand, businessmen worried about how to stay within the
confines of this vague standard.").
102 See FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 433-34 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); GERARD C.
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 48 (1924). After the FTC Act, the Chamber
of Commerce members overwhelmingly recommended to Congress to reconsider the
antitrust laws and formulate standards of general business conduct to be administered by a
supervisory body. Special to The N.Y. Times, Seeks Revision of Anti-Trust Laws:
Referendum by Commerce Chamber of United States Shows Overwhelming Majorityfor It, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 1919, at 22, available at httpJ/query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdPr=1&res=9405E4DC1E3BEE3ABC4D53DFB2668382609EDE.
103 Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States (CBOT), 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its
effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save
an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but
because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret
facts and to predict consequences.1°4
Under Chief Justice White's logic in Standard Oil, Congress
implicitly endorsed the common law's rule of reason in enacting the
Sherman Act. Now CBOTs open-ended rule of reason significantly
differed from its common law counterpart. °5 CBOTs rule of reason
neither identified categories of conduct that were presumptively
anticompetitive or socially undesirable nor contained any other
presumption of illegality. 10 6 The Court's rule of reason instead
resembled a cause of action at its infancy, namely the prima facie
intentional tort. An antitrust defendant, like a tortfeasor, would be
liable if its conduct caused injury to another, were generally culpable
07
(anticompetitive), and were not justifiable under the circumstances.
Even if another court found a similar practice in a different industry
anticompetitive, CBOTs rule-of-reason factors would treat each
challenged restraint as novel. Liability would turn on facts peculiar to
the industry to which, and during the period when, the defendant
applied the restraint.
As a commentator at the time noted, President Wilson never
accomplished his ambitious program to "give a 'further and more
explicit legislative definition of the policy and meaning' of the
'108
Sherman Antitrust so as to 'practically eliminate uncertainty."'
Id.
The Court generally identifies Mitchel v. Reynolds, (1711) 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 347
(K.B.) as outlining the rule of reason standard. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507,
519 (1980) (Stevens, J.,dissenting); Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 689 (1978) ("Rule of Reason suggested by Mitchel v. Reynolds has been
regarded as a standard for testing the enforceability of covenants in restraint of trade
which are ancillary to a legitimate transaction, such as an employment contract or the
sale of a going business.").
"o Mitchel, 24 Eng. Rep. at 347 ("All contracts, where there is a bare restraint of
trade and no more, must be void"; "where the special matter appears so as to make it a
reasonable and useful contract the presumption is excluded").
107 See Flynn, supra note 24, at 635 ("[The] essence of a rule of reason violation is
proof that joint conduct has been used to displace the competitive process without
justification or excuse.").
108 Naujoks, supra note 67, at 134.
104
105
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Insofar as the proponents of the supplemental 1914 antitrust
legislation "had hoped to clarify" the Sherman Act "by substituting
specific rules of conduct for general principles, they largely failed."° 9
Despite its many infirmities, CBOT remains the "classic articulation"
of how courts should undertake the rule-of-reason analysis." I0
C. Rise of the Per Se Rule
While the White Court's rule of reason in Standard Oil drew
criticism, the Court in a different 1911 decision created another farreaching legal standard - per se illegality. The per se rule did not
arise through a Sherman Act claim. Instead, a defendant in a tortious
interference of contract action challenged the validity of a price
restraint imposed by contract."' In addition, before and after CBOT,
the Court bounded its discretion under the Sherman Act by rejecting
certain defenses." 2 For example, in United States v. Trenton Potteries
109HENDERSON, supra note 102, at 48.
10 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
modified,183 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C.
v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also 1
RUDOLFF CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 4:37 (4th
ed. 2009) ("Modem attempts to refine or further develop the rule of reason, as
announced by Justice Brandeis in 1918, are virtually nonexistent.").
"' Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Parke & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 381-82 (1911).
The plaintiff, which manufactured proprietary medicines prepared in accordance with
secret formulae, sought to maintain prices for its medicines at both the wholesale and
retail level. Id. at 394. Defendant, a wholesaler, did not agree to plaintiffs prices, but
sold plaintiffs medicines at a discount to retail druggists. Id. Defendant procured
plaintiffs medicines from other wholesalers under contract with plaintiff and induced
those wholesalers to breach their contract by agreeing to sell plaintiffs medicines at
"cut prices." Id. Plaintiff sued defendant for tortious interference of contract. Id. at
394-95. Defendant countered that there could be no tortious interference of contract
claim because plaintiffs contracts with other wholesalers were void. The Court held
that it was clear and obvious that plaintiffs agreements restrained trade. Id. at 407-09.
In the wake of Leegin, it will be interesting to watch whether manufacturers, no longer
facing the threat of per se liability, pursue more tortious interference claims against
discounters and seek to prevent unlicensed distribution of their authentic branded
products over the Internet. See EU Competition Authorities Ponder Case Barring Sales
of LVMH Products on eBay, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. DAILY, July 18, 2008 (describing

Paris Commercial Court ordering eBay to prevent users on any of its sites worldwide

from selling or buying counterfeit or authentic LMVH perfumes and cosmetics).
12 "In the first price-fixing case arising under the Sherman Act, the Court ...
rejected the defense as a matter of law." Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457
U.S. 332, 350 n.22 (1982) (citing United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S.
290, 339 (1897)); see also Gilbert H. Montague, "Per Se Illegality" and the Rule of
Reason, 12 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEc. 69, 76 (1958).
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Co., the Court recognized its own limitations and rejected the defense
that prices were reasonable: "in the absence of express legislation
requiring it, we should hesitate to adopt a construction making the
difference between legal and illegal conduct in the field of business
relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are
reasonable - a determination which can be satisfactorily made only
economic organization and a choice
after a complete survey of our
3
between rival philosophies." 1

Nonetheless, in the height of the Great Depression, the Court did
not apply its per se rule to an agreement among competitors to fix
price. Instead the Court realized the critics' concerns that under the
rule of reason the Court could decide what good or bad cartels are
according to its economic and political views. Chief Justice White had
previously assured the public that its discretion under the rule of
reason was circumscribed by the public policy embodied in the
Sherman Act. But twenty-two years later, in 1933, the Court reasoned
that an anticompetitive restraint of trade, which was plainly within the
statute's prohibitions, was legal. 114 In Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States,1 5 coal producers were confronted with the oversupply of coal,
exacerbated in part by certain "destructive" trade practices, such as
buyers dumping "distressed" coal (due in part to lack of storage
facilities) onto the market. In response to industry conditions, 137
coal producers formed Appalachian Coals, Inc., as its exclusive selling
agent, enabling the former competing producers to fix the coal prices.
Before commencing operations, Appalachian Coals approached the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for approval. Instead of approving
the combination, the United States challenged its horizontal price
restraint in court. Using the CBOT rule-of-reason factors, the Court
held that the competitors' proposed price-fixing did not violate the
Some of the Court's findings, if valid, are
Sherman Act.
1 6 In one controversial aspect, however, the Court
uncontroversial.
injected its beliefs under the rule of reason - namely that the

113

273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927).

114

Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 377-78 (1933).

115

Id.

Id. at 371-72 (finding there were "virtually inexhaustible sources of supply" by
alternative producers in affected market, "organized buying power of large
consumers," and industry's low-entry barriers and excess capacity; although
customers testified in favor of defendant, several defense witnesses admitted "that
there would be some tendency to raise the price but that the degree of increase would
be affected by other competitors in the coal industry and by producers of coal
substitutes").
116
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Sherman Act permits horizontal restraints that stabilize prices if they
are not detrimental to the Court's conception of "fair competition. 117
The Court's holding legitimized the criticism of the rule of the reason:
the Court, under its vague standard, could permit anticompetitive
restraints it viewed as fostering "fair competitive opportunities" in
distressed industries.
In 1940, faced with another distressed industry, the petroleum
industry, the Court imposed greater restraint on its discretion (and
that of the lower courts) and sought to discipline itself from further
adventures under the rule of reason. The Court turned to its
alternative standard, the per se rule, to prevent an analysis that
legalizes competitors' price fixing arrangements: "Whatever economic
justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to
have,

the

law

does

not

permit

an

inquiry

into ...

[their]

reasonableness.""' In more fully articulating its per se prohibition on
horizontal price-fixing, the Court expanded the scope of liability." 9
The Court also rejected many justifications for price-fixing, including
lack of market power, "ruinous competition," "fairer competitive
prices," "financial disaster," "evils of price cutting," reasonableness of
price, defendants' good intentions, evidence of government approval
of the scheme, or the financial distress of the particular industry.120
Over the next thirty-seven years, the Court did not embrace the per
se rule in every instance.'' But the Court, in recognizing its rule of
,

Id. at 373.

118 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
Ironically, the Socony Court departed from the rule of reason announced in Standard
Oil. Socony was part of the Standard Oil monopoly that after the 1911 Supreme Court
decision was broken into different operating units and principal petroleum marketers.
Daniel A. Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony-Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust
in the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORIES 91, 92-93 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A.
Crane eds., 2007).
119 Combinations that "tamper" with price structure are per se illegal.
SoconyVacuum, 310 U.S. at 221. Thus, the Sherman Act reaches combinations formed for the
purpose, and with the effect, of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing
prices. Antitrust plaintiffs need not prove that defendants fixed prices directly or
controlled a substantial part of the commodity, no competition remained, or prices as
a result were uniform, inflexible, or unreasonable. Id. at 222, 224 n.59.
120 Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 221-22, 226-27, 229. In response to Socony, the
National Association of Manufacturers advocated legislation that would subject all
Sherman Act claims to the rule of reason. N.A.M. Group Seeks Curbs on Bureaus, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1940, at 20.
121 For example, in 1963, the Court needed to know more about vertical nonprice
restraints' actual impact to decide whether they have a pernicious effect on
competition and lack any redeeming virtue. See White Motor Co. v. United States,
372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963). Four years later, the Court condemned certain vertical
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reason's shortcomings, increasingly opted for more administrable
rules. In 1956, for example, the Court admitted, "it is fair to say that
the Rule [of Reason] is imprecise," but adhered to Chief Justice
White's belief that the rule's "application in Sherman Act litigation, as
directed against enhancement of price or throttling of competition, has
given a workable content to antitrust legislation." 12 Two years later,
the Court was more critical of its rule of reason: "This principle of per
se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are
proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone
concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an incredibly
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire
history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an
effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when
unreasonable undertaken."' 2 3
Thus, the Court sought four objectives as it developed the per se
rule. First, the Court generally (but not always 2 4 ) sought a rule that
With some notable
was administrable for generalist judges.
exceptions, 25 the Court turned to the Sherman Act's legislative history
or common law precedent as a basis for its rules. 126 Its philosophy was
nonprice restraints. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 37273 (1967). Given the opaqueness of the Schwinn decision, whether the Court's
learning improved in the intervening years is questionable. In United States v. New
Orleans Insurance Exchange, 148 F. Supp. 915, 918-19 (E.D. La. 1957), affd per
curiam, 355 U.S. 22 (1957), a district court rejected the government's contention that
the challenged group boycott was per se illegal, but found it illegal under the rule of
reason. On appeal by the defendant, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed per
curiam the judgment without elaborating whether the lower court applied the right
standard. Id.
122 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 386-87 (1956).
123 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
124 See, e.g., Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 382 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (saying
"I cannot understand how that marketing system becomes per se unreasonable and
illegal in those instances where it is effectuated through sales to wholesalers and
dealers").
125 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 168-69 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(pointing out that contrary to Court's holding, protecting households from monopoly
overcharges furthered antitrust principles). Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 388
(stating that no "previous antitrust decision of this Court justifies" adoption of a per
se rule and government requested only presumption of illegality).
126 For example, to bring some transparency and predictability in merger review, the
Court aimed for a presumption consistent with the Congressional concerns in the 1950
Clayton Act amendments to deal with the rising tide of economic concentration in the
American economy. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 365 (1963). The
tests of illegality under amended section 7 "'are intended to be similar to those which
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that "in any case in which it is possible, without doing violence to the
congressional objective embodied in ... [the statute], to simplify the
test of illegality, the courts ought to do so in the interest of sound and
practical judicial administration." 127 The Court, for example, did not
condemn all mergers with high market shares. Instead, it created a
presumption of illegality when the merging parties' share exceeded
thirty percent. 128 By creating an administrable rule, the Court
also
129
restricted the lower courts' ramblings under the rule of reason.
Second, the Court sought rules to enhance predictability. For
example, in devising the thirty percent presumption for mergers, the
Court sought to foster business autonomy: unless business executives
''can assess the legal consequences of a merger with some confidence,
sound business planning is retarded." 30 The Court's role was to
provide clearer rules on what was civilly (and criminally) illegal under
the Sherman Act."' "Should Congress ultimately determine that
predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it can, of course,
make per se rules inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts
free to ramble through
the wilds of economic theory... to maintain a
13 2
flexible approach."

the courts have applied in interpreting the same language as used in other sections of
the Clayton Act.'" Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1191, at 8 (1949)). The Court sought a
presumptively anticompetitive postmerger market share based on the market share and
market concentration figures in its earlier Clayton Act contract-integration cases, and
which was consistent with prevailing scholarly opinion. Id. at 365-66.
127 Phila.Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362.
12 See id. at 363 ("[A] merger which produces a firm controlling an undue
percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market is so inherently likely to lessen competition
substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that
the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.").
129 See id. at 362 ("We must be alert to the danger of subverting congressional
intent by permitting a too-broad economic investigation.").
130

Id.

See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972)
("Without the per se rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid them in
predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the
Sherman Act.").
132 Id. The Court repeated this argument in Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical
Society, 457 U.S. 332 (1982):
131

Our adherence to the per se rule is grounded not only on economic
prediction, judicial convenience, and business certainty, but also on a
recognition of the respective roles of the Judiciary and the Congress in
regulating the economy. Given its generality, our enforcement of the
Sherman Act has required the Court to provide much of its substantive
content. By articulating the rules of law with some clarity and by adhering
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Third, the Court sought to avoid having to bog down the courts
with examinations of difficult economic problems. This was
demonstrated in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., where the
Court recognized its judicial limitations. 33 Neither the Court nor the

to rules that are justified in their general application, however, we enhance
the legislative prerogative to amend the law. The respondents' arguments
against application of the per se rule in this case therefore are better directed
to the Legislature. Congress may consider the exception that we are not free
to read into the statute.
Id. at 354-55 (citation omitted).
133 See 405 U.S. 596 (1972). Topco at the time was a cooperative association of 25
small and medium-sized regional supermarket chains operating in 33 states. Id.
There was limited integration of assets among its members: no pooling of earnings,
profits, capital, management, or advertising resources. Id. Topco purchased goods
and resold them to its members under a private label. Id. Thus, the smaller
supermarket chains could compete with the major supermarket chains by also offering
a private label. Id. at 599. The United States did not challenge the competitors'
formation of Topco itself. See id. at 603. Indeed, the Court recognized the benefits of
the competitors jointly creating and producing private label products, including (i)
exploiting economies of scale in purchasing, transporting, warehousing, promoting,
and advertising, (ii) offering supermarket consumers lower priced products besides
branded products and a greater mix of differently priced and quality goods; and (iii)
giving the smaller supermarkets some bargaining leverage in dealing with national
manufacturers of branded products. Id. at 600 n.3. Approximately 20 years after
Topco was formed, its members agreed to two restraints that the United States
challenged. First, each member could sell Topco brands only in its designated
marketing territory. Id. at 601. If a member sold Topco private-label products outside
of its exclusive territorial area, it could be excluded from Topco and no longer offer
Topco private-label goods. Id. at 602-03. Second, members could not freely sell
Topco private-label products at the wholesale level. Id. at 603. To do so, the member
must first get permission from Topco; even if the member received permission for
such wholesaling, its sales of the Topco private-label product were limited to "a
specific geographic area" and "under any conditions imposed by the association." Id.
at 603-04. Topco's justification for the restraints was that its members needed privatelabel products to compete with the larger supermarket chains. Id. at 604-05. And the
members needed territorial restraints to sell private-label products. Id. at 605. By
restricting intrabrand competition among retailers selling Topco private-label
products, Topco's members promoted greater competition between its products and
those of the major supermarket chains like Kroger and A&P. Id. The United States,
under the direction of Donald Turner, decided to present its case as a per se illegal
territorial restraint. Peter C. Carstensen & Harry First, Rambling Through Economic
Theory: Topco's Closer Look, in ANTITRUST STORIES, supra note 118 at 171, 186. Its
case-in-chief took only a few minutes. Id. at 190-91. The district court, however,
applied the rule of reason and found that the challenged restraints' procompetitive
effects (promoting interbrand competition with the major supermarket chains)
outweighed their anticompetitive effects (minimizing intrabrand competition). Topco,
405 U.S. at 605-06, 608. The Court reversed, holding that agreements among rivals to
allocate territories are per se illegal. Id. at 607-08. The majority and dissenting Chief
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defendant could weigh the reduction of competition in one area (such
as intrabrand competition for Topco private-label products among
Topco member retailers) versus greater competition in another area
(such as interbrand competition between Topco members' privatelabel products and the major retailers' private-label goods).134 The
Court did not share dissenting Chief Justice Burger's confidence
in the
13 5
judiciary's ability to examine "'difficult economic problems."'
Fourth, not only was this weighing beyond its competence, but the
36
Court recognized that the legislature, while subject to rent-seeking,
is more politically accountable than the judiciary; thus, Congress must
make these normative trade-offs:
There have been tremendous departures from the notion of a
free-enterprise system as it was originally conceived in this
country.
These departures have been the product of
congressional action and the will of the people. If a decision is
to be made to sacrifice competition in one portion of the
economy for greater competition in another portion this too is
a decision that must be made by Congress and not by private
forces or by the courts. Private forces are too keenly aware of
their own interests in making such decisions and courts are illequipped and ill-situated for such decisionmaking.
To
analyze, interpret, and evaluate the myriad of competing
interests and the endless data that would surely be brought to

Justice Burger had two fundamental differences. Id. at 622-23. First, the majority
emphasized the administrability of antitrust rules and the court's limited capacity in
examining difficult economic problems. Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, felt
that a court under the Sherman Act must examine these "'difficult economic
problems."' Id. at 622. Second, the majority felt that neither the courts nor the Topco
members had any authority to tradeoff the reduction of intrabrand competition for
greater interbrand competition. Id. at 612. The dissent, however, argued that no price
fixing was involved and Topco was not a "near-monopoly" as its members on average
had a six percent share in their markets. Id. at 622-23.
134 Id. at 609-10 ("Our inability to weigh, in any meaningful sense, destruction of
competition in one sector of the economy against promotion of competition in
another sector is one important reason we have formulated per se rules.").
135 Id. at 622 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
136 Rent seeking involves "[sipending time and money not on the production of
real goods and services, but rather on trying to get the government to change the rules
so as to make one's business more profitable. This can take various forms, including
seeking subsidies on the outputs or the inputs of a business, or persuading the
government to change the rules so as to keep out competitors, tolerate or promote
collusion between those already engaged in an activity, or make legally compulsory
the use of professional services." OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 399 (John Black
ed., 2d ed. 2002).
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bear on such decisions, and to make the delicate judgment on
the relative values to society of competitive areas of the
of the elected representatives of the
economy, the judgment
37
people is required.1

As the Court's concerns reflect, the rule of reason was not only hard to
administer, it also left the courts vulnerable to rent-seekers. Keenly
aware of their own interests, rent-seekers will seek results that benefit
themselves, but not necessarily consumers.
138
But by the 1950s, some called for a return to the rule of reason.
Many of the Court's antitrust decisions between the 1950s and early
1970s became a popular pifiata for the Chicago School adherents,
whose view of law and economics clashed with the simplification
embodied in the per se rules. Some criticism is deserved. But the
hyperbole at times is empirically deficient. For example, some
Chicago School adherents criticized Topco, which they saw as 13a9
procompetitive joint venture to foster interbrand competition.
Chief Justice Burger predicted that unless Congress intervened,
"grocery staples marketed under private-label brands with their lower
consumer prices will soon be available only to those who patronize the
large national chains.""' Congress never intervened. Today one still
117 Topco, 405 U.S. at 611-12. In United States v. PhiladelphiaNational Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 370-71 (1963), the defendant banks after merging would control at least 30
percent of the commercial banking business in the four-county Philadelphia
metropolitan area. The defendants sought to justify the potential loss of competition
in the local commercial market with greater competition in other markets, namely: (i)
increasing the resulting bank's lending limit will enable it to compete with large outof-state banks (particularly New York banks) for very large loans, and (ii)
Philadelphia needs a larger bank to bring business into the area and stimulate

economic development. The Court rejected as a policy matter these two trade-offs,
which would require a court to offset anticompetitive effects in one market for
procompetitive benefits in another:
A value choice of such magnitude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial
competence, and in any event has been made for us already, by Congress
when it enacted the amended [section] 7. Congress determined to preserve

our

traditionally

competitive

economy.

It therefore

proscribed

anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike, fully aware, we

must assume, that some price might have to be paid.
Id. at 371.
Luther A. Huston, Patman Attacks Antitrust Study, N.Y. TIMES, May 11,
138 See, e.g.,

1955, at 20 (noting recommendation of infusion of rule of reason into antitrust
enforcement structures).
139 Bora,

supra note 24, at 274-78.
140United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 624 (1972) (Burger, CJ.,
dissenting).
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can buy private-label Topco products at local supermarkets. Closer
analysis of Topco revealed that the majority got it right. 41 The
deficiency was its incomplete analysis, not its outcome. In applying
the per se doctrine, the majority never addressed the key issue:
whether the challenged restraint
- geographic exclusivity of the
42
trademark - was necessary.1
D. The Rule of Reason Strikes Back
Since its 1977 Sylvania decision, the Court, following its "commonlaw approach, has continued to temper, limit, or overrule once strict
'
prohibitions on vertical restraints."143
Expressing concern over the
risk of false positives under its per se rule," the Leegin Court further
For an excellent retrospective, see Carstensen & First, supra note 133, 199-201.
Justice Burger and later critics adopted this view reflexively, arguing that "by
definition" labels must be exclusive to attract other small firms. Id. But whatever the
risk of free riding, lesser restrictive alternatives than vertical price fixing existed. As
Carstensen and First recount, during oral arguments before the Supreme Court, Topco
conceded that to give each supermarket member its own private-label cost only
$350,000. Carstensen & First, supra note 133, at 174. This amount was small relative to
the minimum amount of annual sales (about $250 million by the 1960s) to support an
effective private-label program. Id. at 177. Given this modest cost, instead of one Topco
brand, inquired the Court, "the private Seven-Eleven label would be competing with the
private Giant label." Id. at 174. Little free-riding occurred before or after the decree, as
supermarkets did not invest in promoting their private-label brands. Id. at 176. Instead,
Topco's underdeveloped record suggested that the restraints were intended to hinder
efficient mid-sized retailers from expanding into another member's territory. Id. at 18285. Because these lesser restrictive alternatives eliminated any free-riding problem (and
the need for territorial restraints), the Court concluded in oral argument, as Topco's
expert previously testified, that "the effect of exclusivity in this arrangement is simply to
limit competition in private label territories." Id. at 174-75. On remand, the district
court permitted "primary responsibility" clauses defeating exclusivity but providing
incentives for firms to concentrate in assigned areas. Id. at 197-98. Topco survived and
prospered. Absent the horizontal restraints, its members freely entered each other's
territories. Topco increased the number of available brands so that members could have
their unique private label (like Food City brand). Today Topco has more than 50
members and combined sales second only to Wal-Mart. Id. at 201.
143 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2721 (2007);
see also AMC REPORT, supra note 23, at 36 ("The Court's decision in Sylvania marked a
major turning point in antitrust law. After this decision, 'the Court systematically went
about the task of dismantling many of the per se rules it had created in the prior fifty
years, and increasingly turned to modern economic theory to inform its interpretation
141
142

and application of the Sherman Act."') (quoting ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW
IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 358 (2002)).
'4
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2718. The Court has also expressed concern over false
positives under its rule of reason with respect to section 2 claims. Verizon Commc'ns
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (explaining
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limited the rule's application. 145 As a result, formerly per se illegal
conduct is now subject to the rule of reason. 146
The Court's shift from per se rules would be an unsurprising
reflection of the Court's increased confidence in its'47 or the lower
courts' capacity to adjudicate complex economic issues, like antitrust.
But the Court's skepticism of, rather than its confidence in, the
judiciary's competency has increased over the past few years as
reflected in its decisions in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v.
Billing,148 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,'4 9 and Trinko. 5 ° Moreover,
that "cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of [section] 2
liability"). The Court's concern over false positives itself may be a false positive and
ignores the risk of false negatives under the rule of reason. Stucke, supra note 45, at
531. As several FTC employees noted after surveying the 344 private enforcement
antitrust actions decided under section 2 between 2000 and July 1, 2007, only nine of
those cases were decided for plaintiffs: "The paucity of judgments for plaintiffs
suggests that false positives in the sense of incorrect final rulings of liability likely are
relatively infrequent. Taken in isolation, this could suggest that any undue influence
of private section 2 enforcement on the conduct of dominant firms is limited."
William F. Adkinson, Jr., et al., Enforcement of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Theory
and Practice app. 5, 14-15 (Working Paper, FTC, 2008), available at http://ftc.gov/
os/sectiontwohearings/docs/section2overview.pdf.
'" Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2713 (explaining that to justify per se prohibition, antitrust
plaintiff must show alleged restraints have "'manifestly anticompetitive"' effects and
"'lack... any redeeming virtue"') (internal citations omitted).
146 See id. at 2710-13 (discussing minimum RPM); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3, 17-19 (1997) (examining maximum RPM); Cont'l TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,
433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977) (reviewing vertical, nonprice restraints).
147 Antitrust issues rarely arose during the recent confirmation hearings, so it is
difficult to assess the recent Justices' familiarity with antitrust. When asked to explain
his thoughts on LePage's Inc. v. 3M, 277 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2002) (joining
majority) and LePage's Inc. v. 3M , 324 F.3d 141, 182 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(dissenting), Justice Alito prefaced his comments by saying, "I'm not an antitrust
expert, and so I plod my way through these antitrust issues when they come up."
Confirmation Hearing of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
525 (2006) (testimony of then-Judge Alito).
148 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2395 (2007).
In holding that the federal securities laws
implicitly preclude the application of the federal antitrust laws to the alleged laddering
and tying conduct in that case, the Court feared that under its antitrust standards,
many different courts would reach inconsistent results and likely to make unusually
serious mistakes.
149 550 U.S. 544 (2007). The Court's concern over false positives and the high
discovery and litigation costs arising from its antitrust standards explained its
unilateral creation of a new pleading standard for civil antitrust claims. To mitigate its
concerns, an antitrust plaintiff stating a section 1 claim must allege enough factual
matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made, id. at 1295; "enough
fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
agreement," id. at 556; "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
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the majorities in Sylvania and Leegin never considered an intermediary
standard consistent with rule-of-law ideals and its experience with
antitrust issues.151 Instead, without assessing the standard's costs or
deficiencies under rule-of-law principles, the Court resurrected its
abused CBOT rule-of-reason factors as the prevailing, usual and
accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in
152
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Even the staunchest critics of Leegin recognize that resale price
maintenance occasionally is competitively neutral or procompetitive.
Ideally, in those circumstances, a workable legal standard efficiently
spares RPM from condemnation. Critics are not, however, dissatisfied
with Leegin because the Court departed from per se liability. Instead,
their dissatisfaction is with the Court's rule of reason. If the
alternative standard efficiently condemned anticompetitive instances
of RPM, spared its procompetitive instances, 5 3 and enabled the parties
face," id.
at 570; or enough facts to convert plaintiffs claims from being "conceivable"
to "plausible." Id.
150
540 U.S. at 414-15. In assessing whether antitrust liability should apply to the
monopolist's failure to comply with the 1996 Telecommunications Act, the Court
noted the high costs of antitrust "intervention," including the high risk of false
positives and the "interminable litigation." Cf. J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, FTC,
The State of Antitrust in 2008, Prepared Remarks Before the Antitrust Section of the
North Carolina State Bar Association (May 9, 2008) ("[Tlhe Court's recent decisions
reflect some concern with the private enforcement of the antitrust laws and the ability
of the courts to reach the right answer in private cases."); INT'L COMPETITION
NETWORK, COMPETITION AND THE JUDICIARY 8-9 & tbl. 3 (2006), available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/mediaAibrary/conference_5th-capet
own_2006/CompetitionandtheJudiciary.pdf (highlighting two principal findings from
survey of 18 competition authorities in 17 countries (both developing and developed
nations) were their perception that their countries' judiciaries interpreted competition
rules differently and were not sufficiently familiar with economic concepts to assess
competition claims).
151 One interviewee in Finsbury
International Policy & Regulatory Advisers'
(FIPRA) recent study commented:
If you read [Leegin] you are struck by two things: First, the list of potential
benefits of RPM as well as a list of potential theories of harm, [... ] which
reads like a textbook without much [judgment]. I expected the Supreme
Court to clearly express its priorities. Secondly, what was most striking was
the statement that increases in price following RPM may not matter all that
much. If prices go up, so be it, we don't care; what really matters are the
efficiency benefits from the use of RPM. This is a significant departure and
indicates what you care about at end of day.
FIPRA STUDY 53 (2008).
Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2710, 2712-13.
For example, a manufacturer entering a market may use RPM to provide the

PHIL EVANS, IN SEARCH OF THE MARGINAL CONSUMER: THE
152
153
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to adjudicate their claims quickly and cheaply, then the shift from per
se liability would be welcomed, rather than criticized.
E.

Quick-Look Rule of Reason

Although the Court's 1977 decision in Sylvania represents its retreat
from per se rules to the rule of reason, there appeared in the 1980s the
prospect of a third standard that lay between the Court's full-blown
rule of reason and per se illegality: quick-look standards.1 4 The
quick-look relieves an antitrust plaintiff from an extensive detailed
market analysis in its prima facie case. 155 "If, based upon economic
learning and the experience of the market, it is obvious that a restraint
of trade likely impairs competition, then the restraint is presumed
unlawful."' 56 The antitrust plaintiff need not prove as part of its prima
facie case the relevant product and geographic market. Instead, the
burden shifts to defendants to establish the restraint's procompetitive
benefits. 157 Encouraged by the Court's openness to a quick-look,

58

the

retailer with sufficient profit margins for the retailer to invest in providing the
necessary promotion, services, advertising and other efforts to promote the product
and increase consumer demand.
151 See FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (condemning
challenged conduct without "elaborate industry analysis"); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. (NCAA), 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984).
155 Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).
156 Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
157 NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109-10.
158 The Court in NCAA recognized that restraints that fall outside the category of
per se illegal restraints can be condemned short of a full-blown rule of reason. NCAA,
468 U.S. at 117. If competitors agreed not to compete in terms of price or output,
then "no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive
character of such an agreement." Id. at 109 (quoting Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). Such naked restraints "on price and output
[require] some competitive justification even in the absence of a detailed market
analysis." Id. at 110. The Court appeared open in applying the rule of reason "in the
twinkling of an eye." Id. at 109 n.39 (quoting P. Areeda, The "Rule of Reason" in
Antitrust Analysis: General Issues 37-38 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., June 1981)).
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FTC and DOJ refined these standards,' 59 which sparked further
discussion within antitrust circles. 160
But the Court's later articulation of quick-look in CaliforniaDental
Ass'n v. FTC impeded the doctrine's development. 6 ' In California
159 See In re Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, No. 9195, 110 F.T.C. 549,
1988 WL 1025476, at *11-13 (F.T.C. 1988); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.4
(1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm; Joel Klein,
Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, A Stepwise
Approach to Antitrust Review of Horizontal Agreements, Address at American Bar
Association's Antitrust Section Semi-Annual Fall Policy Program 4-6 (Nov. 7, 1996)
(available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/0979.pdf).
160 See, e.g., ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 24, at 103-04, 142-61, 175-76 (discussing
differing quick-look standards); Joseph Kattan, The Role of Efficiency Considerations in
the Federal Trade Commission's Antitrust Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 613, 625 (1996)
(stating that vague concept of "inherently suspect" in Massachusetts Board was
inherently elastic and is being applied to broad range of situations far outside realm of
per se or borderline per se conduct); William J. Kolasky, Jr., Counterpoint: The
Department of Justice's "Stepwise" Approach Imposes Too Heavy a Burden on Parties to
Horizontal Agreements, 12 SPG. ANTITRUST 41 (1998) (stating that stepwise approach
places heavy burden on parties to justify legitimate business arrangement without
regard to whether they pose any real danger to competition); Timothy J. Muris, The
Federal Trade Commission and the Rule of Reason: In Defense of Massachusetts Board,
66 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 773-75 (1998) (emphasizing that MassachusettsBoard standard
encourages courts to listen to justifications rather than determining that conduct is
per se illegal).
161 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (Cal. Dental III).
Approximately three-quarters of
California dentists belonged to the voluntary nonprofit California Dental Association
("CDA"). Id. at 759. The CDA's code of ethics prohibited false and misleading
advertising. Id. at 760. Violators were subject to censure, suspension, or expulsion
from CDA. Id. at 761-62. The FTC sued CDA, not for its code of ethics, but for its
application of the code. CDA allegedly restricted truthful, nondeceptive (i) price
advertising and (ii) advertisements relating to the quality of dental services. Id. at 762.
Without regard to whether the discount advertising was false or misleading, CDA
required its members to include additional disclosures, such as

(i)

the dentist's regular price for the dentist service;

(ii) the discount price (either the dollar amount of the discounted fee or the
percentage of the discount for the specific service);
(iii) the length of time, if any, the discount would be honored;
(iv) a list of verifiable fees; and
(v) identification of specific groups who qualify for the discount or any
other terms and conditions or restrictions for qualifying for the discount.
Id. at 761. CDA also objected to across-the-board discounts (that is discounts on each
service provided) that resulted in charges below the regular fee. Cal. Dental Ass'n (Cal.
Dental 1), 121 F.T.C. 190, 227 (1996). As a result, a member dentist could not simply
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Dental, rather than simplify antitrust litigation and provide greater
predictability, the Court increased the uncertainty for litigants, district
courts, and market participants. The Court said that its categories of
analysis are "less fixed" than they appear. No categorical lines
separate the per se, quick-look, and rule-of-reason standards. Instead,
a lower court can choose a standard somewhere along the continuum
between rule of reason and per se illegality based on its personal
"enquiry" for the antitrust case, and its view of "the circumstances,
details, and logic of a restraint. ' 16 2 But instead of clarifying its quicklook doctrine to enhance predictability, the Court added another
totality-of-economic-circumstances test with CaliforniaDental. Under
that test, if the quality of proof varies with each case's particular
circumstances, predictability diminishes.
A continuum, of course, has benefits. Ideally, a continuum would
efficiently reduce the risks of false positives - characterizing
procompetitive behavior as anticompetitive - and false negatives characterizing anticompetitive behavior as procompetitive - without

advertise "senior citizen discounts" or a "20% military discount."

Id. Some of the

complaining dentists noted that the CDA discount advertising rules effectively precluded
across-the-board offers: dentists, to comply with the CDA rules, must include the
regular fee for 100 to 300 different procedures, which would make the ad resemble a
telephone book. Id. at 228-29. CDA also prohibited advertised claims as to the quality
of dentistry services that were not susceptible to measurement or verification, such as
"gentle dentistry team," "quality dentistry in a pleasant and positive manner," or
"leading edge technology." Id. at 230-31. The FTC treated CDA's advertising restraints
as per se illegal or, in the alternative, illegal under a "quick-look" standard. The FTC
found that although CDA's verifiable requirement "may sound like an innocuous
regulation that does no more than enhance the truthfulness of the information
conveyed, in its enforcement the CDA effectively precluded advertising that
characterized a dentist's fees as being low, reasonable, or affordable, as well as
advertising of across-the-board discounts." Id. at 301. The Ninth Circuit held that the
FTC should not have applied the per se standard to the restraint, but agreed that these
restraints were illegal under an abbreviated "quick-look" rule of reason. Cal. Dental III,
526 U.S. at 763-64. The Court, however, disagreed, noting that the lower court should
not have applied a "quick-look" rule of reason analysis, which is limited to where "the
likelihood of anticompetitive effects" of the challenged restraint are "comparably
obvious." Id. at 771. The Court assumed that even if the CDA essentially barred
member dentists from advertising "across-the-board" discounts, "it [did] not obviously
" Id. at 774. The
follow that such a ban would have a net anticompetitive effect ..
CDA's calculus was that any costs to competition associated with the elimination of
across-the-board advertising (e.g., 20 percent off all services) were outweighed by gains
to consumer information (and competition) by requiring discount advertising that is
exact, accurate, and more easily verifiable. Although the CDA's view may have been
ultimately wrong, the Court found it plausible and thus not presumptively illegal under
the antitrust laws. Id. at 775.
162 Cal. Dental III, 526 U.S. at 781.
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necessarily subjecting the parties to the cost and time of a full-blown,
rule-of-reason analysis. A continuum would promote the capacity for
further developing the rule of reason. Rather than swinging from one
extreme (rule of reason) to another (per se illegality), the standard
might evolve incrementally in defining and limiting the elements of
the antitrust cause of action, legal presumptions, defenses, and
evidentiary burdens.
But the Court never gave guidance as to where along its continuum
the lower courts should evaluate specific kinds of restraints. Absent
such guidance, antitrust plaintiffs face a difficult tactical decision: if
they litigate only on a per se or quick-look theory, they may be
prevented from further factfinding if the court opts for a rule-of-reason
analysis. 163 Risk-averse counsel will ultimately prepare for a full-blown
rule of reason, plead their case to include all three standards, and hope
that the trial court opts for the quick-look or per se standard in a
preliminary hearing. The necessity of a comprehensive trial strategy,
however, defeats the purpose of the quick-look. 164 And trial courts are
likely to opt for rule of reason to lower the risk of reversal because they
lack guidance on the proper legal standard for particular restraints.
Not surprisingly, the quick-look standard is rarely applied and has
fallen into disuse in actually resolving cases. On a few occasions since
CaliforniaDental, an antitrust plaintiff, namely the FTC, has prevailed
under a quick-look. 165 For example, in Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC,
the D.C. Circuit accepted the FTC's quick-look analytical framework
to condemn the joint venturers' agreement not to discount or advertise

163

See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC (Cal. Dental II), 224 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2000)

(agreeing with defendant that "further factfinding would give the FTC an unwarranted
second bite at the apple"); Fox v. Good Samaritan Hosp., No. C 04-00874 RS, 2008
WL 2805407 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2008) (finding claims not viable under rule-of-reason
theory when court earlier dismissed claims when styled as per se).
164 See United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2001),
affd, 344 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding it unnecessary to consider whether to
decide case on "quick look" because "[als a practical matter, the parties and the court
have already undertaken a thorough analysis of the alleged restraints and their impact
on the relevant markets" and "it would make little sense for the court to disregard any
of the evidence presented.").
165 See, e.g., N. Tex. Speciality Physicians v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346, 370 (5th Cir.
2008) (concluding that FTC's "look" into the North Texas Speciality Physicians'
("NTSP") challenged practices, although "less than a fullblown market analysis," was
enough); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 34-37 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting
that restraint presumed unlawful if "it is obvious that a restraint of trade likely impairs
competition"); cf. In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279
(S.D. Fla. 2005) (applying per se, yet only quickly looking at defendants'
justifications).
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similar products that were outside their joint venture. 166 Although the
federal competition agencies cannot create antitrust's legal standards,
they can play an important role in advocating to the courts where
along the continuum certain categories of restraints should be
evaluated. Despite the FTC's commendable efforts in Polygram and
North Texas Speciality Physicians v. FTC,'167 the FTC's quick-look
416 F.3d at 37. Defendants Polygram and Warner entered into a joint venture
to distribute the upcoming recording of three noted tenors (Jos6 Carreras, Placido
Domingo, and Luciano Pavarotti). Id. at 31. Defendants' earlier recorded concerts of
the Three Tenors, however, competed with the joint venture's sales. Id. at 32. Warner
distributed the recording of the Three Tenors' 1994 concert album; Polygram
distributed the 1990 concert. Id. at 31. The defendants privately agreed to suspend
advertising and discounting the recordings of the two earlier Three Tenors concerts
while they jointly promoted the upcoming 1998 release. Id. at 31-32. The FTC
successfully challenged the defendants' restraint on advertising and discounting under
its quick-look. Id. at 32-33. The FTC argued that because defendants' restraint was
"inherently suspect" - that is on its face likely to restrict competition and decrease
output - it should be presumed illegal under section 5 of the FTC Act (which
employs the same antitrust analysis as under the Sherman Act). Id. Thus, the burden
should shift to the defendants to identify some competitive justification for their
restraint. Id. at 35-36. If the defendants offer a procompetitive justification, then the
FTC, under its quick-look, must either (i) explain why it can confidently conclude
without adducing evidence that the defendants' restraint very likely harmed
competition or (ii) provide the tribunal with sufficient evidence to show that
anticompetitive effects are in fact likely. Id. at 36. If the FTC succeeds under either
way, "then the evidentiary burden shifts to the defendant[s] to show the restraint in
fact does not harm consumers or has 'procompetitive virtues' that outweigh its burden
upon consumers." Id. Polygram, on appeal, argued that the FTC under the rule of
reason must first prove that the challenged restraints actually harmed competition
before it required defendants to proffer a competitive justification. Id. The D.C.
Circuit rejected such formalism. Id. The FTC's quick-look framework, as applied,
addresses the Sherman Act's central inquiry: "whether the challenged restraint
hinders competition." Id. The defendants' agreement to curtail advertising and
discounting for products outside the joint venture bore a close family resemblance to
price fixing, which, absent any joint venture, would be summarily condemned as per
se illegal. Id. at 37. Part of the FTC's success with the quick-look is attributable to the
FTC's efforts in developing this standard; another factor may be that the opinion's
author was Chief Judge Ginsburg, an antitrust scholar. See id. at 31.
167 528 F.3d at 352 (upholding FTC's challenge under quick-look of collectivebargaining and information sharing program among competing doctors). The North
Texas Speciality Physicians accounted for many competing specialists practicing in
Tarrant County, Texas. Id. NTSP annually polled its member physicians as for each
doctor's minimum acceptable rate for a nonrisk (fee-for-service) contract with
different local health insurance companies and other payors. The NTSP shared survey
results with its members and negotiated on the doctors' behalf with payors for a
contract for the participating doctors' services. Id. at 353. If the insurance company
offered a price below the minimum acceptable rate, the NTSP rejected it and did not
166

forward the offer to the members. Id. at 365. If the payor tried to circumvent the
NTSP and negotiate directly with some of the doctors, the doctors would tell the
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efforts have not provided the framework used in other antitrust
Moreover, the ABA Section of Antitrust Law recently
cases.16
observed that no coherent quick-look legal standard has emerged
between, or within, the federal antitrust agencies. 169 At times, the
quick-look is justification for quickly disposing of the antitrust
claim. 7 ° More often, however, the lower courts refuse to apply the
quick-look, opting instead for the rule of reason. 7 '
payor to negotiate with the NTSP. Id. The participating doctors also agreed not to
negotiate separately with the payor unless and until the NTSP notified them that it
permanently discontinued negotiations with that payor. Id. at 353. The FTC found
that the competing doctors, acting through the NTSP, sought to secure higher fees.
The FTC indicated that it could have challenged this price-fixing arrangement among
competitors as per se illegal. Id. at 354. It opted instead for the quick-look because (i)
"the Supreme Court has urged caution in the application of the per se label to conduct
in a professional setting," which includes physicians, and (ii) the FTC wanted to
"encourage providers to engage in efficiency-enhancing collaborative activity." Id. at
359. The Fifth Circuit agreed that the NTSP's practices bore "a very close
resemblance" to those price-fixing agreements ordinarily struck down as per se illegal.
Id. at 362. NTSP failed to establish how its justification of higher quality healthcare
resulted from, or were connected to, its challenged conduct. Id. at 369.
11 A February 15, 2009 Westlaw search identified only three judicial decisions that
cite Polygram: (i) North Texas Speciality Physicians, discussed supra note 167; (ii)
Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 462-63, 467 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 1318 (2009) (citing Polygramnot for quick-look framework but as to general legal
standard for reviewing FTC's construction and application of antitrust laws); and (iii)
Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 38, 49, 51 (D.D.C. 2008)
(citing Polygram not for quick-look framework but for proposition that "Supreme
Court's approach to evaluating a § 1 claim has gone though [sic] a transition over the
last twenty-five years, from a dichotomous categorical approach to a more nuanced
and case-specific inquiry;" and contrary to Polygram quick-look framework, insisting
that antitrust plaintiffs establish relevant antitrust market for inherently suspect
agreement between brand-name and generic drug manufacturer to delay market entry
of generic version of contraceptive). An online search did not identify any judicial
decision that cites North Texas Speciality Physicians (Westlaw, Feb. 15, 2009).
169 The ABA Section of Antitrust Law recently recommended that the incoming
Obama administration should "provide more clarity regarding truncated rule of reason
analysis, determine whether their staffs are performing such analysis consistently, and
obtain input from the legal, economic, and business community regarding the

appropriate analytical framework." AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, 2008
TRANSITION REPORT 42 (2008), available at http.//www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-

comments/2008/11-08/obamabiden.shtml [hereinafter ABA TRANSITION REPORT). The
Section recognized the quick-look's utility in avoiding the time, expense, and data
required for a full-blown rule-of-reason analysis. "But based on interviews and
individual attorneys' experiences, it is not clear to the Section that both agencies - or
even different staffs within the same agency - are employing quick look analysis under
similar factual circumstances, or are utilizing the same analytical framework." Id.
170 Wallace v. Int'l Bus. Machine Corp., 467 F.3d 1104, 1108 (7th Cir. 2006);
Viazis v. Am. Ass'n of Orthodontists, 314 F.3d 758, 766 (5th Cir. 2002); Blubaugh v.
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As this history makes evident, the development of antitrust
doctrines has been long and contentious, dating back to the enactment
of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The Court, over the years, has
employed several different standards: per se illegality, quick-look
standards, and the rule of reason. But since 1977, for a number of
reasons, the rule of reason dominates. The Court has constricted its
per se standard to some horizontal restraints like price fixing and
market allocation. The quick-look has fallen into disuse, as litigants
fear that the court will revert to the rule of reason. And the Court has
repeatedly noted of late that its rule of reason is the prevailing, usual,

Am. Contract Bridge League, No. IP 01-358-C H/K, 2004 WL 392930, at *17 (S.D.
Ind. Feb. 18, 2004).
' See Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 334 (2d
Cir. 2008) (finding no error when district court reviewed antitrust claim under rule of
reason, rather than quick look); Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat'l Hockey League,
270 Fed. App'x 56, 58 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no error when district court briefly
applied "quick look" before returning to rule of reason after defendant offered several
procompetitive benefits); Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 491 F.3d 380,
385-86 (8th Cir. 2007); Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 210 (3d Cir.
2005); Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
388 F.3d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that district court erred in applying
quick look); Nat'l Hockey League Players' Ass'n v. Plymouth Whalers Hockey Club,
325 F.3d 712, 719 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Because hockey leagues involve the same types of
restraints discussed by the Supreme Court in [NCAA v. ]Board of Regents[ of the
University of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)], the district court erred in failing to apply
the rule of reason analysis."); Berlyn Inc. v. Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 73 F. App'x
576, 585, 2003 WL 21958335, at *7 (4th Cir. 2003); Dickson v. Microsoft Corp., 309
F.3d 193, 205-06 (4th Cir. 2002); Va. Vermiculite, Ltd. v. Historic Green Springs,
Inc., 307 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2002) (describing parties dispute of standard, but
dismissed for lack of anticompetitive effects); Cont'l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines,
Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 511 (4th Cir. 2002) ("In a nutshell, although the district court
demonstrated mastery of many intricacies of antitrust law, it performed too quick an
analysis on an insufficiently developed factual record."); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275
F.3d 191, 207 (2d Cir. 2001); New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v.
McKesson Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 431, 434-35 (D. Mass. 2008); Int'l Norcent Tech. v.
Koninklijke Philips Elec. N.V., No. CV 07-00043 MMM (SSx), 2007 WL 4976364, at
*5 n.46 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2007); Klickads, Inc. v. Real Estate Bd., Inc., No. 04 Civ.
8042(LBS), 2007 WL 2254721, at *6 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2007); Jame Fine Chems.,
Inc. v. Hi-Tech Pharm. Co., Civ. No. 00-3545 (AET), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21650, at
*11 (D.NJ. Mar. 27, 2007) (deeming "Quick Look" analysis inapplicable because
vertical nonprice restraints evaluated in Third Circuit under full Rule-of-Reason
analysis); Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 212, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 2005); Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass'n v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Toscano v. PGA Tour, Inc., 201 F.
Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Carter v. Variflex, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 2d 1261,
1266 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (describing quick-look analysis as exception, not rule).
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and accepted standard for evaluating conduct under the Sherman Act.
Although the rule of reason is approaching its 100th anniversary, it
continues to suffer from the infirmities that President Taft and Justice
Harlan's dissent in Standard Oil identified: it is too fluid an analysis to
create clear objective rules that business leaders and lawyers can
follow. This raises fundamental questions as to whether the rule of
reason can ever be reconciled with rule-of-law principles.
II.

EVALUATING THE RULE OF REASON UNDER THE RULE OF LAW

Having reviewed in Part I the development and ensuing controversy
over the rule of reason, including the Court's attempt to reverse course
and provide more administrable rules and its return after 1977 to the
rule of reason, this Part examines the rule of reason's shortcomings
under rule-of-law principles. This Part outlines several rule-of-law
principles and the importance of the rule of law as a precondition for
effective antitrust enforcement. It next discusses seven infirmities that
the rule of reason has under these rule-of-law principles, and shows
how these infirmities can have significant implications on antitrust
enforcement and competition policy generally.
A.

Rule-of-Law Principles

Although the term "rule of law" is frequently cited, 172 the "high
degree of consensus on the virtues of the rule of law is possible only
because of dissensus as to its meaning."173 This Article incorporates
and applies several principles underlying the rule of law to the rule of
reason. To accomplish this, we must first establish what these
principles are. Rule-of-law principles guide impartial courts in
quickly and economically' 74 enforcing laws that:
172 A Google search of the term yielded approximately 15.3 million websites. A
Westlaw search on February 13, 2009 identified more than 10,000 federal and state
court decisions citing the term.
113 Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331, 332
(2008); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional
Discourse,97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1997) (observing while term is much celebrated, its
meaning has always been contested).
174 Any rule must aspire to minimize, and if possible eliminate, unjustifiable
expense and delay. 257,507 civil cases and 68,413 criminal cases were commenced in
federal district court during the 12 months ending September 2007. ADMIN. OFFICE OF

THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 208 (2008), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2007/

appendices/DOOCSepO7.pdf (documenting criminal cases); id.at 139 (documenting
civil cases). Given this caseload, functionality requires some predictability and
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*

are "prospective, accessible and clear" to constrain the
government (both the executive and judiciary) from exercising
its power arbitrarily;17

"

make "it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority
will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan
176
one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge";

*

apply to all persons equally, offering equal protection without
prejudicial discrimination; and

"

are "of general application and consistent implementation;
' 177
[they] should be capable of being obeyed."

A key component of these rule-of-law principles is that enforcement
authorities apply clear legal prohibitions to particular facts with
sufficient transparency, uniformity, and predictability so that private
actors can reasonably anticipate what actions would be prosecuted and
fashion their behavior accordingly. The law should be sufficiently
specific and its enforcement predictable and fair.
B.

Rule of Law Is a Preconditionfor Effective Antitrust Enforcement

If the rule of law applies to the law generally, it should apply to
competition law specifically. Few dispute the rule of law's critical role
in supporting our economy, generally, and with respect to prohibiting
anticompetitive behavior specifically. This subpart briefly discusses
several reasons why adherence to the rule-of-law principles is
important for effective antitrust enforcement.
First, the competition laws help create the rules of the game. If the
rules enhance welfare and outline with sufficient clarity what is
impermissible, then all can rely on these rules in channeling their
behavior in welfare-enhancing directions.' 78 When this does not

efficiency. Otherwise, trial preparation would be costly and protracted. When
potentially everything is relevant, anticipating what evidence is admissible (and for
what purpose) is difficult.
175 Chesterman, supra note 173, at 342; see also Fallon, supra note 173, at 8.
176 F.A. HAYEK, TH ROAD TO SERFDOM 112 (2007); see also, Fallon, supranote 173, at 7-8.
177 Chesterman, supra note 173, at 342. Fairness in administration also minimizes
forum shopping and the predilections of particular fact-finders.
178 Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally
Differentiated Rules Instead of "Per se Rules vs. Rule of Reason," 2 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 215, 219 (2006); Alfred E. Kahn, Standardsfor Antitrust Policy, 67 HARv. L. REV.
28, 41 (1953).
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happen, firms cannot form expectations as to the boundaries of their
competitors' behavior.1 79 Suppose, for example, a competitor abides
by these rules (and incurs costs to do so), while its rival cheats (and
seeks a competitive advantage). Failure to uniformly enforce the rules
invites others to cheat as well. Without rules yielding predictable legal
outcomes, firms may refrain from welfare-enhancing activity and opt
for less efficient forms of doing business. 8 ° Alternatively, competitors
may engage in socially harmful activity but rely on lawyers and
lobbyists to try to clear them of legal difficulties. 8 ' Thus, the rule of
law can reduce the negative welfare effects associated with such rentseeking activities."8 2 As the Nobel laureate economist Friedrich
August von Hayek frames it, "The important thing is that the rule
enables us to predict other people's behavior correctly, and this
requires that it should apply to all cases - even if in a particular
instance we feel it to be unjust."8 3
Second, although the law "fixes the rules of the game," i" 4 and
"proscribe[s] specific actions deemed socially undesirable,"''8 5 the
government is not exogenous to the free market. The laissez-faire
approach is to exclude the government from the market.8 6 But the
law, as a positive force, provides the needed scaffolding for a market
economy; it facilitates commerce and economic growth. 187 Thus, the

179

As a former DOJ official wrote:

It is well to remember that every anti-trust action is initiated because some
business men have complained about the oppressive tactics of others. An
anti-trust suit against some is fundamentally designed to help others. It is a
business baseball game with the court as an umpire.
Wendell Berge, Can We End Monopoly?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1943, at SM12.
181 See Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 178, at 220 ("The basic idea is that
following an appropriate rule without trying to optimize in any specific case might
produce on average fewer wrong decisions. If we also take into account that rulefollowing requires less information and, therefore, leads to much lower costs than
case-by-case maximization, then the application of rules can be a very economical way
of dealing with knowledge problems.").
"I For a grim account of the role of lobbyists in one recent antitrust investigation,
see Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein, The Plot to Kill Google, WIRED MAG., Jan.
19, 2009, http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-02/ff~killgoogle.
182 Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 178, at 220.
183 HAYEK, supra note 176, at 117.
"84 Kahn, supra note 178, at 30.
185 Id.
186 Laissez-faire, in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, supra note 136, at
187 Maurice E.Stucke, Better CompetitionAdvocacy, 82 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 951,

31(2008).
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rule of law enables political institutions to "provide the necessary
underpinnings of public goods essential for a well-functioning
economy and at the same time limit the discretion and authority of
188
government and of the individual actors within government."
Third, clear rules mitigate the "knowledge and information
problems that can lead to decision errors."' 8 9 With a general totalityof-economic-circumstances standard, the current administration may
be more sympathetic to one industry or firm than another. 9 ° As
Professor Hayek warned, a vague standard fosters central planning and
concentrates more power in the hands of the privileged. As central
planning "becomes more and more extensive, it becomes regularly
necessary to qualify legal provisions increasingly by reference to what
is 'fair' or 'reasonable'

. .

. [Tihis means that it becomes necessary to

leave the decision of the concrete case more and more to the
discretion of the judge or authority in question."'19
Fourth, by reducing uncertainty, the rule of law generally can lower
transaction costs, which in turn can foster transactions and allocative
efficiency.19 2 The parties, for example, need not incorporate into their
contractual dealings a dispute resolution system with all the rules to
interpret and enforce the contract, including remedies if breached, 193
or insure against complaints by third parties that their agreement is
anticompetitive.
Given these benefits, it is not surprising that the OECD's ideal
characteristics of a competition standard dovetail with these rule-oflaw principles. An antitrust standard should promote the following:
0

Accuracy negatives;

the standard should minimize false positives and

supra note 2, at 85.

188

NORTH,

189

Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 178, at 220.
HAYEK, supra note 176, at 115 (stating that where "precise effects of government

190

policy on particular people are known, where the government aims directly at such
particular effects, it cannot help knowing these effects, and therefore it cannot be
impartial").
191 Id. at 116.
192 See R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 114-19 (U. Chicago Press
1988). Allocative efficiency "means allocating goods between consumers so that it
would not be possible by any reallocation to make some people better off without

making anybody else worse off." Efficiency, in THE

OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS,

supra note 136, at 137.
'9' Simeon Djankov et al., Courts: The Lex Mundi Project 37 (Yale ICF, Working
Paper No. 02-18; Harv. Inst. of Econ., Research Paper No. 1951, 2002), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract-id=304453.
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*

Administrability-

*

Consistency - the standard should yield predictable results;

*

Objectivity - the standard should leave no subjective input
from the decision makers;

*

Applicability - the standard should reach as wide a scope of
conduct as possible; and

*

Transparency - the standard and its objectives should be
understandable. 194

the standard should be easy to apply;

Thus, if the rule of law is a necessary prerequisite for an effective freemarket system, then the competition laws, which seek to maximize the
benefits from a free-market economy while minimizing its attendant
risks and correcting its failures, should comport with these rule-of-law
principles.
To argue otherwise renders the following illogical
conclusion: the law generally must comport with these rule-of-law
principles for our market economy to function properly; but competition
law, which directly governs market behavior, is somehow exempt.
C. The Rule of Reason's Infirmities Under Rule-of-Law Principles
So how does the rule of reason, the Court's "prevailing,"'95 "usual"'96
and "accepted standard"1 97 for evaluating conduct under the Sherman
Act, fare under these rule-of-law principles? Poorly. As this subpart
discusses, the rule of reason has been criticized for its inaccuracy, its
poor administrability, its subjectivity, its lack of transparency, and its
yielding inconsistent results. 98 As Justice Scalia observed, "One can
hardly imagine a prescription more vague" than the Sherman Act's
prohibition of contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of
trade. But Justice Scalia noted, "[W] e have not interpreted it to require
a totality of circumstances approach in every case. ' 99 Since he made

194 COMPETITION COMM.,

23 (2005),

OECD,

POLIcY ROUNDTABLES:

COMPETITION ON THE MERITS

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf

COMPETITION ON THE MERITS].
195 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE

[hereinafter

OECD,

Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977).

196 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. at 2710.
197 Id. at 2712.
198

See OECD,

COMPETITION ON THE MERITS,

supra note 194, at 255 (discussing

debate between ex-ante form-based versus ex-post effects-based standards).
199 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1183
(1989).
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those statements, the Court, with Justice Scalia in the majority, has
embraced with greater fervor its totality-of-economic-circumstances test
for federal antitrust claims. 200 Justice Scalia is correct that totality-ofcircumstances tests will remain. But rather than reflexively embrace its
rule of reason, the Court should assess the infirmities of the rule of
reason under rule-of-law principles and the extent to which its standard
contributes to antitrust's ailments. In doing so,20 the Court would more
likely avoid the rule of reason "where possible." '
1. Under the Rule of Reason, Market Participants Cannot Foresee
with Fair Certainty How the Authority Will Use Its Coercive
Power in Given Circumstances and Therefore Cannot
Effectively Plan Their Affairs.
The rule of reason simply does not give market participants enough
certainty. This stems, in part, from the judicial application of a rule of
reason. As discussed above, the CBOT decision enumerated various
factors to determine liability under the antitrust laws. The rule of
reason's flexibility does little to constrain the Supreme Court's or the
lower courts' discretion.20 2 Companies therefore have little guidance
in predicting whether courts will later deem their or other market
participants' actions as unreasonablerestraints of trade.2 °3 But this lack
of certainty also stems from the inability to translate the rule of reason
into simple norms. Were that so, business executives could readily
internalize those norms into their daily business behavior. 2"
See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (narrowing scope of
quick look and opting enquiry particular to that case and circumstances, details, and
logic of challenged restraint); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (opting for
rule of reason over per se rule); Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2725 (opting for rule of reason
over per se rule).
201 Scalia, supra note 199, at 1187.
202 See, e.g., ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 24, at 102 (stating that "rule of reason and its application in particular cases - has remained imprecise and unpredictable");
Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against
Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1489 (1983) ("[P]redictability with respect to
likely legal consequences is virtually impossible since the various relevant factors
rarely point unanimously and unambiguously to a particular result."); Richard A.
Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se
Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 14-15 (1981).
203 As the Court noted before its recent decisions eliminating the per se rules,
"businessmen would be left with little to aid them in predicting in any particular case
what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act." United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc. 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
204 Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A New Approach to the Antitrust Analysis of Mergers, 83
B.U. L. REv. 785, 807 (2003) (arguing rule of reason had "become so confusing that it
200

2009]

Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law

1423

Moreover, those norms would foster a culture of competition. 20 But
without this simplicity, the rule of reason leaves businesses searching
in the dark.
The Court recently used its antitrust standards' unpredictability to
curtail antitrust enforcement:
[A]ntitrust plaintiffs may bring lawsuits throughout the
Nation in dozens of different courts with different nonexpert
judges and different nonexpert juries. In light of the nuanced
nature of the evidentiary evaluations necessary to separate the
permissible from the impermissible, it will prove difficult for
those many different courts to reach consistent results. And,
given the fact-related nature of many such evaluations, it will
also prove difficult to assure that the different courts evaluate
similar fact patterns consistently. The result is an unusually
high risk that different courts will evaluate similar factual
20 6
circumstances differently.
The Court, however, never admitted the extent that its own rule of
reason contributes to this "unusually high risk" of inconsistent
verdicts.2"7
In reality, the Court may have overstated the degree of uncertainty
from its rule of reason. The empirical evidence reflects that most ruleof-reason claims never reach juries; rather, most are decided on
motions to dismiss or summary judgment, and most (and in some
surveys nearly all) antitrust plaintiffs lose.20 8 For example, in one

precluded antitrust practitioners from advising their clients as to the legality of
particular conduct").
205 Stucke, supra note 187, at 1030.
206 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2395 (2007); see also
id. ("Once regulation of an industry is entrusted to jury trials, the outcomes of
antitrust proceedings will be inconsistent with one another ...." (quoting Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Violations in Securities Markets, 28J. CORP. L. 607, 629 (2003)).
207 The majority never responded to Justice Breyer's dissenting point that "[olne
cannot fairly expect judges and juries in such cases to apply complex economic
criteria without making a considerable number of mistakes, which themselves may
impose serious costs." Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct.
2705, 2730 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
208 See Adkinson et al., supra note 144, at 15; Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of
Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1268 (noting 84 percent of
rule of reason cases examined were disposed after plaintiff failed to make prima facie
showing of restraint's actual anticompetitive effects or likely effects using defendants'
significant market share); Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality
Under the Rule of Reason, 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 70-71 (1991) (observing that plaintiffs
lost 41 of 45 (more than 90 percent) nonprice vertical restraint cases studied, but no
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recent survey of judicial resolutions of private section 2 Sherman Act
claims, all of which are governed by the rule of reason, defendants
prevailed ninety-seven percent of the time (335 of the 344 cases).
Nearly all of the defendants' wins (313) came on motions to dismiss or
summary judgment. °9
So why is the rule of reason unpredictable, if antitrust plaintiffs
predictably lose? Although many antitrust plaintiffs lose in the
decided cases, these surveys do not reflect the number of cases where
the parties settle. 2 0 Defendants whose motion to dismiss is denied
may settle when the settlement is cheaper than protracted and costly
discovery under the rule of reason. And those defendants who
continue with discovery may settle after their summary judgment
motion is denied if settling is cheaper than the potential exposure to
an unfavorable jury verdict. Thus, one older survey found that
antitrust cases have higher rates of settlement and that antitrust
plaintiffs prevail in a lower percentage of judgments than is true
generally in federal district courts.2 1' Although the statistics temper
claims of runaway juries and high risks of false positives in antitrust
litigation, the Court's perception of uncertainty (which affects in turn
its increasing barriers for antitrust plaintiffs) remains. So too remains
the uncertainty facing market participants.
Acknowledging the uncertainty caused by the rule of reason does
not explain why the rule is so unyielding to rule-of-law principles. At
least four factors contribute to this uncertainty. First, the rule of
reason focuses on the conduct's subsequent competitive effects.2" 2
This is not a concern for blatantly anticompetitive conduct. The
nefarious purposes and effects of such conduct are either well known
or the companies, once aware of their conduct's anticompetitive
effects, choose to persist in the behavior. So if a dominant firm, for
example, acquires its remaining smaller competitors, commits the
former executives at the acquired firms to lengthy noncompete
agreements, and closes the competitors' facilities to further curtail
output, the monopoly cannot complain when the court later finds its
behavior anticompetitive under the antitrust laws. But for other
conduct, a company is still liable even though it cannot predict the
analysis of merits of rule-of-reason claims).
209 See Adkinson et al., supra note 208, at 6 n.17.
210 See id. at 14 n.86, 15-16 (noting that "plaintiffs may also affect dominant-firm
conduct by obtaining favorable settlements").
211 See also Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private
Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1001, 1011-12 (1986).
212 OECD, COMPETITION ON THE MERITS, supra note 194, at 9-10.
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competitive effect of its conduct. Lack of anticompetitive intent is not
a defense.213 Competition officials and courts, like private actors,
suffer informational asymmetries and may be little better in predicting
such conduct's future anticompetitive harm (and thus illegality). In
contrast, the per se standard has a different focus: a company (no
matter how inconsequential its market power) that agrees with its
competitors to fix prices, allocate customers or markets, or reduce
output can reasonably expect antitrust prosecution, regardless of the
competitive outcome.2 14
Second, the rule of reason is unpredictable because of the way in
which claims are proved. Frequently, antitrust plaintiffs seek to
establish a defendant's market power not with direct evidence of actual
anticompetitive effects, but circumstantially with evidence of a high
market share.2 15 Market power and liability thus hinge on how
broadly the fact-finder defines the relevant antitrust market.2 16 As
Professor (and former FTC Chair) Pitofsky once observed, the
"measurement of market power, which requires the definition of
relevant product and geographic markets, is the most elusive and
unreliable aspect of antitrust enforcement. ' 217 In investigating various
industries over the years, I found few where the business executives
and antitrust economists viewed market definition similarly.218
213 Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,

101 n.23 (1984); Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); United
States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 342 (1897).
214 indeed, conspirators in hard-core cartels take extraordinary steps to keep their
activities secret, such as burning bid files in bonfires and hiding computer files in the
eaves of one employee's grandmother's house. See Stucke, supra note 50, at 494 &
n.182. Even if cartel members do not appreciate their action's illegality, the per se
rules foster a general moral opprobrium toward these antitrust violations. Id. at 500.
215 See also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705,
2712 (2007) ("Whether the businesses involved have market power is a further,
significant consideration" under rule of reason).
216 See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(discussing key role of market definition in instant litigation).
217 Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REV. 817, 825 (1987);
see also Leegmn, 127 S.Ct. at 2730 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("The Court's invitation to
consider the existence of 'market power,' for example, invites lengthy time-consuming
argument among competing experts, as they seek to apply abstract, highly technical,
criteria to often ill-defined markets." (internal citations omitted)); COMM. ON
COMPETITION LAW & POLICY, OECD, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: ABUSE OF DOMINANCE &
MONOPOLISATION 8 (1996), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/61/2379408.pdf [hereinafter
OECD MONOPOLISATION] ("'Market share seems to be an almost universally applied
criterion, although the details of measurement are undoubtedly different."').
216 The merging parties' business plans frequently contain Strengths/Weaknesses/
Opportunities/Threats (SWOT) analysis, but rarely studies of own- or cross-elasticity
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Debates over market definition needlessly consume litigation
resources to such a degree that the litigation's outcome often hinges
on whether the court adopts the plaintiffs or defendant's proposed
market definition.2 19
Third, the rule of reason fosters uncertainty as courts, to date, often
use neoclassical economic theories to determine the challenged
restraint's likely anticompetitive effects. Antitrust's theories assume
that profit-maximizing market participants pursue their economic selfinterest with perfect knowledge and willpower. Using facts and
methods from other social sciences, the behavioral economics
literature over the past few decades has tested the limits of these
assumptions concerning individuals' rationality, willpower, and selfinterest. 22° Contrary to neoclassical economic theory, actual behavior,

of demand. See, e.g., Franklin M. Fisher, Economic Analysis and "Bright-Line" Tests, 4
J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 129, 132 (2008) (explaining business people usually do
not use "market," term of art in antitrust cases, consistently). With two-sided markets
(such as daily newspapers that must optimally price their content to attract readers,
and then garner the optimal number of readers to maximize advertising revenue),
market definition issues increase in complexity.
219 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595-96 n.20
(1985). In this tribute to faulty market destination, no one seriously contended that the
Aspen, Colorado, ski resorts exercised market power for destination skiers. Skiers
seeking a week-long holiday can consider resorts in Utah, British Columbia, Vermont,
New Mexico, the Alps, and elsewhere. Thus, if the geographic market were national or
international, then defendant's market share (and inference of market power)
diminishes. Defendant's trial counsel, however, never specifically objected to the jury
instruction on relevant market. Defense counsel objected only that the court should not
submit the issue of relevant market to the jury; instead, the court, as a matter of law,
should decide the issue. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d
1509, 1513-16 (10th Cir. 1984). The Tenth Circuit did not find plain error (i.e., the
district court's instructions on the relevant market resulted in a "miscarriage of justice"
or were "patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial"). Id. at 1516.
220 Long before behavioral economics, others questioned these simplistic,
unrealistic assumptions of human behavior. If these assumptions were true, then
market behavior is easy to predict. A state planner arguably could model any scenario
using the hypothetical profit-maximizer, and centrally plan the same outcome. But
there is no reason to favor laissez-faire competition over a centrally planned economy.
The complexity and unpredictability of the competitive process, imperfections of
human knowledge, and the variety of conditions intrinsic to or affecting markets, such
as legal, cultural, and moral norms, technology, production, and service norms, all
undermine economic policies premised on either rational profit-maximizing agents or
central planners. An inverse relationship exists between the two concepts: the greater
the infirmities of the rationality assumptions, the less practical a centrally planned
economy becomes. For interesting surveys of the many areas of behavioral economics
research, see generally DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT
SHAPE OUR DECISIONS (2008); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); ADVANCES IN
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characterized as bounded rationality, may vary. Individuals, however,
may react differently depending on how the choice is phrased, elect
suboptimal outcomes based on certain heuristics, or be far more
charitable and fair than the rational profit-maximizer. Neither the
state nor private economic agents are endowed with perfect
knowledge, but adopt a "satisficing and adaptive behavior." 22'
Ultimately, competition occurs on various dimensions (e.g., price,
quality, choice, innovation) across markets with different levels of
product differentiation, entry barriers, transparency, stages of the
product life cycle, demands for technological innovation, and
operating at different levels of efficiency, none of which can be shoehorned into a single definition of perfect competition or rationality.
Courts, then, are confronted with conflicting testimony of the
parties' retained expert economists, who typically are academics or
consulting economists with little (if any) regular interaction or
experience in the affected industry.222 Each party also gathers
customers favoring, neutral toward, or opposing the challenged
restraint, and company documents that support or undermine the
neoclassical economic theory.2 23 The fact-finder must wade through
this conflicting evidence and decide which outcome is more likely
under neoclassical economic theory, premised on a profitmaximizer. 224 Not surprisingly, the predicted outcome, like the
underlying data, may be divorced from reality. 221
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. Camerer et al. eds., 2004); Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998); Robert
A. Prentice, Chicago Man, K-T Man, and the Future of Behavioral Law and Economics,
56 VAND. L. REV. 1663, 1665-67 (2003). For a broader survey of literature attacking
the conventional economic theories, see generally ERIC D. BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF
WEALTH: THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR BUSINESS AND

SOCIETY (2007). At the 2007 annual meeting of the American Economic Association,
the Nobel laureate George A. Akerlof also questioned the assumptions of human
behavior underlying neoclassical economic theory and called for a greater focus on
actual human nature and the detailed facts of experience. See Louis Uchitelle,
EncouragingMore Reality in Economics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2007, at C1.
221 Francois Moreau, The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics, 28 CAMBRIDGE
J. ECON. 847, 851 (2003).
222 John M. Connor, Forensic Economics: An Introduction with Special Emphasis on
PriceFixing, 4J.COMPETITION L. & ECON. 31, 41 (2008).
223 See, e.g., United States v. Sunguard Data Sys., Inc., 172 F. Supp. 2d 172, 190
(D.D.C. 2001) (acknowledging court's difficulties in defining relevant market "given
the conflicting evidence from the parties' economists, as well as the conflicting
customer statements submitted by the parties").
224 Stucke, supra note 44, at 536-46.
225 Behavioral economics, until recently, made little headway into antitrust. See id. at
584. But there are several promising signs. At its past annual meeting, the American
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A fourth explanation for the rule of reason's unpredictability is its
steady stream of defenses. To its credit, the Court over the years has
foreclosed certain defenses, such as "ruinous competition" or that
'
But defendants today need not argue that
competition itself is "bad."226
price competition itself is ruinous to justify its vertical price-fixing.
The defendant can redefine competition itself under a vague total
welfare standard. Defendant can argue that consumers are better off
paying more for the defendant's goods because the consumers are
benefiting from greater services, more interbrand competition, or the
satisfaction that defendant's premium products indeed carry a premium
price. The Court in Topco notably foreclosed this defense of reducing
intrabrand competition to promote interbrand competition as a tradeoff neither antitrust defendants nor courts could make. But the Court
in Leegin resurrected it. Although a vertical restraint may lead to
higher retail prices (and reduced intrabrand competition), a postLeegin defendant can offer the prospect of more services, or greater
interbrand competition as a justification.2 27 Such a vague test of public
welfare, warned Professor Kahn, provides antitrust defendants "with an
In another troubling
unlimited supply of legal loopholes."228
development, despite a clearly worded savings clause in another recent
case, the defendant can now more easily allege that the securities laws
(or some other statute) impliedly pre-empt the Sherman Act's
application altogether for certain anticompetitive practices.2 29 The rise
Antitrust Institute's keynote speaker and panelists discussed the applicability of
behavioral economics to competition policy. Audio recordings: American Antitrust
Institute's 10th Anniversary Conference, Behavioral Economics Keynote & Panel
Discussion, held at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. (June 18-19, 2008),
available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/2008conferenceaudio.ashx. The
AAI's transition report recommended that the incoming Obama administration study the
relevance of behavioral economics for antitrust policy and proposed specific empirical
analyses. AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 24, at 26 (discussing cartels); id. at 172
(discussing mergers); id. at 185, 196, 200-01, 272-75 (discussing media industries). The
FTC, with respect to consumer protection, held a workshop on behavioral economics.
JOSEPH P. MULHOLLAND,

SUMMARY

REPORT ON

THE

FTC BEHAVIORAL

ECONOMICS

CONFERENCE 1 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/be/consumerbehavior/docs/
070914mulhollandrpt.pdf.
226 See Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
227 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715-16
(2007).
22 Kahn, supra note 178, at 41; see Arthur, supra note 24, at 340 (arguing that
overly broad standard can tempt "courts to create ways to avoid needless
overregulation, especially of sympathetic defendants, leading to formalistic
distinctions that detract from the very certainty that the standard was designed to
promote").
229 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2395 (2007) (holding
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of these vague defenses means that the Court is heading in the wrong
direction -

2.

away from certainty.

The Rule Of Reason Is Ill Suited to a Legal System in Which the
Supreme Court Reviews an Insignificant Proportion of Decided
Cases.

Justice Scalia correctly noted the pitfalls of a discretion-conferring
approach: the "idyllic notion of 'the court' gradually closing in on a
fully articulated rule of law by deciding one discrete fact situation after
another until (by process of elimination, as it were) the truly operative
facts become apparent - that notion simply cannot be applied to2 3a
court that will revisit the area in question with great infrequency."
Moreover, appellate courts do not have the luxury of undertaking
their own fact-based, totality-of-economic-circumstances analysis.
Instead they must defer to the district court's findings of fact, setting
them aside only if clearly erroneous.231
The Court's limited docket and time exacerbate the problems with
the rule of reason. To articulate an objective rule of reason that
accurately predicts competitive effects, the Court would need to
review de novo the factual findings of many cases and continually
reassess various restraints' effects in different industries. So far, the
Roberts Court is hearing more antitrust cases annually than the
Rehnquist Court. 32 But the Court overall has decided relatively few
antitrust cases. Since 1890, the Court has decided fewer than 500

that federal securities laws, despite their broad savings clauses that preserve other
rights and remedies, impliedly preempted federal antitrust law's application to
defendants' challenged anticompetitive conduct).
230 Scalia, supra note 199, at 1178; see also Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S.
469, 486 (1948) ("It is obvious that a court which can make only infrequent sallies
into the field cannot recast the body of case law on this subject in many, many years,
even if it were clear what the rules should be.").
231 United States v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34, 50 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
232 Between
September 1986 and 2005, the Rehnquist Court handed down
approximately 27 antitrust decisions. Leah Brannon & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Antitrust
Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1967 to 2007, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L, Autumn
2007, at 14. The Roberts Court has handed down eight antitrust decisions (all in
defendants' favor). See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109,
1114-17 (2009); Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2710, 2712, 2725; Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC
v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2397 (2007); Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
569-70 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S.
312, 325-26 (2007); Illinois Tool Works, Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28
(2006); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 8 (2006); Volvo Trucks NA, Inc. v.
Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 180-82 (2006).
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antitrust cases.233 That is half the number of antitrust cases filed in
2007 in federal district courts alone.2 34 The absolute numbers are, in
part, affected by the Court's trend to take fewer appeals.23 5 A change
in the Expediting Act, which governs appeals in the government's civil
2 36
antitrust cases, also limits the number of Supreme Court opinions.
Because the Court decides so few antitrust cases annually, it is
unrealistic to expect its totality-of-economic-circumstances test to
provide comprehensive guidance to the lower courts.237
But increasing the number of antitrust cases will not necessarily
improve the rule of reason unless the Court also develops it. Rather
than developing its rule of reason over the past ninety years, the Court
has simply repeated the CBOT factors.2 38 As a result, "[tihe content of
233 An online search found 457 Supreme Court decisions that cite the key antitrust
statutes, 15 U.S.C. H 1, 2, 13, 14, 18, or 45. Only 282 cases have antitrust as a topic.
(Westlaw, Mar. 2009).
234 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE, 444 tbl. 5.41 (2003)
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412007.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
235 See Schauer, supra note 22, at 205 ("One of the remarkable features of the
Supreme Court's declining workload is that during the period when the Court's own
decisional output has dropped to less than half of what it had been in the not-sodistant past, the caseloads of the state and lower federal courts have been increasing
substantially."); Signed Opinions by Term: 1926-2007, http://www.scotusblog.com/
wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/04/opinionchart.pdf (last visited Apr. 21, 2009).
236 As one DOJ official observed, until 1974, appeals in the government's civil
antitrust cases originally went directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (2006). That statute was amended in 1974 "to provide that these
appeals go to the intermediate appellate courts unless the district court certifies that
immediate Supreme Court review is of 'general public importance in the
administration of justice."' R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at British
Institute of International and Comparative Law Conference (May 11, 2004), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/204136.htm.
Even then, the Court
retains discretion to remand the case to the court of appeals. District courts certified
for direct appeal three cases, including Microsoft, which the Court declined to hear
and remanded to the court of appeals. Id.
237 See Scalia, supra note 199, at 1179 ("[It is not we who will be 'closing in on the
law' in the foreseeable future, but rather thirteen different courts of appeals ....

To

adopt such an approach, in other words, is effectively to conclude that uniformity is
not a particularly important objective with respect to the legal question at issue.").
Moreover, the Court is unlikely to review whether a trial or appellate court achieved
the proper balance in particular cases.
23
See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705,
2712-13 (2007) (citing CBOT and standards set therein as quoted throughout
Supreme Court jurisprudence on rule of reason cases); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3, 10 (1997) (same); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 n.15
(1977) (quoting directly Justice Brandeis for statement of rule). Indeed the Court,
one year after Sylvania, recognized its standard's shortcomings: "Nor has judicial
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the Rule of Reason is largely unknown," wrote Judge Posner; "in
practice, it is little more than a euphemism for nonliability." 239 The
Court in its 1977 Sylvania decision "was deceived if it thought it was
subjecting those restrictions to scrutiny under a well-understood legal
standard. ''2 1 "To be told to look to the history, circumstances,
purposes, and effects of a challenged restriction," Judge Posner
2 41
continues, "is not to be provided with usable criteria of illegality.
elaboration of the Act always yielded the clear and definitive rules of conduct which
the statute omits; instead open-ended and fact-specific standards like the 'rule of
reason' have been applied to broad classes of conduct falling within the purview of the
Act's general provisions." United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438
(1978); see also AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 24, at 202; ABA MONOGRAPH,
supra note 24, at 101 (commenting that Supreme Court decisions since Sylvania "have
not greatly clarified the muddy waters of rule of reason jurisprudence").
239 Posner, supra note 24, at 14; see also Stephen Calkins, California Dental
Association: Not a Quick Look But Not the Full Monty, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 495, 521
(2000) ("Beneath the surface lies a truth that plaintiffs and prosecutors understand all
too well: when the full, formal rule of reason is the governing standard, plaintiffs
almost never win.").
240 Posner, supra note 24, at 14; see also Robert Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case:
Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 34 (1978);
GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Cont'l T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 1976) (en
banc) (Browning, J., dissenting) ("If the courts were required to review such issues
under a 'rule of reason,' unpredictable ad hoc determinations as to what is or is not
illegal under the Sherman Act would result . .

.

. A judge or jury should not be

expected to determine whether Sylvania's locations practice contributed to Sylvania's
success in interbrand competition when Sylvania's expert witness was unable to do so.
Because the interbrand effects of Sylvania's location practice cannot be measured, a
decision ... whether the net effect of the practice was procompetitive would be sheer
guesswork."), affd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Two antitrust counsel similarly observed that
Leegin left unanswered
how the Rule of Reason will be applied in vertically imposed minimum
[RPM] agreements and what factors would allow a jury to find a specific
practice illegal. What is clear is that challenges to minimum [RPM]
agreements will be expensive and unpredictable except in the circumstance
where the justification for the minimum price is obvious and undisputed or
when there is no justification for a minimum price.
Conrad M. Shumadine & Michael R. Katchmark, Antitrust and the Media, 917
P.L.I./PAT. 393, 405 (2007); see also Mark D. Bauer, Whither Dr. Miles?, 20 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 12 n.64 (2007); Schauer, supra note 22, at 230 (saying outcome
will be "good news for the Leegin Creative Leather Products Company, for some
economists, and for some lawyers," but bad news for those desiring from Court or
from antitrust doctrine clear statement as to those practices permissible and
impermissible under Act).
241 Posner, supra note 24, at 15; see also Posner, supra note 202, at 8 ("The Rule of
Reason standard lacks content and so does not provide guidance to judges, juries, or
the Federal Trade Commission.").
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The law, like Professor Hayek observed for culture, is "the
transmission in time of our accumulated stock of knowledge."24 2 But

grounded as it is in case-specific facts, rule-of-reason analysis does not
transmit our accumulated stock of knowledge. Although lawyers
labor to satisfy the standard, no rule emerges at the end to provide
greater certainty or guidance about a practice's legality in a different
context.243 Each restraint in a particular industry and time period is
treated differently.
It is true that lower courts, with their multi-step rule-of-reason
2 44
analyses, have provided contours to CBOTs open-ended factors.

But there is no complete uniformity among
number of steps under the rule of reason,
and who bears the burden of production for
require antitrust plaintiffs to undertake
242
243

the lower courts as to the
what each step entails,245
each step. 246 Some courts
the detailed analysis of

F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 27 (1960).
See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982) ("Judges

often lack the expert understanding of industrial market structures and behavior to
determine with any confidence a practice's effect on competition. And the result of
the process in any given case may provide little certainty or guidance about the
legality of a practice in another context." (citation omitted)).
244 See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
245 See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc.,
996 F.2d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that precise role that "market power plays in
rule of reason analysis of horizontal combinations or conspiracies is a matter of some
dispute," as some have argued that "unless an antitrust plaintiff makes a threshold
demonstration that the defendants possess significant market power, defendants'
cooperative effort is immune from further rule of reason inquiry"); In re Wellbutrin
XL Antitrust Litig., No. 08-2431, 2009 WL 678631, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2009)
(stating that under rule of reason, plaintiff needs "to establish the relevant product
and geographic markets, as well as the defendants' market power"); New Eng.
Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. McKesson Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 431, 435 (D.
Mass. 2008) (stating that rule of reason in First Circuit requires that (1)"the alleged
agreement involved the exercise of [market] power in a relevant economic market;"
(2) "this exercise had anticompetitive consequences;" and (3) "those detriments
outweighed efficiencies or other economic benefits").
246 Compare Spanish Broad. Sys. v. Clear Channel Commc'ns, Inc., 376 F.3d 1065,
1071 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that plaintiff must first prove (i)"the anticompetitive
effect of the defendant's conduct on the relevant market" and (ii) "that the defendant's
conduct has no pro-competitive benefit or justification"), with In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that
under Second Circuit law, rule-of-reason analysis is three-step process, where (i)
"plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that the challenged action has had an
actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market"; (ii) "if
plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish [its action's] procompetitive redeeming virtues"; and (iii) should defendant carry this burden, plaintiff
must show that defendant could achieve same procompetitive effect "through an
alternative means that is less restrictive of competition").
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defining a relevant antitrust market at the rule of reason's onset.24 7
Others do not require such analysis (allowing instead plaintiff to show
the rough contours of the area of commerce affected) if plaintiffs
introduce evidence of actual anticompetitive effects. 248 Although the
lower courts' multistep analyses have considerably improved the
Court's CBOT factors, many of the rule of reason's fundamental
deficiencies remain. As the Supreme Court and lower courts agree,
the rule of reason remains "burdensome"2" and "onerous. '"250
247 See, e.g., Meijer, Inc. v. Barr Pharms., Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 38, 53 (D.D.C.
2008) ("A rule of reason analysis almost always begins with the definition of the
relevant market, without which there is little context to discuss competition,
anticompetitive effects, or procompetitive benefits."); Holmes, supra note 12, § 2:10,
at 167-69 n.4 (collecting cases where courts held that proof of relevant antitrust
market is essential first step under rule of reason).
24I See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) ("'[Plroof of
actual detrimental effects, such as reduction of output,' can obviate need for market
power, which is but a 'surrogate for detrimental effects."'); Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC,
221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating market share in properly defined market is
"only [one] way of estimating market power[;]" the other way is through direct
evidence of anticompetitive effects); Law v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 134 F.3d
1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating market definition "is not an end unto itself but
rather exists to illuminate a practice's effect on competition": "Under a quick look
rule of reason analysis, anticompetitive effect is established, even without a
determination of the relevant market, where the plaintiff shows that a horizontal
agreement to fix prices exists, that the agreement is effective, and that the price set by
such an agreement is more favorable to the defendant than otherwise would have
resulted from the operation of market forces."); Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82
F.3d 839, 847-48 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that although plaintiff "ordinarily 'must
delineate a relevant market and show that the defendant plays enough of a role in that
market to impair competition significantly,] ......formal market analysis becomes
unnecessary." when challenged restraint "'actually produced significant
anticompetitive effects, such as a reduction in output"'); Corey Airport Servs., Inc. v.
City of Atlanta, 1:04-CV-3243-CAP, 2008 WL 4452386, at *49 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30,
2008) (citing Ind. Fed. of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61); Mellon v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,

7 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1192 (D. Kan. 1998) (same); COLLABORATION GUIDELINES, supra
note 10, § 1.2, at 4 (" W]here the likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident from
the nature of the agreement, or anticompetitive harm has resulted from an agreement
already in operation, then, absent overriding benefits that could offset the
anticompetitive harm, the Agencies challenge such agreements without a detailed
market analysis," which involves defining relevant markets, calculating market shares
and concentration.); J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, FTC, Litigating Merger
Challenges: Lessons Learned, Prepared Remarks Before the Bates White Fifth Annual
Antitrust Conference (June 2, 2008).
249 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 n.25 (1984); Broad.
Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19 n.33 (1979) (noting "the
burdensome analysis required under the rule of reason"); Stop & Shop Supermarket
Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 373 F.3d 57, 61 (1st Cir. 2004); Calabrese v.
St. Mary's of Michigan, No. 06-13908-BC, 2007 WL 518912, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb.
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In Changing the Sherman Act's Goals, the Court Further
Reduces Accuracy, Objectivity, and Predictability Under Its
Rule-of-Reason Standard.

Under the rule of law, the Court's role would be to interpret the
Sherman Act based on (i) the original law and (ii) precedent that is
true to the original law. It would not interpret the Act based on what
it believes to be the latest economic thinking on competition policy.25 '
By declaring specific principles, Congress would be assured that the
courts, under a rule of law, would construe the Sherman Act to further
those principles, and would circumscribe the courts from arbitrarily
reaching standards (or results) inconsistent with those principles. The
Court could not announce any general rule without "a solid textual
anchor or an established social norm from which to derive the general
rule"; otherwise such a pronouncement "appears uncomfortably like
legislation. "252
Today's conventional wisdom holds that the Court ran amok with
per se liability rules between the 1940s and early 1970s.25 ' But during
that period, the Court did seek administrable rules in furtherance of
the Sherman Act's principles.2 54 To give content to the Sherman Act,
said the Court, "it is appropriate that courts should interpret its words
in the light of its legislative history and of the particular evils at which
the legislation was aimed." 255 One could argue that the Court adopted
the wrong mechanism to further those principles or that its per se
rules hindered, rather than furthered, such principles.
By contrast, today's Court is no longer anchored by the Sherman
Act's principles. The Court now holds that its antitrust doctrines
"evolve with new circumstances and new wisdom." 56 The Court's
justification is that Congress incorporated into the Sherman Act the

15, 2007); Cohlmia v. Ardent Health Servs., LLC, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1267 (N.D.
Okla. 2006); PSW, Inc. v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., No. C.A. 04-347T, 2006 WL 519670, at
*5 (D. R.I. Feb. 28, 2006); McMorris v. Williamsport Hosp., 597 F. Supp. 899, 910
(M.D. Pa. 1984).
250 McKesson, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 435.
251 See Spencer Weber Waller, Microsoft and Trinko: A Tale of Two Courts, 2006
UTAH L. REV. 741, 749 ("Trinko Court's pronouncements on this score stand merely as
a naked assertion of a policy preference that has been rejected since the passage of the
antitrust laws themselves.").
252 Scalia, supra note 199, at 1185.
253 See, e.g., AMC REPORT, supra note 23, at 33, 34, 36.
254 See supra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
255 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940).
256 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2724 (2007).
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common law's evolving standards; by doing so, Congress delegated to
the courts the duty of fixing the standard for each case.251 Citing the
common-law nature of the Sherman Act, the Court argues that
principles of stare decisis are less significant for the Sherman Act than
other federal criminal or civil statutes.258
The current Court articulates a new objective of the antitrust laws
(based on its conception of "modern" economic theory) and a rule to
promote that new objective. 259 For example, in Leegin, the Court
justified a reduction in intrabrand competition by opining that the
antitrust laws' primary purpose is to protect interbrand competition.2 °
But this policy statement never came from the Sherman Act or its

257 Id. at 2720-21; State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) ("[G]eneral
presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force... to
the Sherman Act in light of the accepted view that Congress 'expected the courts to
give shape to the statute's broad mandate by drawing on common-law tradition."'
(quoting Nat'l Soc'y of ProfI Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978))).
258 For over 90 years, the Court viewed RPM as per se illegal. The Court's aim in
Leegin was not to reconcile its abrupt departure with stare decisis principles, but to
show why these principles did not burden the Court. One of the few businesses
submitting an amicus brief in Leegin noted the importance of stare decisis given the
essential part of the regulatory background against which many discount retailers
financed, structured, and operated their businesses. Brief for Burlington Coat Factory
Warehouse Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5-7, Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL
621854, at *2-8. Although the dissent observed, "whole sectors of the economy have
come to rely upon the per se rule," the majority never responded to Burlington's or
Justice Breyer's arguments. Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
259 Likewise, to reorient rule-of-reason analysis to its ideology, the Chicago School
first recharacterized the antitrust laws' objectives. Judge Bork argued that contrary to
early thinking, the Sherman Act's legislative history "displays the clear and exclusive
policy intention of promoting consumer welfare," a term which Judge Bork gave a
different meaning than others. BORK, supra note 24, at 61. His interpretation was so
roundly discredited that some have called for a halt of its bashing. Daniel R. Ernst,
The New Antitrust History, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 879, 882 (1990); see also Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The
But as the
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 873 (1999).
Chicago School recognized, defining the goal of antitrust is paramount. "Everything
else follows from the answer we give." BORK, supra note 24, at 50. After the Chicago
School followers characterized the Sherman Act's goal as their conception of
efficiency, the Chicago School standards naturally followed. Thus to make the rule of
reason "more manageable," the Chicago School adopted the position "that the
essential spirit of the Rule is to condemn only those practices that are, on balance,
inefficient in the economic sense." Posner, supra note 24, at 16. With their goal in
place, the Chicago School adherents could "exclude some of the factors listed in the
standard formulation of the Rule of Reason." Id.
260 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2715 (quoting Khan, 522 U.S. at 15).
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legislative history. It originated in a footnote in Sylvania.261 The
Court's economic theory is sound for fungible products, 262 but flawed
for branded differentiated products. It ignores what every business
executive knows: "the most direct and effective competition for a
branded product, especially
one that is highly advertised, is a firm
263
selling the same brand.

261 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-52 n.19 (1977)
("Interbrand competition ... is the primary concern of antitrust law."). The Court
viewed interbrand competition as competition among the manufacturers of the same
"generic" product - television sets in that case. It is not apparent, however, that
television sets are generic. Television sets range in size, type (plasma or LCD),
features, and price. A recent search of one national electronics retailer found a wide
dispersion in prices for a 42-inch 1080p flat-panel LCD HDTV among the 11 brands
sold: Pioneer ($2,699); Sony ($2,299); Philips ($1,999); HP ($1,899); Panasonic
($1,799); Sharp ($1,799); Toshiba ($1,699); JVC ($1,299); LG ($1,299); Insignia
($996); and Westinghouse ($996). Television sets were also among the differentiated
products fair-traded when RPM was legal under certain states' "Fair Trade" laws. S.
REP. No. 94-466, at 2 (1975) ("The principle products fair traded are stereo
components, television sets, major appliances, mattresses, toiletries, kitchenware,
watches, jewelry, glassware, wallpapers, bicycles, some types of clothing, liquor, and
prescription drugs."). Moreover, a DOJ study estimated a price discrepancy of 18 to
27 percent between states that did and did not enact Fair Trade laws: "For example, a
set of golf clubs that lists for $220 can be purchased in non-fair-trade areas for $136; a
$49 electric shaver for $32; a $1,360 stereo system for $915 and a $560 19-inch color
television for $483." Id. at 3.
262 The Court was correct that "when interbrand competition exists" among
fungible commodities, "it provides a significant check on the exploitation of
intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different
brand of the same product." Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-52 n.19. If Farmer Smith, for
example, seeks to impose RPM for her carrots sold at the local supermarket,
consumers would switch to other farmers' carrots. Thus, intrabrand competition is of
little consequence for fungible products where producers likely are price-takers.
263 Pitofsky, supra note 217, at 826. For example, with the advent of our fourth
child, I recently haggled with Toyota and Honda dealers for the lowest price for a new
minivan. The Sienna and Odyssey models bore similar features, and safety, reliability,
and quality ratings. Under the Court's logic, this interbrand competition should have
maximized my consumer surplus. But the sales representatives were uninterested in
the price of their rival's minivan. Only when presented with a price for the same
vehicle from a rival dealer did the haggling commence in earnest. One recent study
examined the effects of RPM in the car industry when Toyota implemented its "nohaggle" program in certain Canadian provinces. Honda did not implement a similar
RPM program; its customers could still haggle with dealers. The study found that
Toyota's RPM program had the effect of increasing prices for both Toyota and Honda
autos (the authors posit that Toyota's RPM gave Honda the flexibility to increase
price) but did not affect Toyota's sales (Honda's sales increased). Xiaohua Zeng et al.,
The Competitive Implications of a "No-Haggle" PricingPolicy: The Access Toyota Case 23 (2008), available at http://management.ucsd.edu/faculty/seminars/2008/papers/
weinburg.pdf.
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Under the Court's flawed economic theories, antitrust standards will
continue to stray further from rule-of-law principles. 2' Evolving (and
disputed) economic theory cannot provide the requisite rules for civil
and criminal illegality. As one study of the antitrust laws puts it,
"[1] egal requirements are prescribed by legislatures and courts, not by
economic science. '' 265 Each new "wisdom" can affect criminal liability
under the Sherman Act. 26 6

Neoclassical economics cannot predict

Some Toyota customers did note better service, but it is unclear to what degree this
was the result of RPM or the shift from price competition between Honda and Toyota
to nonprice competition. Moreover, the extent to which customers preferred service
over price is also unclear. The EC also found the importance of intrabrand
competition in Grundig.
Without intrabrand competition, consumers for
differentiated goods were forced to buy branded products at an excessive mark-up
because no competition existed in the distribution of the product: "the more
producers succeed in their efforts to render their own makes of product individually
distinct in the eyes of the consumer, the more the effectiveness of competition
between producers tends to diminish." Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements
Consten S.A.R.L. v. Comm'n, 1966 E.C.R. 299, 343, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder]
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 8046 (E.C.R. 1966). The EC found that wholesale
prices for Grundig products in France ranged between 23 and 44 percent higher than
those in Germany, net of customs duties and taxes and after taking discounts into
consideration. A tougher issue is if after RPM, output for the branded differentiated
good increases.
Suppose, for example, Toyota authorized fewer dealers per
geographic region, and each dealer sold Toyotas at a fixed retail price. Output for
Toyotas thereafter increases nationally. Some will argue that the vertical restraint had
the effect of increasing services for, or reputation of, Toyota autos, thereby making
them more attractive to consumers. Besides the correlation/causation issue, the
output test, while a good indicator for undifferentiated goods, is unsatisfactory for

highly differentiated goods (like minivans or TV sets). If the Toyota Sienna remains
cheaper than the Honda Odyssey, the marginal consumer may purchase the Toyota
(thus output increases), but cannot extract that last bit of consumer surplus though
intrabrand competition. See also Brief for Comanor & Scherer as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party at 4-5, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
127 S.Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 173679 (arguing consumer welfare
can decline despite increase in output).
264 See Arthur, supra note 24, at 338 ("Clarity in antitrust law is not possible under
the current conception of the Sherman Act as a standardless delegation to the federal
courts to engage in microeconomic regulation, especially in view of the 'explosive
expansion of Sherman Act coverage' beyond the subjects that dominated antitrust for
its first half century.").
265 STANLEY N.

BARNES ET AL., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO

STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 316 (1955); see also Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2729 ("[A]ntitrust
law cannot, and should not, precisely replicate economists' (sometimes conflicting)
views.").
266 Aware that the government can prosecute Sherman Act violations criminally or
civilly, Justice O'Connor argued that the Act
does not authorize courts to develop standards for the imposition of criminal
punishment. To the contrary, this Court determined that the objective
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myriad behavior across markets today.167 Given many markets'
dynamic nature, courts cannot expect to optimize allocative efficiency
through the rule of reason. Despite claims of being descriptive in
nature, any economics-based competition policy ultimately is
normative. 268

Subjective

value judgments

underlie

"objective"

economic standards,2 69 and the objectives vary. 270 For example,
although lower courts recently described the ultimate goal of the
antitrust laws as protecting consumers or enhancing consumer
welfare,2 7' no consensus exists as to the meaning of "consumer
welfare.

'2

72

Legal standards that are premised on the Court's

standard to be used in deciding whether conduct violates the Sherman Act
- the rule of reason - was evinced by the language and the legislative
history of the Act. It is one thing to recognize that some degree of
uncertainty exists whenever judges and juries are called upon to apply
substantive standards established by Congress; it would be quite another
thing to tolerate the arbitrariness and unfairness of a legal system in which
the judges would develop the standards for imposing criminal punishment
on a case-by-case basis.
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 951 (1988) (citations omitted).
267 Stucke, supra note 44, at 513, 527-31.
26 Kahn, supra note 178, at 39 (saying fair competition "indissolubly linked with the
non-economic values of free enterprise - equality of opportunity, the channeling of the
profit motive into socially constructive channels, and the diffusion of economic power").
See generally Wolfgang Kerber, Should Competition Law Promote Efficiency? Some
Reflections of an Economist on the Normative Foundations of Competition Law, in
ECONOMIC THEORY AND COMPETITION LAW (Josef Drexl et al. eds., forthcoming 2009)
(positing that "normative [economic] foundations of competition law" remain
undeveloped), available at http://papers.ssm.consol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1075265.
269 As the
OECD recognized, an "objective" standard reflects the antitrust
enforcers' objectives. OECD MONOPOLISATION, supra note 217, at 9-10, 14-15; see also
Stucke, supra note 187, at 1001-07.
270 UNILATERAL

CONDUCT

WORKING

GROUP,

REPORT

ON

THE

OBJECTIVES

OF

UNILATERAL CONDUCT LAWS, ASSESSMENT OF DOMINANCE/SUBSTANTIAL MARKET POWER,

AND STATE-CREATED MONOPOLIES 2, 5 (2007) (survey of 33 members identified 10
at
available
behavior),
monopolistic
regarding
objectives
policy
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/medialibrary/unilateral-conduct/
ICN
[hereinafter
Objectives%20of%2OUnilateral%2OConduct%20May%2007.pdf
STUDY];

ADVOCACY WORKING GROUP,

INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, ADVOCACY AND

COMPETITION POLICY REPORT 32-33 (2002) (discussing how "objectives of competition
http://
laws vary widely from one jurisdiction to another"), available at
www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/OutreachToolkit/media/assets/resources/

advocacy-report.pdf.
17lSee John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust:
Protecting Consumers, Not IncreasingEfficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191, 211-37
(2008) (collecting cases).
272 Although 30 of 33 ICN respondents identified this objective, most "do not
specifically define consumer welfare and appear to have different economic
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assessment of the latest prevailing economic thinking simply afford
too much discretion to the judiciary.
Congress never intended to give the courts unfettered discretion to
interpret the Sherman Act for the advancement of a particular judge's
ideologies. 3 Ultimately, the goals of competition law and their
ordering must reflect citizens' preferences and must be determined
politically, not judicially." 4
4.

In Making Competition Policy Tradeoffs, the Court Further
Reduces Accuracy, Objectivity, and Predictability Under the
Rule of Reason.

Between the 1940s and 1970s, the Court articulated rules to
constrain itself and the lower courts from weighing increases in
competition in one sector versus losses in another. Under Justice
Scalia's logic, that approach displays more judicial restraint than to
announce that "'on balance,' we think the law was violated here leaving ourselves free to say in the next case that, 'on balance,' it was
not. 275 Ultimately, as the OECD Competition Committee has noted,

understandings of the term." ICN STUDY, supra note 270, at 9. The AMC's 449-page
report addresses how "antitrust law and enforcement can best serve consumer welfare
in the global, high-tech economy that exists today," yet after spending three years and
nearly $4 million, the AMC has never reached unanimity on the definition of
"consumer welfare."
AMC REPORT, supra note 23, at 1, 26 n.22.
Its 12
Commissioners, all with backgrounds in competition policy, disagreed over a
relatively straightforward question:
"should efficiencies that benefit only the
[merging] parties, with no prospect of being passed along to consumers, be counted in
favor of a merger?" Commissioner Carlton, a University of Chicago professor, argued
yes. Total surplus is "used routinely in cost-benefit analysis, a tool of widespread use
in public policy." Id. at 401. CommissionerJacobson disagreed: "[any doubts that a
consumer welfare standard better reflects the goals of the antitrust laws than a
standard based on total welfare will serve only to undermine antitrust enforcement in
the future." Id. at 423. Although the use of the total versus consumer surplus
standard can have various implications for antitrust analysis, the cases in which the
choice of standard makes a difference, the AMC concluded, "are relatively few." Id. at
26 n.22; see also EVANS, supra note 151, at 36 (quoting FIPRA's U.S. interviews, "[I]t
became apparent that the term 'consumer welfare' was itself an ideologically loaded
one"); HOVENKAMP, supra note 24, at 77 ("Although 'maximizing consumer welfare' is
an appealing term, its content is ambiguous."); OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 18, at 29
(noting dispute over term's definition).
273 Nor can Congress give up and transfer its legislative powers to the judiciary or
executive branch. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
274 Kerber, supra note 268, at 17.
275 Scalia, supra note 199, at 1179-80.
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it is difficult "to have confidence that balancing tests can be applied
accurately, objectively, and consistently. "276
Courts, however, weigh competing interests across numerous other
causes of action.277 Some may be unfazed if the fact-finder, under
antitrust's rule of reason, weighs the challenged restraint's pro- and
anticompetitive effects. Why is antitrust any different?
Antitrust is different in two important ways. First, weighing competing
societal interests may be appropriate when the cause of action is in its
But it is suboptimal
infancy (such as a prima facie tort) or for novel cases.
278
for the majority of adjudications over the long-term.
Second, competition policy should not arise from judicial balancing.
Under the rule of reason, the "factfinder weighs all of the
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on
competition. '' 279 Weighing a particular restraint's competitive benefits
and harms, however, is often beyond the litigants', judiciary's, and
antitrust agencies' capacity. 28 Weighing incommensurable societal
interests in determining antitrust liability also exceeds judicial and
regulatory competence. 28' Thus noneconomic societal interests are
often,282 but not always,28 3 excluded from antitrust analysis.
276
277

OECD, COMPETITION ON THE MERITS, supra note 194, at 11.
In negligence cases, for example, courts weigh whether

the challenged

behavior's societal harm exceeds its benefits. For tortious interference claims, the
Restatement's multi-factor test determines the propriety of the interference.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (1979).
278 For criticisms of some business torts' nebulous standards, see, for example, Dan
B. Dobbs, Tortious Interference with Contractual Relationships, 34 ARK. L. REV. 335, 348
(1980) (criticizing legal standards for tortious interference claims); Donald C. Dowling,
Jr., A Contract Theory for a Complex Tort: Limiting Interference with Contract Beyond the
Unlawful Means Test, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 487 (1986) (noting tort causes of actions are
too broad); Gary Myers, The Differing Treatment of Efficiency and Competition in
Antitrust and Tortious Interference Law, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (1993) (noting
inconsistencies in tortious interference law); Harvey S. Perlman, Interference with
Contract and Other Economic Expectancies: A Clash of Tort and Contract Doctrine, 49 U.
CHI. L. REV. 61 (1982) (criticizing legal standards for tortious interference claims).
279 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2007).
280 The Court "has not provided practical guidance on how to perform the required
balancing, the weight to be given various factors, or the analytical rigor with which
the balancing must be done." ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 24, at 125. Moreover,
courts are ill-suited to decide the optimal competitive outcome out of the spectrum of
possibilities. F. SCHERER & D. Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 336-37 (3d ed. 1990).
In National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692-95
2'
(1978), for example, the competing engineers agreed "to refuse to discuss prices with
potential customers until after negotiations.. . [which] resulted in the initial selection of
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The greater danger today is not the last step of the rule-of-reason
analysis, when the fact finder weighs the pro- and anticompetitive
effects. Instead, it "is now conventional wisdom for antitrust lawyers
to observe

that courts ... almost

never explicitly

balance

the

procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of an alleged restraint."284
Instead, the balancing "occurs at each preceding step of the analysis,
rather than at the end." 5 Thus, the greater danger exists in the
preceding steps when the court makes policy trade-offs of what is proand anticompetitive in the first place.
Competition policy has many unsettled trade-offs. Antitrust policy
makers have long disagreed whether to evaluate mergers or other
restraints under a total-welfare or consumer-welfare standard.2 86 Nor
is there consensus on what either standard encompasses.287 Much
depends on what is measured and is actually measurable over what

an engineer." The Society justified its anticompetitive restraint on bidding with
incommensurable noneconomic concerns - namely, low bids would tempt individual
engineers to do inferior work with consequent risk to public safety and health. The
Court recognized its inability (and its lack of authority under the Sherman Act) to weigh
the loss of price competition with the public benefit of preventing inferior engineering
work and insuring ethical behavior. Instead, the engineers' justifications were "nothing
less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act." Id. at 695.
282 See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990)
(explaining social justifications have no effect); Profl Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 688
(explaining that rule of reason "does not open the field of antitrust inquiry to any
argument in favor of a challenged restraint that may fall within the realm of reason"
and that "[i]nstead, it focuses directly on the challenged restraint's impact on
competitive conditions").
283 See, e.g., United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678 (3d
Cir. 1993) (remanding
so district court could more fully investigate and weigh MIT's noneconomic
justifications); Holmes, supra note 12, § 2:10, at 189-90 (collecting cases).
284 William J. Kolasky, Jr., ReinvigoratingAntitrust Enforcement in the United States:
A Proposal, 22 ANTITRUST 85, 87 (2008); see also ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 24, at
126 (balancing rarely undertaken); 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW c91912, at
339 (2005) ( "[The] set of rough judgments we make in antitrust litigation does not
even come close to this 'balancing' metaphor. Indeed, most courts do not define a unit
of measurement in which the quantities to be balanced can be measured .... To the

best of our knowledge, this has never been done in any antitrust case."); Carrier, supra
note 208, at 1268 (pointing out that fact-finder reached last stage of balancing proand anticompetitive effects in only 20 of 495 rule-of-reason cases studied). But see
Nat'l Football League v. N. Am. Soccer League, 459 U.S. 1074, 1077 (1982)
(disagreeing with appellate court, which "gave too little weight to the procompetitive
features of the cross-ownership rule and engaged in excessive speculation as to its
anticompetitive effect") (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
285 Kolasky, supra note 284, at 87.
286 Stucke, supra note 187, at 993-95.
287 Id.
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period.' Economists, much less judicial fact-finders, are ill-equipped
to quantify the value of different forms of competition, such as interand intrabrand competition, static versus dynamic efficiency, and a
restraint's impact on that competition. 9 Even if such weighing were
2 90
feasible, no consensus exists on the relative weights for each factor.
In certain industries, society may seek to promote innovation91
(dynamic efficiency) more than lower prices (static efficiency)
Moreover, the weighing ignores the distributional effects of the
challenged restraint. In balancing pro- and anticompetitive effects, the
fact-finder does not consider whether one group bears the brunt of
anticompetitive effects over time.292
The Leegin Court resurrected two trade-offs. The five justices never
assessed their competency to make these normative trade-offs, their
authority under the Sherman Act to do so, nor the implications under
the rule of law. Instead, first, the Court willingly traded off the
reduction of intrabrand price competition (the reduction in price
competition for Leegin Brighton brand products among retailers) for
the prospect of increased interbrand competition (greater competition
between Leegin's Brighton brand products and other manufacturers'

The deadweight welfare loss, for example, represents the social costs arising
from supra-competitive pricing. It misses anticompetitive practices' other social costs.
Professor Williamson's trade-off calculus for weighing the effects on total welfare,
include, to the extent quantifiable: (i) the cost from slower (or the lack of)
technological progress once a monopolist or cartel lays claims to a national market,
and (ii) the other social costs the monopolist or cartel imposes (or incurs), such as the
political implications of control over wealth, a matter for "serious" concern. See
Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM.
ECON. REV. 18, 24, 28 (1968). Chicago School adherents, however, exclude these
social costs from their equation.
289 Even if one could determine whether conduct enhances or reduces total or
consumer welfare, "it can be quite challenging, if not impossible, to measure the magnitude
of those changes." OECD, COMPETITION ON THE MERITS, supra note 194, at 11.
290 Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity-BasedApproach, in
288

UNIQUE VALUE:

COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION:

CREATING UNIQUE VALUE FOR

156-57 (Charles D. Weller ed.,
2004), available at http://www.isc.hbs.edu/053002antitrust.pdf (questioning whether
antitrust should be focused primarily on price competition when other parameters of
competition, such as innovation or productivity, may play more important role).
ANTITRUST, THE ECONOMY, EDUCATION AND BEYOND 154,

291 Kerber, supra note 268, at 6-7.

supra note 151, at 18 (noting "Kaldor compensation principle works as a
one off shot, but fails in situations where multiple detriments occur to the same group
of people"); Kerber, supra note 268, at 9-13 (discussing criticisms of Kaldor-Hicks as
normative criterion for economic analysis of legal rules when gains and losses are
distributed unevenly among population).
292

EVANS,
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brands of leather goods and accessories).29 3 Although price surveys
show that RPM often increased the products' retail prices,294 the Court
reasoned, "prices can be increased in the course of promoting
procompetitive effects."2 95 While waiting for these procompetitive
benefits, consumers pay more.' 96 in contrast, the Topco Court found it
beyond its competency and authority under the Sherman Act "to
determine the respective values of competition in various sectors of
the economy;" the politically accountable Congress must make this
297
tradeoff between inter- and intrabrand competition.
293 The Court recognized that a manufacturer's use of vertical price restraints
"tends to eliminate intrabrand price competition." Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2007). But eliminating this form of price
competition was acceptable, reasoned the Court, because it viewed the antitrust laws'
primary purpose as promoting interbrand competition. The Court then offered some
examples from the economic literature of how RPM at times may promote interbrand
competition. Id. at 2714-16. This fares no better than the majority's response in
Sylvania to Continental's contention that balancing intra- and interbrand competitive
effects of vertical nonprice restrictions is not a "proper part of the judicial function."
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 n.27 (1977). The majority
replied that its reasoning in Schwinn, which the Sylvania Court criticized and
overruled, refuted this claim. Id. But reliance on Schwinn is suspect, as the Court
stated, without any analysis that the rule of reason "cannot be confined to intrabrand
competition." United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 382 (1967).
Never addressing its concerns in Topco, the Sylvania Court weakly distinguished its
earlier decision as involving "a horizontal restriction among ostensible competitors."
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56 n.27. But Topco generally justified restricting its members'
intrabrand competition to promote interbrand competition. The Court in Topco noted
its incapacity (and lack of authority) to make such trade-offs generally. It never
suggested that its abilities to make such a trade-off somehow improves when the
trade-off involves a vertical, rather than a horizontal, restraint.
294 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2727-28. See generally Brief for Comanor & Scherer as
Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 4, Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480),
2007 WL 173679 (acknowledging general acceptance that RPM and other vertical
restraints lead to higher consumer prices and these increases can be substantial).
295 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718. In contrast, the Court elsewhere emphasized how
"[1Iow prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as
they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition." Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312, 318 (2007) (quoting Atl.
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990)); Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993) (quoting same); see
also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997) (quoting same).
296 The Court speculates that RPM may reduce retail prices if manufacturers
resorted to costlier alternatives to control resale prices. Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2718.
Under that logic, legalization of facilitating practices (or cartels) lowers the
defendants' transaction costs in circumventing the legal prohibitions against collusion,
and thereby leads to lower fixed prices.
297 The Leegin Court lacked a rich empirical record to confidently trade off intrafor interbrand competition. The empirical evidence, it admitted, was "limited." Id. at
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Second, the Leegin Court accepted a reduction of one facet of
competition (intrabrand price competition), believing it might
promote another facet of competition: encouraging "retailers to invest
in tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts that aid the
manufacturer's position as against rival manufacturers."29' Thus, with
intrabrand "price competition decreased, the manufacturer's retailers
compete among themselves over services."2 99 But in Catalano, Inc. v.
Target Sales, Inc., the Court refused to trade off one facet of
competition for a possible increase in another. °° One distinction from
2717; see also Bauer, supra note 240, at 9 ("Few scholars have performed empirical
research on RPM."). Congress can solicit the views of various constituencies and
independently gather facts; the Court is limited to the facts and views presented. See
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2737 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The supposed villains in Leegin are
profit-maximizing consumers; they shamelessly consumed some retailers' free services
and then patronized the discounters. Id. at 2715-16. Actual consumers were not a
party in Leegin nor had the opportunity to defend themselves against this empirically
suspect allegation. See id. at 2710. Rational choice theory predicts individuals will
free ride when confronted with a public good. Neither the antitrust agencies nor the
Court addressed the more recent empirical behavioral economics literature, which
undercuts the "rationality" assumptions underlying the Chicago School's dated
economic wisdom. Stucke, supra note 44, at 969-71. In behavioral experiments,
many individuals do not free ride at all (or not to the extent predicted under rational
choice theory). In these public good experiments, "people have a tendency to
cooperate until experience shows that those with whom they're interacting are taking
advantage of them." RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIc LIFE 14 (1992); see also Comanor & Scherer, supra note 263,

at 6 (noting "skepticism in the economic literature about how often [free-riding]
actually occurs"); EVANS, supra note 151, at 10 (recommending additional empirical
work on market-by-market basis to determine "who the marginal consumer is, how
they make choices and to what extent they can actually act as the market-disciplining
marginal consumer"); Prentice, supra note 220, at 1675-76. Even if free-riding were
significant in some industries, the Court lacked the empirical foundation for assessing
its trade-off, namely, how much consumer surplus is lost when intrabrand price
competition is eliminated versus the gains from interbrand competition.
298 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2715.
299 Id. at 2716.
300 446 U.S. 643, 644 (1980). In Catalano, defendant beer wholesalers allegedly
agreed to eliminate interest-free credit to the retailers. Before their secret agreement,
defendants extended interest-free credit up to the 30- and 42-day limits "permitted by
state law." Id. at 644-45. Before the alleged agreement, defendants competed with
respect to trade credit; "the credit terms for individual retailers varied substantially.
After entering into the agreement, defendants uniformly refused to extend any credit
at all." Id. The Ninth Circuit believed the credit-fixing agreement might enhance
competition: (1) "by removing a barrier perceived by some sellers to market entry,"
and (2) "by the increased visibility of price made possible by the agreement to
eliminate credit." Id. The Supreme Court rejected both claims. Id. As a matter of
neo-classical economic theory, the defendants' agreement on one facet of competition
will encourage competition in other facets where cheating is less detectable. See
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Leegin, however, is that Catalano involved a horizontal restraint (thus
price competition is eliminated across the defendants' competing
products) whereas Leegin involved a vertical restraint (price
competition is eliminated only for one manufacturer's brand). 301 But
even for this one brand, the Court never articulates how consumers
will benefit in the long-run from this trade-off. Moreover, when
brands are more differentiated, interbrand competition is less
significant relative to the intrabrand competition.
These trade-offs increase the rule of reason's unpredictability. The
Court in Leegin, for example, never indicates how much
manufacturers can raise the minimum retail price for their goods to
deter free-riding. The assumption is that the manufacturer's and
consumers' interests are aligned: the manufacturer will not raise
30 2
prices beyond levels necessary to effectuate the requisite services.
The Court in Leegin never cites any empirical evidence of the extent to
which manufacturers' and consumers' incentives are aligned. It is, of
course, perfectly rational for manufacturers to avoid competition by
differentiating their branded products.30 3 Moreover, a manufacturer
can use RPM to avoid a retail price war, which may ultimately squeeze
its profit margins.3°4 But how then can the fact-finder quantify the
Posner, supra note 202, at 20 ("One should not conclude from this that a cartelized
market is as competitive as a noncartelized market, though in different ways."). When
rates are regulated, the regulated companies (such as airlines and railroads) often
compete on nonprice dimensions, like quality and service. As the Court found in the
regulated transportation industry, "there is frequently no real rate competition at all
and such effective competition as actually thrives takes other forms." N. Pac. Ry. Co.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 12 (1958). Nonetheless, the Court rejected this trade-off
that "the informing function of the agreement, the increased price visibility, justiffies]
its restraint on the individual wholesaler's freedom to select his own prices and terms
of sale." Catalano,446 U.S. at 649.
'0'Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2710; Catalano, 446 U.S. at 644.
302 See Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2719-20.
303 Michael E. Porter, The Five Competitive Forces That Shape Strategy, HARV. Bus.
REv., Jan. 2008, at 86. Such differentiation can enhance consumer welfare by offering
a greater variety of products and services. At other times, image advertising leads to
greater corporate profits, without significant product or services improvements.
Although "rational" consumers opt for the generic, less expensive alternative, others
fall spell to the marketing campaign. Moreover, RPM can be simply used as
presenting a premium image to consumers though a premium price. As one
manufacturer justified RPM, "We don't want consumers to think we're the cheapest
guys in the world." Joseph Pereira, Price-FixingMakes Comeback After Supreme Court
Ruling, WALL ST.J., Aug. 18, 2008, at Al.
" Retailers, whose margins are squeezed, will likely turn for relief to their
wholesalers, who in turn look for relief from the price war from the manufacturer. For
example, the FTC alleged the major music labels employed RPM to end such a price
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incremental value of services to assure that the manufacturer, under
pressure from its dealers, does not exceed it? The Leegin Court never
explained the justifications for RPM "with sufficient clarity for a
generalist judge to understand." 30 5 As a result, it is unclear how the
rule of reason will be applied to RPM.30 6 Not surprisingly, as one
retailer described the post-Leegin rule-of-reason world, "'it's becoming
a nightmare operating a business.' 30 7
5.

Because the Rule Of Reason Is Not Prospective, Accessible, and
Clear, It Does Not Constrain the Executive Branch from
Exercising Power Arbitrarily.

Legal standards of inadequate clarity or precision are criticized "as
undemocratic -

and, in the extreme, unconstitutional -

because

they leave too much to be decided by persons other than the people's
representatives.
This criticism is supported by at least four
concerns: (i) government's susceptibility to rent-seeking behavior; (ii)
selective enforcement; and (iii) administrative inaction; and (iv)
potential economic influence of target companies.

war. Complaint, In re Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp. & UMG Recordings,
Inc. (F.T.C. 2000) (No. C-3974), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/
09/unicomp.htm. In the early 1990s, several large consumer electronics chains began
selling and aggressively discounting compact discs and other prerecorded music
products. Id. A price war ensued. Some retailers requested margin protection from
defendant Universal Music & Video Distribution Corp. Id. Universal, concerned that
declining retail prices could affect its wholesale price, introduced a Minimum Advertised
Pricing policy that set minimum advertised prices for most prerecorded music products.
Id. In 1992 and 1993, the other major distributors (which with Universal accounted for
85 percent of all compact discs sold in the United States) adopted similar policies. Id. In
1995 and 1996, retail prices increased. Id. Distributors increased their prices, and
thereafter, wholesale music prices increased. Id. The FTC reached separate settlements
with the five music distributors to discontinue for seven years their Minimum
Advertised Pricing programs. For 13 years thereafter, defendants cannot condition
promotional money on the retail prices contained in advertisements they do not pay for.
Defendants also cannot terminate relationships with any retailer based on that retailer's
prices. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Record Companies Settle FTC Charges of
Restraining Competition in CD Music Market: All Five Major Distributors Agree to
Abandon Advertising Pricing Policies (May 10, 2000) (http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/05/
cdpres.shtm); see also S. Robson Walton, Antitrust, RPM, and the Big Brands: Discounting
in Small-Town America (II), 15 ANTITRUSTL. & ECON. REv. 11, 15-16 (1983).
305 Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2733 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
306

See AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 24, at 202; ABA TRANSITION REPORT,

supra note 169, at 63.
307 Pereira, supra note 303.
308 Scalia, supra note 199, at 1176.
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If governments have a wide discretionary scope, their policies are
prone to distortion by rent-seeking behavior.3" The vague rule of
reason creates opportunities for competitors to lobby executive
agencies to punish their competitors or to prevent being punished
themselves. For example, before its antitrust headaches, Microsoft
devoted little energy to lobbying efforts. At least one D.C. journalist
believes this neglect exposed Microsoft to the government's antitrust
prosecution. 3 0 As the Washington Post commented, "For a couple of
embarrassing years in the mid-1990s, Microsoft's primary lobbying
presence was lack and his Jeep'-Jack Krumholz, the software giant's
lone in-house lobbyist, who drove a Jeep Grand Cherokee to lobbying
visits. ""'

After the DOJ filed the antitrust lawsuit in 1998, Microsoft

"began what was then considered the largest government-affairs
makeover in corporate history" and now has "one of the most
dominating, multifaceted, and sophisticated influence machines
around - one that spends tens of millions a year. "312 Of the twentythree people now working out of Microsoft's government affairs office
in Washington, sixteen are lobbyists.3 13
Companies increasingly manage exogenous risks, such as currency
rate fluctuations, through an array of financial instruments. But to
hedge against antitrust risks, companies cannot rely on rule-of-law
principles. Instead, they can steer clear of behavior that is potentially
precompetitive, but under the rule of reason poses a significant risk of
antitrust liability. They can resort to lobbyists and lawyers, which can
waste scarce resources.314 Clear rules circumscribe the agencies'

309 The more vague the standard, the more criteria one can consider (and weigh),
the greater the danger of both political pressure and/or the parties' direct interventions
can influence the competition authorities' decisions and produce decision errors.
Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 178, at 216.

310 Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Learning From Microsoft's Error, Google Builds a Lobbying
Engine, WASH. POST, June 20, 2007, at D1.
311

Id.

Id.
Id. What Microsoft spent in lobbying just in the third quarter of 2008 (almost
$2 million) nearly equaled what Google spent in the first nine months of 2008, which
itself exceeds Google's lobbying expenses in 2007. Joelle Tessler, Microsoft's Lobbying
Tab Dwarfs Google's Tally: Software Giant Spent $2 Millionfor the Third QuarterAlone,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 11, 2008, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
27669103/wid/18298287.
312
313

314 FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTIONS, AND
POLITICAL EXTORTION 124-31 (1997).
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discretion and mitigate this rent-seeking, which is condemned by the
Chicago School, post-Chicago, and non-Chicago commentators alike.315
A second concern with the vague rule of reason is that a particular
administration can selectively enforce the Sherman Act to achieve its
political (or personal) ends.
Antitrust enforcement can be
ideological 316 and highly politicized.
The federal agencies have
tremendous discretion when, if at all, and on whom to focus their
pervasive prosecutorial antitrust powers. It is naive to view the
agencies as beyond political pressure.317 For example, President
Lyndon B. Johnson permitted a merger between two Houston banks in
exchange for favorable coverage in the Houston Chronicle.3 8
315 See, e.g., A.E. Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed
Antitrust Programsfor Developing Countries, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 209, 226, 226
n.79 (1994) (collecting literature); see also ADVOCACY WORKING GROUP, ADVOCACY &
COMPETITION
POLICY
REPORT,
at ii (2002),
available at
http://www.
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/OutreachToolkit/media/assetsresources/advocacyreport.pdf.
316 This conflict in ideologies within the United States extends to divergences
between some U.S. and E.U. competition policymakers on issues of abuse of
dominance and vertical restraints. See EVANS, supra note 151, at 74 (observing
divergence in ideologies is exacerbated by "lack of tools and a consensus on the
balancing of consumer welfare, efficiency and innovation").
317 Some Republicans in 2000 charged the DOJ under the Clinton administration as
too political and argued for restoring the agency's integrity.
"'There's been a
leadership vacuum, and the department has been politicized,"' said William Barr, who
served as Attorney General in the George H.W. Bush administration. "'The primary
task will be to rebuild professionalism and morale - the department has to be reprofessionalized.'
Byron York, Restoring Justice - If Bush Wins, A Great and Urgent
Task, NAT'L REV., June 5, 2000, availableat 2000 WLNR 6447647. One of George W.
Bush's campaign promises was to make the DOJ less political. He said that his new
Attorney General would perform his duties "'guided by principle, not by politics."'
Bush added, "'I wanted someone who would have a commitment to fair and firm and
impartial administration of justice. I am confident I've found that person in John
Ashcroft."' Jill Zuckman, Bush Draws from Ends of Political Spectrum: Ashcroft
Nominatedfor Attorney General, Whitman for EPA Chief, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 23, 2000,
available at 2000 WLNR 8271610. Seven years later, recounting some of the many
egregious political abuses at the DOJ under the Bush administration, newspapers were
calling for restoring the rule of law to the DOJ. See, e.g., Editorial, Restoring Faith in

Justice, ST. Louis

POST-DISPATCH,

Sept. 3, 2007, at B8 (calling for new Attorney General

to place law before politics following Alberto Gonzales's resignation); Pedro Ruz
Gutierrez & Tony Mauro, Getting Over Gonzales: DOJ Seeks to Recover: As the
Attorney General's Bumpy Reign Comes to a Close, What Will It Take To Repair Main
Justice?, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 3, 2007 (noting Alberto Gonzales's reign as Attorney
General served as rubber stamp for White House); Opinion, Our View: Gonzales'
Resignation, 30 NAT'. L.J., 23 Sept. 3, 2007 (reiterating earlier concerns regarding
Gonzales's lack of independence from White House).
318 MICHAEL

R.

BESCHLOSS, TAKING CHARGE:

THE JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE TAPES,
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President Nixon used the antitrust laws as a sword of Damocles
against the media networks319 and thwarted the antitrust litigation
against campaign contributor International Telephone & Telegraph
Corp. 320 The ITT scandal led to the criminal conviction of an Attorney
General,3 2' part of the articles of impeachment against Nixon,322 and
1963-64, at 141-42 (1997) (recording exchange in which LBJ wants letter saying "'the
paper is going to support your administration as long as you're there. Sincerely, your
friend, John Jones.'... I don't see a damn thing wrong with that... Both Justice and
Treasury will uncock me right quick, if I [approve the merger] ...and I ain't going to
do it, George, unless IChronicle president] John Jones is willing to say to me that he's
my friend."'). After receiving the letter, the administration cleared the bank merger.
"I President Nixon in 1971 discussed intimidating the nation's three major television
networks by keeping the constant threat of an antitrust suit hanging over them. In a July
2, 1971 taped recorded discussion, aide Charles W. Colson told Nixon that whether
filing an antitrust case against ABC, NBC, and CBS "is good or not is perhaps not the
major political consideration. But keeping this case in a pending status gives us one hell
of a club on an economic issue that means a great deal to those three networks . . .
something of a sword of Damocles." Nixon responded, "Our gain is more important
than the economic gain. We don't give a goddam about the economic gain. Our game
here is solely political .... As far as screwing them is concerned, I'm very glad to do it."
Walter Pincus & George Lardner, Jr., Nixon Hoped Antitrust Threat Would Sway Network
Coverage, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1997, at Al, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-srv/national/longterm/nixon/120197tapes.htm.
"'If the threat of screwing them is going to help us more with their programming
than doing it, then keep the threat,"' said Nixon. "'Don't screw them now.
[Otherwise] they'll figure that we're done."' Id. As for the antitrust actions, the White
House kept the DOJ from filing suit until April 1972, when the government accused
the networks of restraining trade and monopolizing prime-time entertainment with
their own programs. The suits were dismissed without prejudice in 1974 after the
government was unable to identify the requested documents. BERNARD M. HOLLANDER,
ORAL HISTORY: FIFTY-EIGHT YEARS IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION: 1949-2007, at 174-79
(2008). "The Ford administration renewed the complaints and subsequent consent
decrees curtailed prime-time productions by the networks." Pincus & Lardner, supra.
320 The DOJ settled its antitrust suit challenging ITT's mergers with several other
corporations. Critics alleged that campaign contributions to Nixon's reelection effort
in 1972 influenced the administration. Consumer advocates unsuccessfully attempted
to have the district court overturn the settlement. "'[T]here was no meaningful
judicial scrutiny of the terms of the consent decree and no consideration of whether it
was in the public interest.'" Lloyd C. Anderson, United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust
Consent Decrees, and the Need for a Proper Scope ofJudicial Review, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 1,
8 (1996), available at http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/record/2004/2004_SO3616.pdf
321 Nixon's Attorney General Richard Kleindienst was convicted for lying during
his Senate confirmation hearings. When asked whether the White House interfered
with the DOJ's antitrust action against ITT, Kleindienst testified, "I was not interfered
with by anybody at the White House." Kleindienst testified that the Assistant
Attorney General of the Antitrust Division, Richard McLaren, settled the ITT cases on
his own, with no political pressure from anyone. Asked if Nixon played any role in
the cases, Kleindienst assured the committee the president had not. David Stout,
Richard G. Kleindienst, Figure in Watergate Era, Dies at 76, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2000, at
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the Tunney Act, which requires a federal
district court to find the DOJ
32 3
consent decrees in the public interest.
A third concern with the vague rule of reason is that a particular
administration can abdicate through inaction its obligation to execute
faithfully the laws. Although antitrust has always been political, the
ideological shift within the Republican Party in 1980 toward
antitrust 324 was even more important to its enforcement than the shift

A27. The White House tapes show Nixon repeatedly ordering Kleindienst and others
"to leave the ... thing alone." Transcript Prepared by the Impeachment Inquiry Staff
for the House Judiciary Committee of a Recording of a Meeting Among the President,
John Ehrlichman and George Shultz on April 19, 1971 from 3:03 to 3:34 P.M.,
http://www.nixonlibrary.gov/forresearchers/find/tapes/watergate/wspf/482-017_482018.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2009); The Washington Post, Protecting ITT: President
Nixon and Richard G. Kleindienst, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/
content/video/2007/05/22/VI2007052200656.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
322 Article 2, § 4 of the Articles of Impeachment cited Nixon's failure "to take care
that the laws were faithfully executed by failing to act when he knew or had reason to
know that his close subordinates endeavored to impede and frustrate lawful inquiries
by duly constituted executive, judicial and legislative entities concerning . . . the
confirmation of Richard Kleindienst as Attorney General of the United States."
Articles of Impeachment Adopted by the Committee on the Judiciary, Article 2, July
27, 1974, available at http://www.watergate.info/impeachment/impeachmentarticles.shtml#2 (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
323 Enacted in 1974, the Tunney Act sought to remove political influence from the
DOJ's decision to settle antitrust cases. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). As Senator Tunney
later attested in a declaration submitted in the Microsoft antitrust litigation:
The Tunney Act was never intended to allow for a situation where, in
theory, prolific lobbying could be conducted by the defendant prior to the
time the presiding judge has ordered settlement negotiations, without public
disclosure. If allowed, the Tunney Act would not have reformed the
practices utilized in settlement of the ITT case, which in significant fashion
demonstrated the need for the legislation in the first instance. The disclosure
provisions were designed to help ensure that no defendant can ever achieve
through political activities what it cannot obtain through the legal process.
Failure to comply with these provisions raises an inference or, at a
minimum, an appearance of impropriety.
Affidavit of John V. Tunney 1 7, Comments Provided by the United States to the Court,
in United States v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. 98-1232 (CKK), 231 F. Supp. 2d
144 (D.D.C. 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/ms-major.htm.
324 Before Reagan, the Republican Presidential Platforms generally supported
antitrust enforcement. The head of the DOJ Antitrust Division during the Eisenhower
administration, for example, noted how "[elvery political platform of both major
parties since 1848 has contained an antimonopoly plank or pledge." Stanley N.
Barnes, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Promoting
Competition:
Current Antitrust Problems and Policies, Speech Before the
Metropolitan Economic Association 986 (Oct. 25, 1954) (on file with author); see,
e.g., John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency Project, Republican
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from Democratic to Republican control of the Presidency.325 From the
post-WWII period through President Carter's term, antitrust
enforcement enjoyed greater bipartisan support than it currently
does. 326 But under the Reagan administration, antitrust enforcement
became highly politicized.3 21 Congress expressed concern over the

Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1976, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/?pid=25843 (last visited Apr. 13, 2009) ("The Republican Party believes in and
endorses the concept that the American economy is traditionally dependent upon fair
competition in the marketplace. To assure fair competition, antitrust laws must treat
all segments of the economy equally. Vigorous and equitable enforcement of antitrust
laws heightens competition and enables consumers to obtain the lowest possible price
in the marketplace."); John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency
Republican Party Platform of 1968,
Project, Republican Party Platforms:
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25841 (last visited Apr. 13, 2009) ("In
addition to vigorous enforcement of the antitrust statutes, we pledge a thorough
analysis of the structure and operation of these laws at home and abroad in the light of
changes in the economy, in order to update our antitrust policy and enable it to serve
us well in the future."); John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American Presidency
Republican Party Platform of 1956,
Project, Republican Party Platforms:
13, 2009)
(last visited Apr.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25838
(proposing "Legislation to enable closer Federal scrutiny of mergers which have a
significant or potential monopolistic connotations" and "Procedural changes in the
antitrust laws to facilitate their enforcement"). The Republican Party Platform of
1980, had a more laissez-faire attitude toward antitrust: "The forces of the free market
must be brought to bear to promote competition, reduce costs, and improve the return
on investment to stimulate capital formation in the private sector. The role of
government must change from one of overbearing regulation to one of providing
incentives for technological and innovative developments, while assuring through
anti-trust enforcement that neither predatory competitive pricing nor price gouging of
captive customers will occur." John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters, The American
Presidency Project, Republican Party Platforms: Republican Party Platform of 1980,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844 (last visited Apr. 13, 2009).
325 The Republican Party controlled the Executive Branch for 20 of the 28 years
between January 1981 and 2009.
326 Before
Reagan,
some
continuity
existed in enforcement between
administrations. Between 1958 and the 1970s, more section 1 and 2 cases were
brought under Republican Presidents, but this may only reflect an idiosyncratic
increase in enforcement in a two-year period under Nixon. Vivek Ghosal, Regime Shift
in Antitrust 21-22 (Feb. 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020448.
327 In a memo to the Attorney General, John Roberts (before he became Chief

Justice) discussed an upset conservative's upcoming visit: he "will doubtless arrive
with many criticisms of the Department for not advancing conservative ideals."
Among the points Roberts mentioned: "More reasonable [approach] to antitrust law,
epitomized in the dropping of the IBM case." Memorandum from John Roberts to
Attorney General on Talking Points for Meeting with Lofton of Conservative Digest,
(Jan. 27, 1982) (http://www.archives.gov/news/john-roberts/accession-60-89-0372/
doc053.pdf).
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The Reagan

administration actively prosecuted price-fixing or bid rigging in local
road construction cases (246 cases, or forty-seven percent of the
criminal antitrust cases brought between 1982 and 1988) and
government procurement (forty-three cases, or eight percent). 329 They
"brought the same case over and over again - a long series of
challenges to interrelated regional and local conspiracies in the
construction industry." 330 Unlike earlier administrations, the Reagan
administration never challenged vertical restraints or (after settling the
33 2
33 1
1974 suit against AT&T ) monopolies.
After a resurgence of civil antitrust enforcement during the Clinton
administration, the head of the Antitrust Division under President
George W. Bush promised continuity under the rule of law:

328 This ideological shift, Professor Ghosal demonstrates, is reflected in a clear
compositional change in U.S. antitrust enforcement between 1958 and 2002. In 1979,
criminal cases targeting per se illegal cartel activity increased. Civil antitrust cases
(namely, rule-of-reason offenses and per se offenses that an administration elects to
prosecute civilly) decreased. After this regime shift in the 1970s, Republican
administrations initiated more per se criminal cases, and fewer rule-of-reason civil
cases, than the Democratic Clinton administration. Ghosal, supra note 326, at 20.
The Reagan administration argued that its enforcement policies followed the law's
evolution. But the DOJ "actively encouraged many of those changes by participating
in court proceedings as an amicus curiae (friend of the court)." U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, JUSTICE DEPARTMENT:
CHANGES IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICIES & ACTIVITIES 10 (1990), available at
http://archive.gao.gov/d22t8/142779.pdf. [hereinafter GAO STUDY].
Congress

included language in the Antitrust Division's appropriation prohibiting it from using
any funds to overturn or alter the per se prohibition against RPM under the antitrust
laws. Id. at 33. President Reagan took issue and interpreted the bill "narrowly to
apply only to attempts to seek a reversal of the holdings of a certain line of previously
decided cases." President Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing a Fiscal Year 1984
Appropriations Bill (Nov. 28, 1983), available at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/
archives/speeches/1983/112883a.htm.
329 GAO STUDY, supra note 328, at 43.
330 Pitofsky, supra note 217, at 819.
331 See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 137 (D.D.C. 1982).
33' GAO STUDY, supra note 328, at 44. The DOJ had other antitrust offenses to
prosecute. One political appointee during the Reagan administration declined to
bring many antitrust cases that the staff attorneys claimed were winnable under
existing legal precedent. In his view, these cases made no "economic sense" or were
not in the public interest. Id. at 45; see also Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Decade
Ahead: Some Predictions About Merger Enforcement, 57 ANTITRUST UJ. 65, 71 (1988)
(referring to Senate Judiciary Committee identifying 10 mergers where relevant
Antitrust Division Section Chief recommended challenging, "only to see that
recommendation overruled by the front office").
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In thinking about the "transition" and what, if any,
implications this organizational change might have on the
Division, let me just say clearly and unequivocally that the
Division's current mission is no different today than it was
under my predecessors. The core values of antitrust law, as
interpreted by the courts, remain constant. Under the rule of
law, it is those values, not the predispositions of the person
holding my job, that dictate the enforcement agenda.
Anyone... expecting a major shift in enforcement policy is
likely to be disappointed.333
But this turned out to be a platitude. Antitrust enforcement policy
underwent a major shift. The DOJ officials under the George W. Bush
administration, for example, erected an enforcement hierarchy that
focused primarily on criminal cartel behavior. 4 Unlike the European
Commission, which prosecuted Microsoft and is now investigating
Intel and Microsoft over new offenses, the DOJ never challenged any
significant monopolistic abuses during the Bush era. 335 Civil antitrust
enforcement actually declined under his administration.33 6 This
333 Charles A. James, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,

Be Careful What You Wish For: Some Thoughts On The Merger Review Process,
Speech Before the American Bar Association Antitrust Section (Aug. 7, 2001)
(http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/8764.htm).
334 See, e.g., Protecting and Promoting Competition, Message from the AAG: Our
Hierarchy of Antitrust Enforcement, ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE UPDATE, (U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Wash., D.C.) Spring 2005, at 1 (on file with author) (describing
focus on cartel enforcement); R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div.,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, International Anti-cartel Enforcement, Speech at 2004 ICN
Cartels Workshop (Nov. 21, 2004) (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
206428.htm) (noting enforcement of criminal cartel behavior as top priority for U.S.
Department of Justice); R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Securing the Benefits of Global Competition, Speech at Tokyo
American Center (Sept. 10, 2004) (http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
205389.htm) (listing enforcement of criminal cartel behavior as core priority in
American antitrust enforcement hierarchy).
3' Between 1998 and 2000, for example, the DOJ filed five section 2
monopolization cases. ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WORKLOAD STATISTICS:
FY 1997-2006. In the six years thereafter, the DOJ cites one civil action, which
involved, among other things, a section 2 violation. Id.
336 Between 1995 and 1999, the DOJ opened 76 section 2 investigations, and filed
seven civil actions challenging monopolistic abuses. That dropped to 50 investigations
between 2000 and 2004 and two filed civil actions, dropped further to 17 actions
between 2005-2007 and no civil actions challenging monopolistic abuses. The decrease
in section 2 activity was not offset by more section 1 or section 7 investigations or
lawsuits. Instead, the number of civil and criminal section 1 actions dropped between
2000 and 2004, as did the number of merger investigations and section 7 lawsuits.
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decline in antitrust enforcement was noted by the press, 337 antitrust

scholars, 338 politicians, 339 and practitioners. 310 Moreover, this decline

was not attributable to want of cases, reduced staffing, or any lack of
interest from DOJ trial attorneys, who were actively prosecuting these
types of violations during the Clinton administration.
Besides the ideological skewing of antitrust enforcement, another
concern is that that economic power of the target companies can
distort antitrust enforcement. This was evident in the Tunney Act,

According to one source, the DOJ was involved in the fewest number of filed antitrust
cases in 2001, 2002, and 2003 than any other year this past quarter of a century. See
Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, supra note 234, at 444 tbl. 5.41. This decline
in antitrust enforcement is not attributable to staffing (the number of Division
attorneys in these two time-periods was similar) or budget (which when factoring
inflation increased after 1999). See also Deborah L. Feinstein, Recent Trends in U.S.
Merger Enforcement: Down But Not Out, 21 SUM ANTITRUST 74, 74 (2007).
117 See, e.g., Christopher O'Leary, Sizing Up the Candidates: Depending Who Wins
the Presidency, Dealmakers Could See the M&A Landscape Significantly Altered,
DEALMAKER'S J., Mar. 2008, (noting that "Bush
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS:
administration's placid, laissez-faire attitude toward antitrust enforcement has a
rapidly approaching expiration date" with upcoming election); Dennis Berman, The
Game: Handicapping Deal Hype and Hubris, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2007, at C1 ("The
federal government has nearly stepped out of the antitrust enforcement business,
leaving companies to mate as they wish."); Mark Boslet, Europe Takes Greater Role:
Microsoft Won't Fight Ruling in EU Court, Sj. MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 23, 2007, at 1C
(noting how "center of gravity" of antitrust enforcement shifted overseas during G.W.
Bush administration); Stephen Labaton, Legal Beat; New View Of Antitrust Law: See No
Evil, Hear No Evil, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2006, at C5 (saying that besides cartel
enforcement, Bush administration "has taken the most relaxed and least aggressive
approach since the last years of the Reagan presidency"); Stephen Labaton, Sirius Chief
Talks of Ways to Get XM Deal Approved, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, at C3 ("Bush
administration has been more permissive on antitrust issues than any administration
in modern times."); Steven Pearlstein, Here in D.C., The Quiet Rise of a Software
Powerhouse, WASH. POST, May 31, 2006, at DI (stating G.W. Bush administration's
"quiet approval" of Blackboard's acquisition of WebCT "is the best evidence yet that
the Bush administration has abandoned antitrust enforcement").
338 See Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger
Enforcement 17 (2007), available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/Shapiro/
mergerpolicy.pdf.
339 Christopher S. Rugaber, Senators Criticize Bush Administration for Lax Antitrust
Enforcement, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 7, 2007, available at http/Awww.signonsandiego.com/
news/politics'20070307-1402-antitrust-congress.html; Senator Barack Obama, Statement
for the American Antitrust Institute 1 (Sept. 27, 2007), available at
2
http//www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/lesaai-%2Presidential%20campaign% 0%200bama%209-07092720071759.pdf.
31I Feinstein, supra note 336, at 74; Kolasky, supra note 284, at 43; ABA TRANSITION
REPORT, supra note 169, at 3; see, AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 24, at 32, 51
(noting decline in criminal cartel cases); id. at 158-59, 164 (discussing mergers).
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which was enacted in 1974 after Nixon's misdeeds came to light. 341
The Tunney Act enables courts to examine antitrust settlements to
"deter and prevent settlements motivated either by corruption, undue
corporate influence, or which were plainly inadequate.

3 42

Although

the Tunney Act increases transparency for antitrust settlements, the
decision to prosecute rests entirely in the prosecutor's discretion. 343
There remains little actual accountability when the antitrust agencies
do nothing. Lack of transparency and accountability compounds the
dangers of the vague rule of reason.3 4 In a positive step during the
George W. Bush administration, the antitrust agencies issued
statements that explained why they closed several high-profile
investigations.34 5 Unlike the European Commission, which must
provide a reasoned decision when not challenging a merger, and at
times must defend its decision to not challenge in court, 346 the U.S.
competition authorities need not defend their inactivity. It thus
remains difficult to appraise whether the agencies made the right call,
especially when the agencies do not systematically examine the
consequences of their earlier decisions.347 Under the rule of reason,
liability depends upon case-specific facts, which are known to the
341 119 CONG. REC. 3451 (1973) ("Increasing concentration of economic power,
such as occurred in the flood of conglomerate mergers, carries with it a very tangible
threat of concentration of political power. Put simply, the bigger the company, the
greater the leverage it has in Washington.") (statement of Sen. Tunney).
342 150
CONG.
REC. S3616 (daily
ed. Apr. 2, 2004) available at
http://bulk.resource.org/gpo.gov/record/2004/2004_S03616.pdf.
343

United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996);
111-7.

ANTITRUST DIVISION

MANUAL, supra note 50, at

14' See Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 51 BUFF.
L. REV. 937, 943 (2003).
345 See, e.g., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Statement on the Closing of
its
Investigation
of Whirlpool's Acquisition
of Maytag
(Mar.
29,
2006)
(http://www.redorbit.com/news/business/449295/department-of-justice-antitrust-div
ision_statementontheclosing.of/) (setting forth background on transaction and
reasons for allowing merger to proceed); Statement of Chairman Majoras,
Commissioner Kovacic & Commissioner Rosch Concerning the Closing of the
Investigation into Transactions Involving Comcast, Time Warner Cable and Adelphia
Communications, FTC File No. 051-0151 (Jan. 31, 2006) (http://www.ftc.gov/
os/closings/ftc/0510151twadelphiamajoras kovacicrosch.pdf) (approving decision by
Bureau of Competition to close investigation, and setting forth reasons); see also
Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Issuance of Public Statements upon Closing of
Investigations (Dec. 12, 2003); FTC, Commission Closing Letters (Sept. 2, 2008)
(http://www.ftc.gov/os/closings/commclosing.htm)
(collecting number of FTC's
closing letters).
346 Case T-464/04, Impala v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 11-02289, ' 15 (E.C.R. 2006).
341 Stucke, supra note 44, at 575-79.
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agency, but unknown to individual citizens. The ABA Antitrust
Section's transition report to the incoming administration noted,
"[w]ithout the underlying factual information on which the
enforcement decisions are made, it is impossible to determine with
any certainty whether decisions on particular cases were
appropriate." 348 Thus competition authorities can respond, "Tell me
the mergers we should have challenged. Tell me the facts we missed."
Given this informational asymmetry, 3' the public entrusts the
The political
Executive Branch to faithfully execute the laws.
few
Congressional
at
a
appointees may encounter pointed questioning
oversight hearings. 35" But by the time the competitive effects of their
decisions manifest, the appointees have left.
6.

Because the Rule of Reason Is Not Prospective, Accessible, and
Clear, It Does Not Constrain Rent-Seeking nor Prevent the
Judiciary from Exercising Its Power Arbitrarily.

In applying the law, judges "cannot act wisely unless they know the
source of law, the reason of it, and why it is subject to change, and

why they have authority to change it."35 1 Vague standards invite some
352
judges to inject their ideological beliefs into competition policy,

which can reduce the judiciary's effectiveness in providing social
order.353 The burgeoning "New Legal Realism" scholarship has
examined the influence of the judge's ideology on the outcome.3 54
348

ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 169, at 3 n.6.

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) does not correct this informational
asymmetry. As the Division Manual states, FOIA "does not require disclosure of
materials obtained through . . . [Civil Investigative Demands] (such as documents,
interrogatory responses, and transcripts of oral testimony) or materials obtained as
part of the HSR process." ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL, supra note 50, at 111-18; 15
U.S.C. § 1314(g) (2006) (exempting from FOIA disclosure any "documentary
material, answers to written interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony provided
pursuant to any demand issued under" Antitrust Civil Process Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a(h) (2006) (HSR documents and information exempt from FOIA disclosure).
350 See, e.g., Rugaber, supra note 339.
351 Edwin W. Smith, Law and the Function of Legislation, 46 AM. L. REV. 161, 169
(1912).
352 Frank H. Easterbrook, JudicialDiscretion in Statutory Interpretation, 57 OKLA. L.
REV. 1, 6 (2004) ("What judges have done is little different from what the FTC does as
one political party or another acquires control of that agency and endows it with a
different economic perspective.").
353 WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 129.
354 One recent empirical study, for example, found a strong correlation between the
validation rate and the ideological alignment of judges and agencies: in reviewing EPA
and NLRB decisions for arbitrariness, Republican (Democratic) appointed judges are
349
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Business lobbyists, once focusing on legislation, are now more active
in the selection of state supreme court judges.3 5
The Court's decision in Bush v. Gore served as a springboard into its
current politicization.35 6 Recently the Court received its first negative
rating from a politically divided survey group,357 and according to one
more likely to invalidate liberal (conservative) decisions than conservative (liberal) ones.
Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism 13 (Univ. of Chi. Law &
Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 372; Univ. of Chi., Pub. Law Working Paper No. 191,
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1070283. Republican-appointed judges are
estimated to compose approximately 62 percent of the federal bench by the 2009
Presidential Inauguration (higher than the 50 percent when President Bush took office
in 2001), and constitute a majority of 10 of the 13 federal circuit courts. Charlie Savage,
Appeals Courts Pushed to Right by Bush Choices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/us/29judges.html?partner=rssnyt.
355 See Jonathan D. Glater, To the Trenches: The Tort War Is Raging On, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/22/business/
22tort.html. In the 2006 judicial election campaigns, "Idlonors from the business
community gave $15.3 million to high court candidates - more than twice the $7.4
million given by attorneys." JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS 2006: How 2006 WAS THE MOST THREATENING YEAR YET TO THE FAIRNESS AND
IMPARTIALITY OF OUR COURTS -

AND HOW AMERICANS ARE FIGHTING BACK 2006, at vii

(2007); see also Penny J. White, An Independent and ImpartialJudiciary: The New
Urgency, DICTA, Feb. 2009, at 12 (observing dramatic increase in money spent on state
judicial campaigns and reliance on special interest groups' donations).
356 See, e.g., Clive Crook, The Highest Political Bearpit in the Land, FIN. TIMES, June
30, 2008, available at http://blogs.ft.comcrookblog/2008/06/column-the-highestpolitical-bearpit-in-the-land/ (using Bush v. Gore as example for claim that Supreme
Court has become political body). Republican-nominated Supreme Court justices
were in the minority during 1963-69, had a simple majority during 1970-71, and
attained in 1972 (and maintained thereafter) a two-thirds majority. Ghosal, supra
note 326, at 3. Not all Republican-nominated justices (e.g., Justices Stevens and
Souter), however, are more conservative than Democratic-nominated justices. But
analysis of Supreme Court voting between 1937-2006 found justices appointed by
Republican presidents tend to vote more conservatively than those appointed by
Democratic presidents. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial
Behavior: A Statistical Study 8-9 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 404,
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126403. "More recent appointees have
significantly higher ideology scores." Id. at 15. Republican-appointed appellate
judges are "more likely to vote conservative, with the imbalance being greater among
judges appointed by the most recent Republican Presidents - Reagan and the two
Bushes." Id. at 23-24.
...Forty-three of those surveyed disapproved of the job the Court is doing, "the
lowest rating in five years of Quinnipiac University surveys on the Court and the first
time the Court has received a negative score." Press Release, Quinnipiac Univ. Polling
Inst., American Voters Oppose Same-Sex Marriage Quinnipiac University National
Poll Finds, But They Don't Want Government to Ban It 2 (July 17, 2008)
(http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/us/us07172008.doc).
Forty-two percent
said that the Supreme Court is moving in the wrong direction. Id. at 2 But voters who
identified themselves as Republican significantly differed in their opinion on the
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ranking, five of the ten most conservative justices are on today's
Court.358 A CBS commentator summarized the Court's 2007-08 Term:

"As they have every term over the past few decades, the Justices once
again sided in most cases with employers over employees, with big
business over consumers, and with the government over
individuals."3

59

The Court, of course, could debunk this perception by

identifying recent decisions where consumers prevailed. But more
than sixteen years have passed since the Court decided an antitrust
3 6 ° Over that stretch, defendants are
case in a plaintiffs favor.

18-0.361

Over a longer timeframe, the Court has shifted from ruling in the
antitrust plaintiffs to the defendant's favor.362 Again, this should not
be determinative: the Court need not intercede when antitrust
plaintiffs rightfully win, but only when the lower courts misapply
antitrust law. But there is no empirical evidence that the lower courts
are predisposed to antitrust plaintiffs, which would require the Court
to veer them to the appropriate mean. Instead the evidence shows the
lower courts overwhelmingly rule against antitrust plaintiffs' rule-ofreason claims.363 Moreover, the Court's recent activism in Leegin and
Billing, 364 and dicta in Trinko365 raise independent concerns.

Courts' performance (46% approved/35% disapprove) from Democrats (34%
approve/49% disapprove), women (33% approve/45% disapprove), and AfricanAmerican voters (32% approve/53% disapprove). Id. at 3.
358 See Landes & Posner, supra note 356, at 46 (ranking justices by fraction of
conservative votes in nonunanimous cases between 1937 and 2006, as follows:
Justices Thomas (1), Scalia (3), Roberts (4), Alito (5), Kennedy (10); 4 of the 5
Rehnquist (2), Burger (6),
remaining conservative justices were fairly recent:
O'Connor (7) and Powell (8)).
359 Andrew Cohen, Not Your Father's Court: Andrew Cohen Reviews the Decisions
2008,
and Looks at Trends from the Past Supreme Court Term, CBS NEws, July 2,
2
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/02/opinion/courtwatch/main422792 .shtml.
11 See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 625 (1992); Eastman Kodak Co.
v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 486 (1992).
36' Brannon & Ginsburg, supra note 232, at 3, 14. The most recent decision in
defendant's favor is Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Communications, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1109, 1109 (2009). The Court in 2009 had the opportunity to reverse this trend
and correct the D.C. Circuit's questionable causation analysis. Instead, the Court
denied the FTC's petition for writ of certiorari. Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456,
459 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (mem.).
362 Over the past four decades, the win percentage for antitrust defendants before
the Court increased: 33% (Oct. 1967-Oct. 1976), 44% ('77-'86), 55% ('87-'96), 91%
('97-'06). Brannon & Ginsburg, supra note 232, at 17.
363 See supra notes 208-09.

4 See supra note 229.
365 See supra note 220.
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Given its interest in commercial cases and the lower costs of
affecting competition policy (a rent-seeker as an amicus need only
convince five justices rather than a majority of Congress and the
President), the Court has become an attractive magnet for corporate
rent-seekers. 66 Although the Court on average grants certiorari to less
than two percent of petitions, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's
backed-petitions between 2004 and 2007 were granted at a
disproportionate rate of twenty-six percent. 36 7 During oral argument
in Leegin, Justice Scalia observed that discount retailers, if concerned
over the Court's prospective departure from its ninety-six-year
precedent, would have petitioned the Court:
I mean, if it was really the case that they were going to be
losing, losing profits, I think they would have been here. I
mean, we talk about the Wal-Marts and the Targets. They're
not here on amicus briefs because they're - what they're
selling is cheap.368
One could construe from Justice Scalia's comment that if discount
retailers were concerned about any departure from the per se rule and
resulting economic harm, they would have petitioned the Court as
amici. But under the rule of law, discounters need not lobby the
Court. Spending time and money to get the Court to change its rules
so as to make one's business more profitable, while discouraged under
rule-of-law principles, perhaps represents today's business reality. The
American Petroleum Institute, for example, filed amicus positions in
five recent antitrust decisions, including Leegin, all on the prevailing
side. When antitrust devolves into a contest among rent-seekers, it
loses its legitimacy under the rule of law.369
366 See Rosen, supra note 29.
367 Id.
One popular blog tracks the won-loss for business interests, and in
particular the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's litigation arm. The Chamber filed 16
briefs in the Court's 2006-2007 Term; of the Court's 14 signed opinions, the
Chamber's side won 12. In the 2007-2008 Term, the Chamber's winning percentage
dropped from 85.7 percent to 53.3 percent (eight of 15 cases in which it was party or
wrote amicus in 2007). Posting of Max Schwartz to httpY/www.scotusblog.com/
wp/ot-07-business-docket-review/#more-7642 (July 3, 2008, 16:35 EST); see also
Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. LJ. 1487, 1490-91 (2008)
(detailing rise in Court's recent business docket, its favorable response to legal
arguments raised on behalf of business interests by private Supreme Court Bar).
3' Transcript of Oral Argument, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 06-480), 2007 WL 967030, at *31-32.
369 See Brief for Am. Petroleum Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No 06-480), 2007 WL 160781.
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With its vague legal standards and often high financial stakes,
antitrust litigation is inherently attractive for rent-seeking. Moreover,
in recent years, the Court has ceded antitrust's consumer protections
to politically unaccountable independent agencies and self-regulatory
37
agencies, which are also susceptible to regulatory capture.
The Rule of Reason Prevents Courts from Enforcing the
Antitrust Laws Quickly and Inexpensively.

7.

Under the rule of law, rules are "construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action.

' 371

The goal is a legal system that adjudicates cases "cheaply,

quickly, and fairly, while maximizing access. "372 Otherwise, if it is too
costly to vindicate one's legal rights, the law is majestic in theory, but
impractical in reality. 37 3 Clear rules inhibit strike suits3 74 by plaintiff

attorneys or competitors.375

370

See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2397 (2007)

(ceding enforcement of abuses to SEC). In addition, the Court compounded the rentseeking problem through its implied immunities. Under the Court's vague stateaction doctrine, special interest groups can solicit anticompetitive legislation from
With its "varied and inconsistent interpretations," this
their state government.
implied immunity permits anticompetitive competitive conduct and further hinders
consumers and the politically less powerful. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW, THE STATE OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT - 2001: REPORT
OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST AGENCIES 42 (2001) ("[State action
immunity drives a large hole in the framework of the nation's competition laws.");
Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust and Beyond,
32 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 113, 124-25 (2000) (observing state-action doctrine is inconsistent
with regulatory reform normally promoted in international fora by United States and
restricts United States' ability to obtain as great package of concessions from other
nations).
371 FED. R. CIv. P. 1; see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (proffering rules interpreted "to
provide for the just determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in
procedure and fairness in administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and
delay").
372 WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 124.
373 AMC REPORT, supra note 23, at 63 ("[Wihen parties are able to predict in
advance what types of transactions are likely to result in enforcement actions, they can
eschew them in the first instance, thereby reducing the need for costly investigations
and enforcement actions.").
371 Strike suits are actions "brought without legitimate claim (usually by a
shareholder in the name of the company) in hopes of an inflated settlement."
WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD LAW DICTIONARY 245 (2006).
375 Indeed, the clearer, more predictable the rule, the greater the risk of Rule 11

sanctions for spurious cases.
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Rule-of-reason litigation, however, is a crusade, enlisting legions of
economists, lawyers, and paralegals. It is unclear how many private
litigants (even with the prospect of trebled damages) will incur the
"litany of costs" and risks associated with suing companies with
market power 376 by embarking on such a crusade - especially if their
chance of prevailing is less than one in three.377
The Supreme Court recently recognized how the "extensive scope"
of antitrust discovery is "inevitably ... protracted" and has an

"unusually high CoSt. ' 378 Although the Court recognized that a ruleof-reason case is costlier to pursue than a per se case,379 the Court

37" The rule of reason

requires an elaborate inquiry into the challenged business practice; litigation
on the competitive effects and the business justification of the challenged
conduct is often extensive and complex; the judiciary frequently lacks the
expertise in industrial market structures and behavior to determine with any
confidence the effect of a practice on competition; the judicial inquiry in one
area may provide little legal certainty or guidance about the legality of a
practice in another context; and, finally, businesses can use private antitrust
litigation, or the threat of it, to raise rivals' costs.
ABA MONOGRAPH, supra note 24, at 6; see Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29,
34 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting under rule of reason's exhaustive inquiry of myriad
factors, "everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive .... Litigation costs are the
product of vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is that combination
more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason" (quoting Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1984))); Shumadine &

Katchmark, supra note 240, at 407 (observing rule-of-reason analysis "is enormously
expensive, involving conflicting expert testimony and virtually unlimited discovery"
and that "[tihere are few things about the operation of a business that would not be
relevant in a Rule of Reason analysis").
377Antitrust damages, according to Senator Sherman, should be "commensurate
with the difficulty of maintaining a private suit." 21 CONG. REC. 2456-60 (1890).
Under neo-classical economic theory, the optimal penalty (which includes civil
damages and criminal penalties) levied against an antitrust offender equals the
violation's expected net harm to others (plus enforcement costs) divided by the
probability of detection and successful prosecution. Stucke, supra note 50, at 458.
Successful antitrust plaintiffs can recover their litigation costs, including reasonable
attorney's fees, and trebled damages. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). It is often unclear when
the odds of an antitrust plaintiff prevailing with a meritorious rule-of-reason claim are
at least 33 percent. See supra note 208.
378Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007) (citations omitted);
see also Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 289 (1985); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982)
("The elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of a challenged business practice
entails significant costs. Litigation of the effect or purpose of a practice often is
extensive and complex.").
171Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 344 n.14 (noting "'opinion, shared by a majority of

1462

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 42:1375

never asks why antitrust discovery is inevitably costly and
protracted.38 °
One reason is that so many fact-intensive issues are relevant in a
rule-of-reason case.18 ' None of these issues is easily established.
Defining the relevant market, by itself, is fact-intensive, timeconsuming, costly, and imprecise.38 2 Although some restraints are
American economists concerned with antitrust policy, ...
that in the present legal
framework the costs of implementing a rule of reason would exceed the benefits
derived from considering each restrictive agreement on its merits and prohibiting only
those which appear unreasonable"' (quoting F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 440 (1970))).
380 Compounding the problem are the incremental costs to retrieve and review
electronic data, such as e-mail and back-up tapes. See AMC REPORT, supra note 23, at
165 (reporting statement of some commentators, "a ten-fold increase in the volume of
documents collected per employee due to electronic documents"). But the costs
involving electronic discovery extend beyond antitrust litigation. Among the themes
from a recent survey of over 1,000 trial lawyers were that electronic discovery was a
"morass," the civil discovery system is broken, and 85 percent thought that civil
litigation generally and discovery particular are too expensive. INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS. AT THE UNIV. OF DENVER & AM. COLL. OF TRIAL
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY, INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR
THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3-4 (2008) [hereinafter TRIAL
LAWYERS
SURVEY],
available at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=

Home&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentD=3650. Sixty-four percent said
that many law firms' economic models encourage more discovery than necessary, and
only 11 percent believes that clients, rather than attorneys, drive excessive discovery.
Id. at 4, app. A-4. Although counsel who are billing hourly stand to profit, corporate
plaintiffs and defendants ultimately incur the opportunity costs, disruption, and
expense of extensive discovery. Stipulations, by reducing the number of contested
issues, can reduce antitrust's discovery costs. But in my experience, antitrust defense
counsel (perhaps in part due to malpractice concerns) were unwilling to stipulate any
factual issue where they perceived a remote possibility of prevailing.
11 See Willard K. Tom & Chul Pak, Toward a Flexible Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST
L.J. 391, 399 (2000).
382 Because
businesses and antitrust economists generally viewed markets
dissimilarly, it generally took, in my experience, a team of eight to 15 DOJ paralegals,
lawyers, and economists between five to seven months for a HSR merger review. See
AMC REPORT, supra note 23, at 164 ("For both agencies, the length of second request
[merger] investigations averaged about six months from the opening of the investigation
in FY2005."). Given the time constraints of a HSR merger (including the risk that
talented executives leave the acquired firm), the parties generally expedite document
production to achieve substantial compliance. Thus, the U.S. antitrust agencies' HSR
merger review is considered fast-track compared to civil nonmerger investigations,
which the ABA recently characterized as "'black holes' for agency resources, dragging on
for months or years." ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 169, at 9. In fairness to the
agencies, the ABA recognized that this delay is attributable in part to the "targets of nonHSR [who] may have perverse incentives to delay cooperation and 'drag their feet'
responding to agency requests in hopes that the investigation will eventually close due to
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blatantly anticompetitive, others, such as tying arrangements, 38 3 are
more nuanced. Neither the judiciary nor economic experts have
sufficient expertise on the actual workings of the market to accurately
assess the likely effects of these nuanced restraints.
As proof that plaintiffs can prevail under a rule-of-reason case, some
cite the Government's protracted case against Visa and MasterCard. In
December 1993, the DOJ opened a preliminary investigation on the
overlapping structure of Visa and MasterCard. 38 4 During its five-year
investigation of Visa's and MasterCard's activities, the DOJ's Civil Task
Force interviewed "approximately 180 individuals." 38 5 Besides the
many attorneys and paralegals, at least nine DOJ economists were
involved.386 On October 7, 1998, the United States finally sued the
two credit card manufacturers.3 7 The Government's complaint,
however, alleged only two counts under section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 388 Much of the forty-three-page complaint was devoted to issues
its length." Id. One study found that the "U.S. second request process is by far the most
costly in the world, imposing twice the external costs (including payments for attorneys,
economists, and document productions) than do second-phase investigations in the
European Union." AMC REPORT, supra note 23, at 163. Another survey found "second
request investigations took seven months and resulted in median compliance costs of
$3.3 million." Id. The former FTC chair, Deborah Platt Majoras, in 2005 estimated the
average Second Request compliance costs exceeded $5 million. ABA

TRANSITION REPORT,

supra note 169, at 7 n.13.
383 Tying arrangements refer to situations where the sale of one good is
conditioned on the purchase of another good. OECD GLOSSARY, supra note 18, at 83.
Tying may be overall anticompetitive in foreclosing opportunities for rivals to sell
related products or increasing entry barriers for those that do not offer a full line of
products. But tying may be overall procompetitive by reducing costs of producing and
distributing the line of products and ensuring that like quality products are used to
complement the product being sold. Id.
3" Moltenbrey Declaration 1 5, United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. (Visa I), 163 F.
Supp. 2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 98-7076), 1999 WL 34247436. In January 1996,
the DOJ "began investigating the by-laws, rules, and policies that permit their member
banks to issue both Visa and MasterCard cards without restriction but prohibit them
from issuing American Express and Discover cards." Id.
11 Id. 1 6. Approximately 115 of these individuals were officers and employees of
defendants or their member banks. The remainder were "officers or employees of
defendants' competitors or other industry participants." Id.
386 Rozanski Declaration
5, Visa 1, 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (No. 98-7076), 1999 WL
34403481.
17 Complaint at 1, Visa 1, 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (No. 98-7076), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f1900/1973.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2009).
388 Count One involved Visa's and MasterCard's governance rules, which permitted
each association's members to sit on either Visa's or MasterCard's Board of Directors,
but not both. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. (Visa II), 183 F. Supp. 2d 613, 615
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). Count Two targeted the associations' exclusionary rules, under
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of market definition, defendants' market power in the network market,
barriers to network entry, and competitive effects. 389 After nearly two
more years of additional discovery, the case was tried before a district
court sitting without a jury.39 ° It lasted thirty-four trial days (from
June 12 through August 22, 2000). The district court described the
volume of evidence:
In addition to considering the oral and written testimony of a
number of current and former executives of the Visa and
MasterCard associations and their member banks, as well as
American Express and Discover, the court also heard expert
testimony [from Richard Rapp and Professors Michael Katz,
Richard Schmalensee, Ronald Gilson, and Robert Pindyck].
The court has considered over six thousand pages of trial
testimony, volumes of deposition testimony, approximately six
thousand admitted exhibits and amicus curiae briefs from
American Express and Discover - among others.391
Faced with this massive quantity of evidence, it took the trial court
one year after the trial (and by then nearly eight years had lapsed since
the investigation began) for the district court to enter more than 145
pages of findings of fact and conclusions of law.392 The Government
prevailed on only one of its two counts.393 After modifying its
judgment,39 4 in 2002 the district court stayed its judgment pending
appeal.395 Defendants, not the Government, appealed, but the Second
which each association's members can issue credit or charge cards of the other
association, but not American Express or Discover cards. Id.
389 See generally Complaint, Visa 1, 163 F. Supp. 2d 322 (describing myriad issues
integral to claims).
390 Visa 1, 163 F. Supp. 2d at 330.
391 Id. at 330-31.
392 See id. at 327 (opinion and Proposed Final Judgment).
393 The district court found (1) that the Government failed to prove that Visa and
MasterCard associations' governance structures resulted in a significant adverse effect
on competition or consumer welfare; but (2) the Government successfully
demonstrated that the defendants' exclusionary rules and practices barring their
member banks from issuing Amex or Discover cards resulted in such adverse effect
and should be abolished, and permanently enjoined defendants from promulgating
similar rules in the future. See generally id.; Visa II, 183 F. Supp. 2d 613
(modifications to Proposed Final Judgment) (modifying prior court's judgment
regarding injunctive relief granted).
394 Visa II, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
311 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 7076 BSJ, 2002 WL 638537, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2002). "In February 2004, after the court of appeals denied
rehearing this case, American Express and MBNA (a member of both the Visa and
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A decade after the DOJ's
Circuit affirmed the one count.396
investigation began, the Supreme Court denied defendants' petition for
certiorari.3 97 The costs in prosecuting and defending this action must
have been staggering. 98 But compared to some other rule-of-reason
cases, this one was quick.399
Consequently the rule of reason has been rightly criticized for its
Market participants cannot
inaccuracy and inconsistent results.
always foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its
coercive power in given circumstances. Nor will the rule of reason
naturally orient itself toward rule-of-law principles. The Court, with
its limited docket, cannot provide a case-by-case tutorial on how to
apply its rule of reason. If anything, the Court further reduced the
rule of reason's accuracy, objectivity, and predictability when it

MasterCard associations) announced an agreement under which MBNA would begin
issuing general purpose cards on the Amex network, while continuing to issue cards
on the Visa and MasterCard networks. [But b]ecause the district court issued a stay
pending appeal, and the court of appeals stayed its mandate pending ...the Supreme
Court's review, the [challenged] exclusionary rules . . . [were still] in effect" and
MBNA could not issue Amex cards. Brief for the United States in Opposition, Visa
U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 543 U.S. 811 (2004) (Nos. 03-1521 & 03-1532), 2004
WL 1836188, at *11 n.5, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f205000/
205051.htm.
396 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 234 (2d Cir. 2003).
391 Visa, 543 U.S. at 811.
398
In response to a written demand from U.S. Senator Slade Gorton, a Republican
from Microsoft's home state of Washington, the DOJ in 1999 reported that its rule-ofreason monopolization case against Microsoft cost $13.3 million. This was "paltry"
compared to the estimated expenses of other major antitrust cases, which "easily can
run $750,000 each month." Ted Bridis, U.S. Tab Is $13 Million in Microsoft Cases,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 7, 1999, at D08. RealNetworks reported spending in three
months $3.7 million in legal expenses related to its antitrust lawsuit against Microsoft.
Kim Peterson, Profit Tiny, But Real Surprises Media Analysts, SEATTLE TIMES, May 5,
Estimates of the DOJ costs in other landmark rule-of-reason
2005, at Dl.
investigations and cases (all in 1999 dollars) run higher: the IBM investigation cost
"well above $29 million;" the FTC spent an estimated $30 million investigating Exxon
(an Exxon attorney estimated both sides' legal costs to exceed $200 million); the
AT&T litigation cost about $20 million. James V. Grimaldi, Microsoft Case Costs
Justice Department $13.3 Million, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 6, 1999.
199One popular antitrust casebook describes the issues related to the "big case."
PITOFSKY, supra note 101, at 113 ("In both government and private actions, it is not
uncommon for discovery, trial, and appeal to take ten or more years and to involve a
vast number of documents."). Visa was quickly compared to IBM and some of
antitrust's other big cases. See id.at 113-17. Prosecuting criminal offenses, in
contrast, is generally more straight-forward: often the law is settled, pleading the
complaint or indictment is simpler, and discovery issues are less protracted.
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reinvented the Sherman Act's goals to suit its new economic wisdom
and in making competition policy trade-offs more suitable for
Congress than the judiciary. Accordingly, the vacuous rule-of-reason
standard fails to constrain the Executive and Judiciary Branches from
exercising power arbitrarily and leaves the litigants mired in
interminable and costly litigation.
D. The Rule of Reason's Infirmities Have Significant Implicationsfor
Antitrust Enforcement and Competition Policy
Having identified at least seven infirmities of the rule of reason
under rule-of-law principles, this subpart considers several
implications of those infirmities on competition policy: less antitrust
enforcement, exposing consumers and smaller competitors to
anticompetitive abuses, promoting undesirable market behavior and
outcomes, hindering global convergence over antitrust rules and
standards, and weakening the Court's remaining per se antitrust rules.
One implication is that because a rule-of-reason case is so costly to
try, plaintiffs will bring fewer cases.' 0° This is significant because
private plaintiffs have brought the overwhelming majority of antitrust
cases over the past thirty years. 4° ' Concerned about expenses,
plaintiffs with meritorious claims may forego antitrust litigation.
Expert economic testimony is often necessary for antitrust plaintiffs to
prevail under the rule of reason. °2 Indeed, some have attributed
Pitofsky, supra note 217, at 1489; Posner, supra note 24, at 15.
Between 1975-2007, the United States brought 2,531 civil and criminal antitrust
cases. Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, supra note 234, at 444 tbl.5.41. This
represents 7.8 percent of all federal antitrust claims. See id. Annually, the federal
government on average accounts for 8.5 percent of total claims, with the actual
percentage significantly lower since 2000 (ranging between 3.4 and 5.9 percent). Id.
One cannot place too great reliance on these ratios, as it is difficult to compare the
relative overall value of a private claim (for example, three tag-along private suits)
versus a government claim (for example, the United States' Microsoft litigation).
402 See Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int'l, Inc., No. CV407-42,
2008 WL 2811940, at *3 (S.D. Ga. July 21, 2008) ("'Construction of a relevant
economic market cannot be based upon lay opinion testimony,' and the absence of
economic expert testimony may require summary judgment in favor of the
defendant." (quoting Am. Key Corp. v. Cole Nat'l Corp., 762 F.2d 1569, 1579 (11th
Cir. 1985)); Water Craft Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Mercury Marine, 361 F. Supp. 2d 518, 542
(M.D. La. 2004) ("Courts consistently require that expert testimony adequately define
the relevant geographic and product markets in antitrust cases."); Gulfstream Park
Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. Tampa Bay Downs, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1306 (M.D. Fla.
2003) ("Construction of the relevant market 'must be based on expert testimony.,"),
affd, 479 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2007); Berlyn, Inc. v. Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 223 F.
Supp. 2d 718, 727 (D. Md. 2002) (stating that "to prove relevant market, expert
400

401
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antitrust litigation's significant costs for economic experts as one
factor for the decline of antitrust claims and growth of business torts
claims. 3 One recent survey of trial attorneys found generally that
"[e]xpert witness fees are a significant cost factor driving litigants to
settle, ranking just slightly behind trial costs and attorneys fees in that
respect. "404

The Court fears that "the threat of discovery expense will push costconscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching"
summary judgment."° Yet the Court has not improved its own vague
antitrust standards to redress its concerns.
Moreover, although
antitrust counsel can identify anecdotes of meritless claims, there does
not appear to be any empirical evidence of widespread abuse. 4 6
Indeed, if this threat were significant, one would expect private
antitrust claims to increase, not decrease, after Sylvania, which
breathed new life into the rule of reason.w7 Instead, since the Court's
Sylvania decision, there are fewer private federal antitrust cases.' °

testimony is of utmost importance"; "[ilt is unclear whether expert testimony, as a
matter of law, is a necessary predicate to a finding market definition .... As a practical
matter, however, it would seem impossible to prove such a complex economic
question without the assistance of a qualified expert, viz., an economist"), affd, 73 F.
App'x 576 (4th Cir. 2003).
43 Harvey I. Saferstein, Antitrust Law Developments: The Ascendancy of Business
Tort Claims in Antitrust Practice,59 ANTITRUST LJ. 379, 385-86 (1991).
404 TRIAL LAWYERS SURVEY, supra note 380, at 4.
4o1

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007). As a general matter,

83 percent of trial lawyers recently surveyed agreed that civil "litigation costs drive
cases to settle that should not settle on the merits." TRIAL LAWYERS SURVEY, supra note
380, at app. A-6.

AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 24, at 231-32.
11 See infra note 408 (showing decline in number of private antitrust claims after
1977).
406 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 234, at 444 tbl. 5.41.
406
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Fewer antitrust cases are now brought annually relative to total
litigation. 4°9 Some enterprising plaintiff lawyers instead seek redress
under state business tort claims.4"' But others abandon their client's
antitrust claims and forego litigation altogether.

"

-
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Fled WnU.S.DiLrlac
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The data do not distinguish between per se and rule-of-reason cases. After a low point
in 1990, private antitrust cases increased. Part of the increase, after 2005, may be
attributable to the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006), which
makes removal of class actions filed in state court easier, and thereby affects incentives
to rely on state or federal antitrust statutes. Moreover, after a high profile antitrust
class action is filed, other similar private antitrust claims may be filed, with the
expectation that the cases will be consolidated under the MDL rules for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings. Thus, the number of private actions claims does
not necessarily reflect distinct antitrust violations. The number of consolidated MDL
antitrust class actions has remained fairly constant, averaging 8.6 per year between
1998 and 2007. AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 24, at 228-29.
409 Overall, the annual number of filed private federal antitrust claims is declining
relative to the federal court's civil docket: federal antitrust claims have declined by about
two-thirds, from 1.2 percent in 1977 to 0.4 percent in 2007 of the total number of civil
claims filed in federal court. AAI TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 24, at 228. Of the
1,319,565 civil actions filed in federal district court between September 2000 and 2004,
only 3,921 cases (0.3%) involved federal antitrust claims. Judicial Business of the United
States Courts 2004, Table C-2A, U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, by
Nature of Suit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 2000 Through
2004, availableat http'/www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/c2a.pdf.
410

See, e.g., ABA

SECTION

OF ANTITRUST

LAW,

BUSINESS TORTS AND UNFAIR

COMPETITION HANDBOOK, at xiii-xiv (2d ed. 2006) (noting shift in prominence of state

business tort claims and federal antitrust claims); A. Michael Ferrill & James K.
Spivey, Clearing The Sylvania Hurdle: Developments in Business Torts and Dealer
Termination, 11 FALL ANTITRUST 5 (1996) (observing that, as with other traditional
antitrust claims, "dealer complaints are increasingly being brought under state law tort
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A second adverse effect on antitrust enforcement and competition is
the potential loss of protection for consumers and smaller competitors.
Unfortunately, an independent judiciary and the rule of law may be
their only protections.4 11 Powerful firms may not need judicial redress
for any antitrust violations.4 12 After all, "where force can be used, law
is not needed."4 13 Entrants with potentially innovative technologies
may lack comparable means of self-preservation414 and be foreclosed
theories," given availability of punitive damages, which "may far surpass treble
damages available under antitrust laws," more receptive state courts, and "with
infusion of economic theory into antitrust law . . .business torts often are easier to
explain to jury, and ultimately to prove"); A. Michael Ferrill, Survey of Antitrust
Practitioners on the Interplay Between Antitrust & Business Tort Claims in Private
Litigation, 59 ANTITRUST LJ. 389, 398-99 (1991) (conveying responses of surveyed
plaintiff attorneys); William L. Jaeger, New Tools for the Plaintiffin the 1990s, 4 SPG
ANTITRUST 4 (1990) (noting "[c]onsigning state claims to second class status in an
antitrust case may not be the wisest move for plaintiffs, in view of the increasing
hostility of the federal courts to antitrust claims, and the eagerness of some courts to
dismiss antitrust claims on summary judgment motions."); Harvey I. Saferstein, supra
note 403, at 379 (describing perceived increase in state law tort claims and
simultaneous decline in federal antitrust claims). I was unable to identify the number
of business tort claims filed in the past 20 years (even with this number, it would be
difficult to determine the number of business tort claims that substituted for antitrust
claims). The number of tort cases overall filed in 30 surveyed states declined 21
percent between 1996 and 2005. R. LAFOUNTAIN ET AL., EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE
COURTS, 2006: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATISTICS PROJECT 13
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ncsconline.org/D-Research/csp/2006-files/
CaseloadTrends.pdf.
...As the World Bank found for developing countries, "the primary beneficiaries of
well-functioning commercial courts are new, small firms unaffiliated with either
private business groups or the state, run by those who do not necessarily have
established social connections." WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 119.
412 Instead, if other competitors victimized them, firms with market power would
favor increasing the barriers for challenging anticompetitive behavior. If the fringe
firm were an annoyance, the dominant firm may resort to quicker, lower cost means
to resolve their disputes, such as venturing with the fringe firm to increase
mechanisms to punish unwanted behavior, retaliating with anticompetitive measures,
or lobbying the government for relief.
413 In addressing the Spartans, the Athenians were responding to their reputation
of being litigious, as they resolved their contractual disputes with their allies through
the courts. They noted the irony that an individual's "indignation, it seems, is more
excited by legal wrong than by violent wrong; the first looks like being cheated by an
equal, the second like being compelled by a superior." THUCYDIDES, THE LANDMARK
THUCYDIDES:

A

COMPREHENSIVE

GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN

WAR

44 (Robert B.

Strassler ed., Richard Crawley trans., 1996).
414 See WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 119 ( "Studies on commercial litigation in
Italy, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Ukraine and Vietnam show that newly created
private enterprises, which do not have established supplier and customer networks or
significant market power, are most likely to resort to the use of commercial courts.
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from the market, which is troubling under an evolutionary economic
perspective.415 Indeed, a profit-maximizing competitor should opt for
litigation, when it represents the least costly or only remaining
alternative. 16 The drafters of the Sherman Act recognized the
inherent difficulties in challenging dominant firms' anticompetitive
To encourage victims to challenge dominant firms'
practices.
anticompetitive behavior, the federal antitrust laws mandate that the
successful plaintiffs recover three times their actual damages, the cost
of their suit, and reasonable attorney's fees.417 But the judicially
created rule of reason makes these statutory incentives less appealing.
Plaintiffs under the rule of reason still face the uncertainty of whether
they will ever prevail for their antitrust injuries and must bear the
upfront costs of expert and legal fees to wage their crusade.4 1
Third, the Court's choice of rules will affect future market behavior
(and its future rules). As Nobel laureate economist Douglass North
notes, "How the game is actually played is a consequence of the formal
structure [e.g., formal rules, including those set by the government],
the informal institutional constraints [e.g., societal norms and
conventions], and the enforcement characteristics. "419 A market's
performance characteristics are a function of these institutional
constraints. The rules will define the opportunity set in the economy.
"Changing the [game's] rules" can lead to "different outcomes."42 If
the institutional constraints reward (or are indifferent to)
monopolization, monopolies will be the likely outcome in markets
conducive to monopolization.4 21 "The ideal economic model," unlike
the current rule of reason, "comprises a set of economic institutions

Older, especially state-owned, enterprises are often able to settle disputes out of
court.").
415 Stucke, supra note 187, at 984-87.
4 16

RIC-ARD POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 447-48 (2d ed. 1977);

J.

Mark

Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and Institutional
Barriersto Litigation inJapan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 606 (1985).
'417
15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006); see generally Harry First, The Case for Antitrust Civil
Penalties, NYU Law & Economics Research Paper No. 08-38; NYU School of Law,
Public Law Research Paper No. 08-43, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1162353.
418 For example, a survey of the 40 percent of successful private antitrust actions
found that plaintiffs recovered at least $18-$20 billion for their injuries, nearly half of
which came from 15 cases that did not follow actions by federal, state or EU competition
authorities. Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. David, Benefits from Private Antitrust
Enforcement: An Analysis of Forty Cases, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 879, 891-93 (2008).
419 NORTH, supra note 2, at 52.
420 Kerber, supra note 268, at 16.
421 See NORTH, supra note 2, at 50.
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that provide incentives for individuals and organizations to engage in
productive activity. "422
Fourth, a suboptimal U.S. legal standard hinders global convergence
among enforcement agencies. "A key objective of international
cooperation between antitrust agencies is to achieve convergence as
far as possible (taking into account differences that might exist in each
jurisdiction), in rules and standards of review and remedies in order to
facilitate the conduct of business in a global marketplace," reported
the ABA Antitrust Section.4 23 "Without such cooperation, inconsistent
rules, standards, procedures and remedies can serve as an obstacle to
business investment, growth, and economic expansion by imposing
regulatory burdens that are costly or even impossible to reconcile. 424
Given the rule of reason's shortcomings under rule-of-law principles,
U.S. competition authorities have difficulty in persuading other
nations to converge to the rule of reason. They cannot plausibly argue
that convergence is feasible when the Supreme Court remains wedded
to its rule of reason; nor can the United States be of much assistance in
having other nations model their competition standards after the
United States' infirm rule-of-reason standard.425
In recent years, the Court has shown little interest in appraising its
standard's costs or the extent its standard's deficiencies discourage
productive activities. Instead, the Court simultaneously states that its
rule of reason is the prevailing standard, while using its standard's
negative effects to dismantle the antitrust scaffolding that supports, in
part, the market structure. In Billing, the Court used its standard's
deficiencies (i.e., the high risk of inconsistent outcomes) to
contravene Congress's broad savings clauses in both the Securities Act
and Securities Exchange Act, and thus further restrict antitrust
enforcement in regulated industries.426 In Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly,427 the Court cited the risk of false positives and high
discovery costs arising from its per se antitrust standard to justify
another layer of uncertainty for pleading all civil antitrust claims. This
further limits antitrust plaintiffs' judicial access:
Id. at 158; see also Kerber, supra note 268, at 15 (noting Ordoliberal concept of
shaping rules for this market game so that only quality of performance (merit)
determines "market success").
423 ABA TRANSITION REPORT, supra note 169, at 16.
424 Id.
425 An amorphous legal standard for some developing competition authorities can
also hinder enforcement and foster corruption. Id. at 18.
426 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S.Ct. 2383, 2399 (2007).
427 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-66 (2007).
422
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Experience with litigating many 12(b)(6) motions, including
through appeals, has shown problems enough under preTwombly pleading standards. It could take 4 or 5 years to
reach the point of establishing that the complaint states a
claim. What will lawyers and judges talk about under
[Twombly's] "plausibility" test? The test seems completely
subjective, judge-by-judge. It will be as so many Rorschach
blots, with self-same complaints interpreted differently by each
viewer. Even now, motions to dismiss commonly assert that
the complaint 'does not sufficiently allege * * *.' This has

To say that pleading
almost become a legal standard.
much advance the
not
does
requirements are 'contextual'
428
inquiry or practice.
Such increased procedural formalism will have rule-of-law
implications. As one study found, it can bring "extreme costs and
delays, unwillingness by potential participants to use the court system,
and ultimately injustice."4 29
Finally, the Court's reliance on its rule of reason weakens its
remaining per se rules,4 30 which are critical in the DOJ's criminal
428 CIVIL RULES MINUTES, supra note 7, at 34. Because the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are transsubstantive, Twombly generates ambiguity on the extent to which
pleading standards now vary in civil litigation. Although Sherman Act violations can
be civilly or criminally prosecuted, one district court refused to apply Twombly's
heightened pleading requirements for a criminal indictment alleging a section 1
violation. United States v. Northcutt, No. 07-60220-CR, 2008 WL 162753, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Jan. 16, 2008). Depending how courts apply Twombly, the United States may bear
a lower pleading burden when seeking to incarcerate defendants (and fully deprive
their liberty), than when seeking to enjoin certain behavior through a civil action.
429 An analysis of legal procedures triggered by resolving two specific disputes eviction of a nonpaying tenant and collection of bounced check - in 109 countries
found lower procedural formalism in the richer countries, and greater procedural
formalism in civil law countries (especially French civil law countries). Formalism was
"nearly universally associated with lower survey measures of the quality of legal system,
including judicial efficiency, access to justice, honesty, consistency, impartiality,
fairness, and even human rights." Djankov et al., supra note 193, at 36-37.
430 Expert Masonry, Inc. v. Boone County, 440 F.3d 336, 343 (6th Cir. 2006). But
distinguishing restraints that warrant application of the per se rule from those that
qualify for rule-of-reason analysis is not always easy or straightforward. As courts have
taken a more explicitly economic approach to antitrust, the old distinction between
per se and rule-of-reason analysis has lost some of its former clarity, resulting in the
advent of the so-called "quick look" approach wherein the court must decide, in close
cases, whether a restraint is facially anticompetitive before applying either per se or
rule of reason analysis. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779 (1999)
("[Olur categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like
'per se,' 'quick look,' and 'rule of reason' tend to make them appear . .. [;]'there is
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enforcement against hard-core cartels.43' In Leegin, the Court further
muddled the distinction between its standards.432 An agreement
between competitors to fix prices or allocate markets is per se illegal,
regardless of the means employed. The agreement itself, not the
means employed (whether by RPM or allocating exclusive territories
to each conspirator), is determinative.43 3 But the Court opined that if
the cartel agrees to use RPM to fix prices, then its agreement "would
have to be held unlawful under the rule of reason. '434 This makes no
sense. If the agreement has to be held unlawful (regardless of the
defenses or defendants' lack of market power), then the Court has
reverted to per se illegality, and rule-of-reason analysis no longer
applies. The Court's Leegin comment has already caused confusion.435
The Article thus far discussed the rule of reason's significant
infirmities under rule-of-law principles and how those infirmities
affect competition policy. But to complete the analysis, the next Part
considers attendant risks when orientating antitrust standards toward
rule-of-law principles.
IIl.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE RULE OF LAW

Even though antitrust's rule of reason suffers many deficiencies
under rule-of-law principles, it does not automatically follow that the
standard is deficient. The rule of law, like antitrust, is not an end, but
a means to achieve some greater moral and social interest. For
example, if a law permits torturing another nation's citizens, the law's
application (although consistent with rule-of-law principles) is
inconsistent with greater moral and social norms. Even as a means,
the ideals underlying the rule of law can be approached, but not
often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason analysis,' since 'considerable
inquiry into market conditions' may be required before the application of any socalled 'per-se' condemnation is justified.").
431

See Brief of Amicus for the United States at 30, Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S.

1 (2006) (Nos. 04-805 & 04-814), 2005 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 598, at *45
("Effective criminal prosecution of hardcore cartel conduct - such as horizontal price
fixing, bid rigging, and market allocation - would be immensely more difficult if
defendants were permitted to complicate jury trials with extended arguments about
the reasonableness of such practices.").
432 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S.Ct. 2705, 2717 (2007).
... United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
"I Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2717.
431 See Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 225
(3d Cir. 2008) (holding rule-of-reason analysis applies even when "plaintiff alleges
that purpose of vertical agreement between manufacturer and its dealers is to support
illegal horizontal agreements between multiple dealers").
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perfected.4 36 Drafting, administering, and learning specific rules, as
the thicket of tax codes attests, can be Costly. 437 Thus, the marginal
costs (in comparison to the marginal benefits) in approaching the
rule-of-law principles must be considered.438
The Rule of Law Must Account for the Law's Development and
Growth

A.

A rigid conception of the rule of law does not account for the origin
of a common law cause of action. For example, a prima facie
intentional tort represents the tort at its infancy; weighing and
unpredictability are at their zenith.4 39 In each case, the fact-finder
balances afresh the litigants' conflicting interests in light of society's
social and economic interests generally."0 As that cause of action
matures, there is less need for such balancing." Over time, legal rules
replace or limit the factors to be balanced. 4 2 As it develops, a tort is
formalized with specific elements. The defendant's interests are
protected by established privileges, with their individual attributes set
by legal rules." 3
The legal rule, once developed, represents the existing order. But
even developed law remains dynamic. One can consider the rule of
law as complete when each new case is decided. Each case's relation
If a new legal
to the whole gives an individual case its significance.'
436

Fallon, supra note 173, at 9.

...See William Klein, Criteriafor Good Laws of Business Association, 2 BERKELEY
Bus. LJ. 13, 24 (2005).
438 See Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule of Law Orthodoxy 32 (Carnegie
at
available
2002),
30,
No.
Paper
Working
Endowment,
http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/wp30.pdf.
439 Tortfeasors, "who intentionally cause injury to another," are liable if their
conduct "is generally culpable and not justifiable under the circumstances."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 870 (1979). Only a few states recognize a prima
facie tort as an independent cause of action, but it serves as a useful analytical
framework on a tort's evolutionary development. See id. § 870 cmt. a.
0 Id. § 870 cmt. c.

Id. § 870 cmt. d ("The more mature the stage of development" of the tort, "the
more definite the contours of the tort and of the privileges that may be defenses to it.").
442 Id. § 870 cmt. c ("[There is] no need of using the balancing process afresh for
each case in which an established tort exists; and the task is merely to apply the legal
rules to the facts.").
"'

443 Id.

44 T.S. ELIOT, The Function of Criticism, in SELECTED ESSAYS 1917-1932, at 12, 12
(1932). In discussing relation of new to old in art, Eliot noted: "The existing order is
complete before the new work arrives; for order to persist after the supervention of
novelty, the whole existing order must be, if ever so slightly, altered; and so the
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case is similar to an old case and conforms to current legal
conventions, it, like any replica of past works, is soon forgotten. An
attorney may seek to distinguish through a trifling difference her
client's ordinary case from the existing order. But these ordinary cases
are dispensed with ease; their treatment more closely approximates the
rule-of-law ideals. Indeed, an affront to the rule of law occurs when
ordinary cases are treated as if they are extraordinary. Rather than an
affront to the rule of law, a novel legal case represents the law's
incremental growth. In other words, a rule-of-reason standard must
apply at the margins of any rule of law to respond flexibly with various
alternatives and resolve novel problems that continually emerge over
time." 5 A novel case readjusts the relations, proportions, and values
of each legal precedent toward the whole, and thus becomes part of
the whole.446
Absent this safety valve, the law becomes contorted. For example,
Congress, in debating the hearsay exceptions under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, expressed concern that without such a pressure release namely a residual hearsay exception - frustrated judges would
contort the existing hearsay exceptions to admit probative hearsay that
had guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to, or greater than, the
guarantees reflected by the enumerated exceptions." 7 Antitrust's per
relations, proportions, values of each work of art toward the whole are readjusted; and
this is conformity between the old and the new." Id.
15
See NORTH, supra note 2, at 154. For example, one study of the economic loss
rule doctrine ("ELR") in 465 state appellate court decisions between 1970 and 2005
found the following pattern. In the survey's first 20 years, courts increasingly
accepted the ELR. But in its last 10 years, courts moved away from strictly applying
the ELR and more frequently invoked its generalized (and sometime idiosyncratic)
exceptions. As the study's authors conclude, "[a]lthough the ELR is quite widely
accepted, the law does not come to a rest, and states continue experimentation, often
in ways inconsistent with the ELR and its generally recognized exceptions.
Experience slows this experimentation down, as one would expect, but not
completely." Anthony Niblett et al., The Evolution of a Legal Rule 37 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13856, 2008), available at http://ssrn.coml
abstract=1 114941.
4, What if most cases are unique, rather than common? This is unsurprising
when the common law cause of action is at its infancy. If, after a century of
jurisprudence, most cases remain novel, then the legal standard acts, not as a
terminus, but a springboard for the court's fancy. In that event, the legal standard is
badly in need of reform.
...Tension exists between two themes underlying the evidentiary rules: the need
for uniformity and predictability versus flexibility (given the variety of cases where the
Rules apply). The hearsay exceptions were "designed to take full advantage of the
accumulated wisdom and experience of the past in dealing with hearsay." FED. R.
EVID. 803(24) advisory committee's note, reprinted in II MOORE'S FEDERAL RULES
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se rules, however, have no parallel residual exception. Consequently,
courts became dissatisfied with the standard's imposition of liability
for competitively neutral or procompetitive behavior. To find for
defendant, courts began torturing the definition of the term
"agreement" under section 1 of the Sherman Act." 8 For example,
But the Advisory Committee thought it
2008 § 807.411] (2007).
"presumptuous to assume that all possible desirable exceptions to the hearsay rule
have been catalogued and to pass the hearsay rule to oncoming generations as a closed
system." Id. The Committee wanted to leave some room for evidentiary law to
develop. The House Judiciary Committee, however, deleted the catch-all, instead
favoring uniformity. It thought the catch-all injected "too much uncertainty" into
evidentiary law and impaired practitioners' ability to prepare for trial. Id. § 807.4[3].
The House Judiciary Committee believed that hearsay exceptions should grow by
amendments to the Rules, not on a case-by-case basis. Id. The Senate Judiciary
Committee disagreed: Without a safety valve, courts will shoehorn certain hearsay
into the existing exceptions, rendering them "tortured beyond any reasonable
circumstances which they were intended to include (even if broadly construed)." Id. §
807.4[4]. Exceptional circumstances may arise where the court finds the hearsay to
have guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to, or greater than, the guarantees
reflected by the enumerated exceptions. This evidence should be properly admissible.
But the Senate was concerned that a broad hearsay exception offering too much
flexibility could "emasculate the hearsay rule and the recognized exceptions or vitiate
the rationale behind codification of the rule." Id. So the Senate offered a compromise:
provide the courts some flexibility for the exceptional circumstance, but not enough
to authorize major judicial revisions of the hearsay rule, which is best accomplished
by legislative action.
441 Pre-Sylvania, courts generally construed vertical agreements liberally. Anything
by the manufacturer beyond a simple statement of discounting policy and subsequent
termination would likely constitute an "agreement." The Court had a "narrow
channel" for manufacturers under United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg., 277 F.2d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1960);
PITOFSKY, supra note 101, at 684. Leading up to, and post-Sylvania, courts began
construing "agreement" narrowly. Sylvania adopted the Chicago-school economic
doctrine that manufacturers have strong legitimate business interest in maintaining
prices to foster services and curb free-riders. Thus, evidence of pricing suggestions,
persuasion, conversations, arguments, exposition or pressure no longer meant an
.agreement." See, e.g., Garment Dist., Inc. v. Belk Stores Servs., Inc., 799 F.2d 905,
909 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that "regardless of whether competitor's complaints were
mere expressions of dismay or constitute economic duress, coercion, and threats, the
terminated distributor must still present additional evidence that the manufacturer
and another distributor acted in concert to set or maintain prices"). Some courts
required plaintiff to show that the manufacturers used "coercion" on retailers to
comply with suggested prices. Part of this was attributable to commercial realities, as
manufacturers' need to communicate with its retailers about its product's sales.
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1984). But the
tortured definition of agreement for vertical restraints was also attributable to the
reality that finding an "agreement" determined liability. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 n.14 (1977) (noting that "many courts 'have struggled
to distinguish or limit Schwinn in ways that are a tribute to judicial ingenuity"'
PAMPHLET
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courts' interpretation of "agreement" fluctuated depending on their
attitude toward RPM's benefits and harms. 9 Similarly, the per se rule
of group boycotts announced in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores45
proved unworkable. The lower courts chafed,45' and Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & PrintingCo. provided a
safety valve.452
So too did Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, Inc.453 and NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma454 provide a safety valve for procompetitive
ventures among competitors.
Thus, the proper judicial response to the rule of reason is not more
per se tests. Although these "bright-line" tests may offer greater
predictability in the short-term, ultimately the lower courts will balk
when applying these per se standards adversely affects incentives and
competition. Nor is the Court likely to discover the optimal per se
rule to apply across industries.
It is a misconception then that under the rule of law, the rules
"become so fixed and rigid that they are difficult or impossible to
change" and thus "necessarily become[] a clog upon national
'
The rule of law
development, an incentive to revolutionary reform."455
must incorporate a mechanism to provide the judiciary enough
flexibility for the exceptional and novel circumstance, but not enough to
authorize major judicial revisions of the rule, which is best accomplished
by the more democratically accountable legislative process.

(quoting Stanley D. Robinson, Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
243, 272 (1975)); see Arthur, supra note 24, at 351; Flynn, supra note 24, at 627.
4" See supra note 448 and accompanying text.
450 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959) (holding that group boycotts among competitors are
per se illegal even if lower prices ensue or boycott temporarily stimulates competition
because group boycotts fell within category of restraints which by their nature were
unduly restrictive and accordingly condemned under common law and Sherman Act).
151
See, e.g., Larry V. Muko Inc. v. Sw. Pa. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 670
F.2d 421, 429-31 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Though Kor's appears flatly to proscribe group
boycotts, whatever their form or function, courts and commentators alike continue to
resist the notion that all concerted refusals to deal fall automatically as per se
violations of the antitrust laws.").
452 472 U.S. 284, 285 (1985) (stating that group boycotts are evaluated under rule
of reason unless plaintiff shows that defendants possess market power or exclusive
access to business element essential to effective competition (i.e., boycott cuts off
access to supply, facility, or market necessary to enable boycotted firm to compete)).
453 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
45 See 468 U.S. 85, 113-15 (1984).
451 Frederic R. Coudert, Certaintyand Justice, 14 YALE LJ. 361, 362 (1905).
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The Rule of Law Does RequireJudges to Centrally Plan

One criticism of Justice Scalia's conception of the rule of law is that
it encourages the judge to anticipate future cases where the rule might
be thought problematic and to dispose of them in advance.45 6 In other
words, the court legislates with a rule of law. A French Minister of
Justice noted a century ago,
The more the intellectual domain of humanity is enlarged, the
more the development of industry and of science diversify forms
of production and forms of property, the greater the political
ascendancy of the proletariat tends to cause a recognition by
society of new rights and of contracts heretofore unknown, the
less can it be pretended that a code can contain and hem in the
4 7
powerful movements of a nation's life.
The law cannot anticipate every anticompetitive act.
But an
unworkable rules-based system does not mean a principles-based
system is the sole alternative. Labeling a complex regulatory system as
either a rules- or principles-based system is too simplistic.4 58 Instead,
an effective regulatory system is a combination of both. A purely
principles-based approach is unworkable. Professor Hayek, among
others, eschewed intervening on a case-by-case basis with ex post,
totality-of-economic-circumstances standards. Instead, he advocated
effecting economic policy through ex ante rules applying to general
situations.41 9 The more the state plans, the more often its actions are
decided on the full circumstances of the particular moment; the less
predictable or transparent the state becomes, and the more difficult
planning becomes for the individual.4 6 °
On the other hand, relying on a myriad of specific behavioral
prohibitions is suboptimal. Human behavior is hardly uniform in
various contexts and thus does not often admit to simple predictive
rules. Antitrust law cannot anticipate every socially undesirable
anticompetitive action. Nor can a rule be self-contained to foreclose
the novel cases. In those cases, the drafter assumes infallibility: The
rule directs future action, but is incapable of being altered by the
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term - Foreword: The Justices
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 87 (1992).
451 Coudert, supra note 455, at 370-71.
451 Indeed, a tight statutory rule (as the Court originally construed the Sherman
Act) can later be judicially transformed into a vague standard. Cunningham, supra
note 16, at 1442-43.
411 Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 178, at 220.
460 See HAYEK, supra note 176, at 114.
456
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present. Instead, events overtake the myriad specific rules.46 These
self-contained rules then become slalom poles for counsel, leading to
absurd results (and a distortion of resources).
Myriad rules are also difficult to internalize. 462 Without an
underlying moral or social principle, the law becomes unintelligible.
It invites rent-seekers to secure statutory exceptions. "63 These specialinterest exceptions cannot strike a discordant note because the rules
themselves are not in harmony. Moral or social principles, however,
can provide context, and thereby unify the myriad rules. A vague
standard may then be preferable to specific, but suboptimal, rules.46
Antitrust need not digress into a binary approach, seeking either a
rules- or principles-based system. Instead, antitrust law should blend
rules with general principles to enhance predictability for ordinary
cases while preserving flexibility for novel restraints. 465 The Court
should articulate specific rules that further antitrust's general
principles, while maintaining the rule of reason for novel cases. The
workability of this tandem can be tested, in part, by the percentage of
cases it efficiently resolves. For example, one consumer protection

statute has specific rules on telephone directory listings for florists,466

but its continued relevancy exists in the law's general prohibitions on
unfair or deceptive acts. 4 67 The specific rule for florist listings
I"

The initial sections of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act contain general

prohibitions. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104(b)(1) (2008) ("Falsely passing off
goods or services as those of another."). Later sections become idiosyncratic. See, e.g.,
id. § 47-18-104(b)(29) (prohibiting advertisements that business is "going out of
business" more than 90 days before business ceases to operate); id. § 47-18104(b)(36)(C) (requiring certain disclosures be printed in not less than 10-point type).
462 If humans plan actions according to the law, one simple way is to internalize
the norm. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OFJURISPRUDENCE 48 (1999) ("Standards
that capture lay intuitions about right behavior (for example, the negligence standard)
and that therefore are easy to learn may produce greater legal certainty than a network
of precise but technical, nonintuitive rules covering the same ground."); Stucke, supra
note 50, at 510-14.
4" Todd J. Zywicki, The Rule Of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity, 10 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 1, 11 (2003).
461 After Socony, some business groups lobbied for the rule of reason: "The old
Rule of Reason, if applied, would cure part of the problem, if revived, because it is
flexible - but it is also highly indefinite. Most businessmen and lawyers, even so,
prefer the flexibility of a Rule of Reason, even with its indefiniteness." BUSINESS
ADVISORY COUNCIL, EFFECTIVE COMPETITION 5 (1952).
465 See Cunningham, supra note 21, at 1435.
466 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104(b)(32) (2008)
(making act of
misrepresenting florist location Class B misdemeanor).
467 See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-18-104(a), (b)(27) (2008) (rewriting statute to
make act of misrepresenting any business person's location Class B misdemeanor).
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illustrates the application of the general principles of unfair and
deceptive practices for a specific practice in a particular industry.
IV.

TOWARD A BETTER RULE OF REASON

Although a perfectly realized rule of law may be unattainable,
antitrust standards must be reoriented toward rule-of-law ideals.
Some Chicago School adherents may disagree. They applaud the
Roberts Court's antitrust activism. But others recognize, as Professor
Handler did in the 1950s, and as the Sherman Act's evolution affirmed,
"In no branch of the law has dissent played a more significant role
than in antitrust."46' 8 Under the guise of the burgeoning "postmodern" behavioral economics literature, a more paternalistic Court
under the rule of reason could seek greater protections for irrational
consumers. 469 The new economic wisdom would obliterate the
Roberts and Rehnquist Courts' dated and empirically weak Chicago
School social policies, without necessarily improving the rule of
reason's accuracy and administrability or yielding greater consistency,
objectivity, or transparency. Consequently, this Part offers three
suggestions for reorienting antitrust's legal standards toward rule-oflaw ideals. First, the Court should refrain from announcing new
competition policies based on its perception of "modern" economic
theory, and instead return to the Sherman Act's legislative aims.
Second, the Court should endeavor to cast more intelligible standards
that are consistent with these legislative aims. Third, to assist the
Court toward that end, the U.S. competition authorities should step
up and undertake more empirical analyses to better comprehend how
markets operate and evolve.
A.

Returning to the Legislative Policies Underlying the Sherman Act

Congress never drafted the Sherman Act as a vehicle for the Court to
advance its own ideologies, nor those of certain economists. The
Court should refrain from announcing new policies based on its
perception of "modern" economic theory that run counter to the
" Handler, supra note 57, at 39.
469 For an informative discussion on the topic, see ARIELY, supra note 220; THALER

& SUNSTEIN, supra note 220; Colin F. Camerer & George Lowenstein, Behavioral
Economics: Past, Present, Future, in ADVANCES INBEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra note
220, AT 3-14; Jolls et al., supra note 220, at 1487; Prentice, supra note 220, at 1664-70.
For a broader survey of literature attacking the conventional economic theories to
which the Court's recent antitrust jurisprudence adheres, see BEINHOCKER, supra note
220, at 19-45.
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Sherman Act's originally intended and understood meaning.470 The
Court's earlier statements, such as its theory that antitrust law's
primary concern is interbrand competition, have nurtured today's
suboptimal competition policies. 471' Reckless statements, like one
suggesting that monopoly pricing is an important element of the freemarket system,"' can lead to uninformed competition policies that are
inconsistent with citizens' preferences 473 and the legislative policies
underlying the Sherman Act. To give content to the Sherman Act, the
Court should interpret the Act's "word[s] in the light of its legislative
history and of the particular evils at which the legislation was
aimed."4 74 Any trade-off or policy pronouncement should come from
Congress, rather than the democratically unaccountable judiciary.
One example, which I elaborate elsewhere,4 75 is section 2 of the
Sherman Act, which prohibits any person from monopolizing,
attempting to monopolize, or conspiring to monopolize trade or
commerce. In enacting section 2, Congress sought to preserve
economic opportunity. It neither criminalized bigness per se, nor
intended to target, as Judge Learned Hand characterized,4 76 the
Seven years after the Sherman Act's passage, the Court recognized the shortfalls
of resorting to the Act's legislative history. United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n,
166 U.S. 290, 312, 318-19 (1897). Judicial investigation of legislative history, the
Court observed, is like "looking over a crowd and picking out your friends." Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005) (citation omitted).
Nonetheless, the number of party-goers is finite, unlike the variety of possible judicial
justifications. Unlike the unstructured chatter at a party, the Court previously
discerned several important themes from the Act's legislative history. Standard Oil
Co. of NJ. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50, 52, 57, 83-84 (1911); Trans-Mo. Freight,
166 U.S. at 319.
471 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2715
(2007) ("The promotion of interbrand competition is important because 'the primary
purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect Ithis type of] competition."' (quoting State
Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997))).
472 Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
407 (2004).
473 Even if some economists share the Court's normative policies, citizens may
reject them. Some economists are agnostic on price discrimination or believe in
certain instances it is procompetitive; 91 percent of individuals in one survey thought
charging higher prices to those more dependent on the product was offensive. Daniel
Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constrainton Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,
76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 735 (1986).
174 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940).
475 Stucke, supra note 45, at 534-42; Maurice E. Stucke, How Do (and Should)
Competition Authorities Treat a Dominant Firm's Deception? (University of Tennessee
Legal Studies Research Paper 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1395076.
476 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 429-30 (2d Cir.
470
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company that unwittingly finds itself a monopoly because of its
"superior skill, foresight, and industry." Instead, Congress sought to
prohibit monopolistic practices that make "it impossible for other
persons to engage in fair competition."4

77

The widespread belief was

that the great trusts had acquired their power, in the main, through
destroying or overreaching their weaker rivals by resorting to unfair
practices.

"Congress focused not on the end" -

monopoly -

"but

the means of attaining (or maintaining) that end."478 Were the means
normatively fair (by virtue of the monopolist's superior skill in that
particular product) or unfair (actions making it impossible for other
persons to engage in fair competition with the monopoly)? Thus,
selling better products at lower prices does not make it impossible for
rivals to fairly compete. But section 2 would apply when the
monopoly gradually restricts access to a key input necessary to
compete479 or engrosses (acquires) all other persons engaged in the
same business. 480 Instead of forcing the parties and lower courts to
ramble through the wilds of economic theory, the legislative intent of
section 2 is to deter these unfair anticompetitive methods of
competition, which, at common law, includes a monopolist's
anticompetitive deception.
Some may ask whether section 2's legislative policies are too broad
to circumscribe the courts' discretion. That is not the case today as
the Court in Trinko sings hymns in praise of monopolies and
monopoly pricing, and the D.C. Circuit recently held that a

1945).
477 21 CONG. REC.

3152 (1890) (statement of Sen. Hoar).

478 Stucke, supra note 45, at 534-35.

479 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 170 (1911) (monopolies
controlling all elements essential to manufacture tobacco products, including licorice
paste); Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 422 (extracting aluminum from alumina "requires very large
amount of electrical energy, which is ordinarily, though not always, most cheaply
obtained from water power"; aluminum monopoly in securing hydroelectric power
contractually required several power companies "not to sell or let power to anyone
else for manufacture of aluminum").
48 See, e.g., Am. Tobacco, 221 U.S. at 183 (detailing how defendant tobacco
companies spent millions of dollars to purchase competitors' facilities, not with
purpose of using them, but to close them down and render them useless for purposes
of trade, and bind facilities' employees to long-term noncompete agreements). Similar
allegations were recently made against IBM. After Platform Solutions "developed

software that turned standard servers into systems that mimicked IBM's expensive
mainframes[,]" IBM purchased Platform for $150 million, and promptly terminated
Platform's innovative product. Ashlee Vance, Rivals Say I.B.M. Stifles Competition to
Mainframes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/

2009/03/23/technology/companies/23mainframe.html?ref=business.
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monopoly's use of deception to charge even higher prices is
permissible under the Sherman Act.48' Returning to the Sherman Act's
legislative policies would deter further misadventures under the rule
of reason. Any ensuing antitrust standards should be in accordance
"with the originally intended and understood meaning of the
directives of legitimate, democratically[ ]accountable lawmaking
authorities. "482
B.

Crafting More Intelligible Standards Consistent with the Sherman
Act's Principles

The Court's extreme standards (per se and rule of reason) are
unsatisfactory for evaluating many ordinary competitive restraints.
Rather than reflexively returning to ground zero - namely, the 1918
CBOT rule-of-reason factors - the Court should aim for differentiated
rules that further the Sherman Act's legislative aims, and leave the rule
of reason and per se rules for the exceptional cases.
Commonplace restraints do not merit the cumbersome rule of
reason. As several scholars have argued, in many cases, simpler is
better. This is especially true when resources are scarce and the
increased complexity leads to slight marginal social benefits.483 In
crafting more differentiated rules, the Court must consider whether
the new rule (in lieu of per se liability) reduces or increases error and
enforcement costs. The majority in Sylvania and Leegin, for example,
rejected any standard less than the full-blown rule of reason. Yet the
fact-specific rule of reason suffers from both high error and
enforcement costs. Justice White in Sylvania,484 like Justice Breyer in
Leegin,485 offered an incremental shift away from per se liability with
an intermediate standard. Their proposed standard would reduce the
481 Rambus Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (assuming that

monopolies which use deception to "obtain higher prices . . . ha[ve] no particular
tendency to exclude rivals and thus to diminish competition"); see Stucke, supra note
475 (examining D.C. Circuit's faulty arguments).
482 Fallon, supra note 173, at 38.
483 Christiansen & Kerber, supra note 178, at 229-33.
484 Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 71 (1977) (White, J.,
concurring) (proposing use of market power as screen and exception for infant
industries: "Court need only hold that a location clause imposed by a manufacturer
with negligible economic power in the product market has a competitive impact
sufficiently less restrictive than the Schwinn restraints to justify a rule-of-reason
standard, even if the same weight is given here as in Schwinn to dealer autonomy").
483 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2737 (2007)
(modifying per se rule to allow exception for more easily identifiable and temporary
condition of new entry).
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cost of error under the Court's per se rule, without imposing the high
litigation costs under the rule of reason. Even if the majority of
Justices have concerns with the intermediary standard, they cannot
assume that its shortcomings are greater than the rule of reason's.
One easy category for simpler legal standards is when the challenged
activity is both anticompetitive and independently wrongful (such as
deception). The court must weigh (or consider) the undesirable
conduct's procompetitive effects under the rule of reason. Microsoft,
as the D.C. Circuit found, deceived Java developers to maintain
illegally its monopoly.486 Even if Microsoft proffered a procompetitive
explanation for its deception (it did not), the plaintiff need not
demonstrate that lesser restrictive alternatives existed or that the
deception's anticompetitive harm outweighs its procompetitive
benefits. If the challenged conduct is both independently wrongful
conduct and reasonably appears capable of making a significant
contribution to the defendant's maintaining or attaining its monopoly,
then it violates section 2 of the Sherman Act. This legal standard
furthers section 2's purpose of deterring unfair anticompetitive
methods of competition, without the extra and unnecessary steps
required under the rule of reason.
For otherwise legal conduct, the Court can restructure its legal
standard to minimize judicial weighing. It can begin with legal
presumptions of a restraint's anticompetitive effects, based on the
available empirical evidence. One key issue (which the majority in
Leegin avoids) is the percentage of cases where RPM leads to positive
and negative effects.487 The Leegin Court fell into the "never" fallacy:
486 "Microsoft deceived Java developers regarding the Windows-specific nature of
its tools. Microsoft's tools included 'certain keywords' and 'compiler directives' that
only Microsoft's version of Java could . . . execute properly." United States v.
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Java developers thus relied upon
Microsoft's public commitment to cooperate with Sun Microsystems and used
Microsoft's tools "to develop what Microsoft led them to believe were cross-platform
applications." Id. Instead, the deceived Java developers ended up producing
applications that ran only on Microsoft's Windows operating system. Id. Although
Microsoft publicly denied the accusation, its internal documents showed the contrary:
Microsoft intended to deceive Java developers, and predicted that the effect of its
actions would be to generate Windows-dependent Java applications, and thwart Java's
threat to Microsoft's monopoly in the operating systems market. Id. at 76-77.
487 See Leegin, 127 S.Ct. at 2729 (Breyer, J.,dissenting) (opining that before
settling on rule of reason, Court should ask how often are harms or benefits likely to
occur, and "[how easy is it to separate the beneficial sheep from the antitrust
goats?"); Brief for Economists as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16, Leegin, 127
S. Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480), 2007 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 68, at *28 (noting "some
disagreement within the economics literature, and among amici, regarding the
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"Vertical agreements establishing minimum resale prices can have
either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the
circumstances in which they are formed."'
But this is also true of
horizontal agreements among competitors to fix price, 4 9 or of many
possible criminal acts, like homicide, which can be legal or illegal
depending on the surrounding circumstances. 4" The fact that at times
killing can be justifiable does not justify the assessment of guilt under
the rule of reason. The relevant issue is determining what percentage
of cases the challenged restraint results in anticompetitive (compared
to procompetitive) outcomes. If anticompetitive outcomes are more
likely (or the discounted harm is greater than the discounted benefits),
then the Court should create a legal presumption that the restraint
violates the antitrust laws. Thus, the antitrust plaintiff can establish
its prima facie case by showing that the defendant engaged in the
challenged conduct in a specified area of trade or commerce.
Antitrust defendants could overcome the presumption of
anticompetitive harm for discrete categories of business behavior. The
Court would base these categories on the existing empirical evidence
- namely, the challenged restraint in those discrete circumstances is
more likely to lead to procompetitive efficiencies than anticompetitive

frequency of minimum RPM['s] pro[-] or anticompetitive effects"); Christiansen &
Kerber, supra note 178, at 225.
4 Leegin, 127 S. Ct. at 2717.
489 "Literal" price fixing, as in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), may be benign. Defendants ASCAP and BMI, which
had nonexclusive rights to their members' copyrighted musical compositions, each
sold blanket licenses. These blanket licenses gave the licensee the right to perform any
or all compositions owned by each defendant's members as often as it desired for the
licensed term. Id. at 5. The issue before the Court was whether each defendant's
blanket license at fees negotiated by each defendant (and its members) constituted per
se illegal price fixing. Id. at 4. Although the competing musicians literally agreed to
fix the price for the blanket license, their agreement was not per se illegal. Through
their joint action, the musicians created a new product (the blanket license) that
lowered transaction costs. Id. at 22-23. Thus the blanket license was designed to
increase economic efficiency and render markets more (rather than less) competitive;
it did not facially appear to restrict competition and decrease output. Id. at 19-20.
Even "hard core" price fixing, as the Court recognized, may be competitively neutral.
Thus, even for per se violations, private plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury. Atd.
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 341 (1990).
490 Richard E. Myers II, Responding to the Time-Based Failures of the Criminal Law
Through a Criminal Sunset Amendment, 49 B.C. L. REv. 1327, 1338 (2008) ("Even
murder statutes are rife with shifting value judgments, such as the beginning and
ending of life, the status of the fetus, the criminality of assisted suicide, the basis for
reduction of murder to manslaughter, and defenses based on various medical and
psychological ailments.").
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As an example, resale price maintenance could be
effects.
An
presumptively anticompetitive (rather than per se illegal).
antitrust defendant could overcome the presumption with sufficient
evidence that RPM was reasonably necessary to achieve certain
procompetitive outcomes (such as, using RPM to combat actual freeriding or to introduce a new product). If defendant makes such a
showing, it prevails.
The Court's full-scale rule of reason, given its infirmities under the
rule of law, would then be limited to instances where the courts have
little experience with the challenged restraint. Even for the novel cases,
the lower courts' multistep rule of reason can be improved. One
improvement is to minimize contentious issues of market definition in
the rule of reason's first step. Circumstantial evidence of market power
via market definition is a weak proxy for direct evidence. If a
challenged restraint has been in force for several years, an antitrust
plaintiff should identify the restraint's anticompetitive effects. 491 To
avoid the costly and often unproductive battle of experts, market
definition would play a limited role, providing only some general
contours to the area of trade or commerce adversely affected by the
Focusing on the restraint's actual
challenged restraint.492
491 Using market share as circumstantial evidence of market power should be
relegated to those few cases where the harm is largely prospective (e.g., mergers under
section 7 or nascent anticompetitive threats). The antitrust plaintiff would establish
both the severity and probability of the alleged likely anticompetitive effects, which
the defendant can rebut with the magnitude and likelihood of procompetitive benefits.
Kolasky, supra note 284, at 88. Even here, courts should giver greater weight to
natural experiments than theoretical claims on functional interchangeability of the
products. For example, although consumers can obtain office products through
different outlets, the trial court properly focused on empirical evidence of localized
competition between the merging parties and the differences in pricing in geographic
markets when one faced competition with the other. FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F.
Supp. 1066, 1073-81 (D.D.C. 1997).
492 Indeed, the Court in CBOT noted that the challenged restraint "had no
appreciable effect on general market prices" or on output - "the total volume of grain
coming to Chicago." Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 240 (1918).
Instead, the challenged restraint had several procompetitive benefits including
increasing price transparency. Some courts appear to require the antitrust plaintiff to
prove market power with both circumstantial evidence (high market share in a
relevant antitrust market) and direct evidence (that the restraint produces significant
anticompetitive effects within that relevant product and geographic market). See, e.g.,
United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that
"government must demonstrate [both] that defendant conspirators have 'market
power' in particular market for goods or services" and "defendants' actions have had
substantial adverse effects on competition, such as increases in price, or decreases in
output or quality"). But this is cumulative. One can prove defendant's market power
with direct evidence of anticompetitive effects or circumstantially with evidence of
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anticompetitive effects leads to a second improvement to the rule of
reason - minimizing the need for judicial balancing and eliminating
the need to trade off reductions of competition in one sector for
increases in another. If the challenged conduct's net result is higher
prices and reduced output, then it is difficult to fathom what offsetting
procompetitive justifications defendants could offer.493
Even if
defendants could establish that their practice fosters competition in
another market, it is doubtful that the courts or antitrust agencies could
quantify those pro- and anticompetitive effects. These trade-offs are
beyond the judiciary's competence or authority under the Sherman Act.
The Court should also reserve its other extreme (per se liability) for
cartels and other "naked" restraints of trade long-recognized as
socially harmful. The courts, absent empirical evidence, should
hesitate in categorically condemning any other particular practice
without regard to its justification.
C.

More Empirical Analyses to Better Comprehend How Markets

Operate and Evolve
The Court cannot assume that these simpler differentiated rules will
arise independently.
Effective learning "requires accurate and
immediate feedback about the relation between the situational
'
conditions and the appropriate response."494
Such feedback is lacking
in antitrust analysis currently because:
market share in a properly defined market. An antitrust plaintiff need not prove both.
Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000).
113 Some
argue that without analyzing the justifications and considering the
relative benefits and costs, the fact-finder cannot determine whether the practice
harms consumers. Timothy J. Muris, The New Rule of Reason, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 859,
864-65 (1988).
But if the antitrust plaintiff establishes actual significant
anticompetitive effects, such as the evidence in NCAA that the challenged restraint
raised price and reduced output, then the market has signaled the net effect. (At
times, the challenged restraint may increase output and price, such as a monopolist
devising a scheme to price discriminate; whether society is better off is a normative
judgment.)
'9'Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of

Decisions, in RATIONAL

CHOICE: THE CONTRAST BETWEEN ECONOMICS

& PSYCHOLOGY 67,

90 (Richard M. Hogarth & M.W. Reder eds., 1987). Two recent business articles, for
example, highlight this information flow. Gary L. Neilson et al., The Secrets to
Successful Strategy Execution, HARV. Bus. REV., June 2008, at 61, 63 (summarizing
survey of over 20,000 people in 31 companies, among more important traits to
implement strategy are promoting information flow and feed-back of decisions'
consequences on bottom-line); Hirotaka Takeuchi et al., The Contradictions That Drive
Toyota's Success, HARV. Bus. REV., June 2008, at 96, 101 (encouraging experimentation

and learning from successes and failures).
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(i) outcomes are commonly delayed and not easily attributable
to a particular action; (ii) variability in the environment
degrades the reliability of the feed-back, especially where
outcomes of low probability are involved; (iii) there is often no
information about what the outcome would have been if
another decision had been taken; and (iv) most important
decisions are unique and therefore provide little opportunity
for learning. 9
Accordingly, this learning requires dedicated resources. The Supreme
Court and lower courts have not undertaken the empirical analysis to
promote their understanding of the impact of the antitrust standards
(and decisions) on the marketplace. Nor can they. Their view is
limited to the evidence the parties supply. Courts do not unilaterally
revisit a particular industry to assess the impact of their decision.
Nor can academia and the private bar fulfill this complex mission.
Through division of labor and increased specialization, knowledge has
dispersed in today's society. This dispersal "requires a complex
structure of institutions and organizations to integrate and apply that
knowledge." 496 Collecting information on how various markets work,
and the impact of restraints on those markets, entails high transaction
costs. Moreover, the relevant information is often nonpublic.
The U.S. competition authorities in the Obama administration
should now undertake this empirical testing and learning. Unlike
private litigants who are concerned with prevailing and promoting
their parochial interests, the competition authorities are acting on the
citizens' behalf. Their role should be less ideological and more
objective. To assist the Court in crafting the proper legal standard for
the challenged restraint, one would reasonably expect the competition
authorities to rely on their recent empirical analyses. But any
empirical analysis undertaken by either the FTC or DOJ over the past
twenty years in support of RPM's costs and benefits was conspicuously
absent from the United States' amicus brief in Leegin.49 7 Consequently,
... Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 494, at 90.
496 NORTH,

supra note 2, at 99.

497 Justice Breyer in Leegin noted that "both Congress and the FTC, unlike courts,

are well-equipped to gather empirical evidence outside the context of a single case. As
neither has done so, we cannot conclude with confidence that the gains from
eliminating the per se rule will outweigh the costs." Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2737 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting). The United
States' amicus brief, however, does mention in one string citation a 1984 FTC study
(but offers no elaboration as to its findings), and makes three brief references to a
1983 FTC study. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
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to assist the courts in determining the proper legal standard for
evaluating certain restraints, the federal antitrust agencies first must
better comprehend how markets operate and evolve.4 9 This requires
more empirical analysis on the agencies' part. 99
CONCLUSION

"Although we are accustomed to think of antitrust as part of our
statutory law," observed Professor Handler, "actually all of its
doctrines, both before and since 1890, are the creation of judges. '"500
Over time, while those doctrines have battled for supremacy, their
meaning has remained elusive. After the Court replaced its original
literal construction of the Sherman Act with the rule of reason, that
standard never evolved to something workable or consistent with ruleof-law ideals.
As Justice Scalia observed, by adopting a "totality of circumstances
test" to explain its decision, the court "is not so much pronouncing
the law in the normal sense as engaging in the less exalted function of
fact-finding. 50 1 This might be appropriate for cases at the margins,50 2
or a prima facie tort. But it should not be the "usual" standard for a
statute on the books for over a century. Indeed, Justice Scalia
recognized, as did his brethren in the 1960s and 1970s, that the
totality-of-economic-circumstances standard "is, in a way, a
regrettable concession of defeat - an acknowledgment that we have
passed the point where 'law,' properly speaking, has any further

Petitioner at 14, 20 nn.2-3, Leegin, 127 S.Ct. 2705 (No. 06-480), 2007 U.S. S. Ct.
Briefs LEXIS 29, at *26, *35 (citing RONALD N. LAFFERTY ET AL., IMPACT EVALUATIONS
OF FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION VERTICAL RESTRAINTS CASES (1984) [hereinafter 1984
FTC Study], and THOMAS R. OVERSTREET, JR., RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: ECONOMIC
THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (1983)). In contrast to the Bush administration's
amicus brief in Leegin, the 1984 FTC Study rejected the application of the rule of

reason to RPM, which would likely increase "business uncertainty, litigation costs,
and judicial application error." 1984 FTC Study at 41-42. Rather than a per se or
rule-of-reason standard, the Study proposed a legal policy that allows manufacturers
to select dealers on the basis of quality and to allow RPM for new entry. Id. at 44-45.
Given the changes in the retail sector, with the growth of mass merchandisers and the
Internet, more recent empirical analysis is warranted.
498 Stucke, supra note 44, at 579-86.
9 See Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, GLOBAL COMPETITION PoL'Y MAG.,
Jan. 2009, at 2, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323815.
500 Handler, supra note 57, at 21.
501 Scalia, supra note 199, at 1180-81.
502 Id. at 1181.
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application. , 50 3 If the Court is regressing to the Sherman Act's infancy,
indeed going beyond the common law legal presumptions, then Justice
"equality of treatment is difficult to
Scalia's fears are realized:
demonstrate and, in a multitiered judicial system, impossible to
judicial arbitrariness is facilitated;
achieve; predictability is destroyed;
5 4
judicial courage is impaired.

0

The Court's outdated dichotomy of rule of reason and per se
illegality leads to a feast or famine mentality for litigants. When
reverting to rule of reason, the Leegin Court understood the likely
outcry. Yet it never assessed its standard's failures or explored an
intermediate standard consistent with the Sherman Act's principles.
Despite a century of litigation experience with the Sherman Act, the
Court can only offer the weary Sisyphus the promise that its rule of
reason one day may transform into something better. Future courts
perhaps can "devise rules over time for offering proof, or even
presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and
efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote
procompetitive ones." 50 5 Future courts one day might "establish the

litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate
anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more
guidance to businesses. "506 Until then, businesses, consumers, and
lower courts are stuck with the Court's rule of reason.

503

Id. at 1182.

504

Id.

1o Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007).
Id. at 2709.

506

